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EDITOR'S NOTE
Everyone is abuzz with Millennium Fever, but here at the
Water Law Review we are looking head-on at 1999, as it represents
the 30th Anniversary of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969. This issue of the Water Law Review
offers differing perspectives on the statutory scheme that governs the
allocation of Colorado's arguably most precious resource: "white
gold,.... nectar of the gods," water. We are pleased to present the 1969
Water Right Determinationand Administration Act Symposium.
A particular statement remains one of the West's most oftcited mantras, that "whisky is for drinking and water is for fighting
over," and we hope that this issue of the Water Law Review remains
true to that mantra, at least intellectually. The Symposium articles
predict, review, disagree, agree, critique, and praise. They present the
opportunity to explore in-depth, after its first thirty years, our water
rights allocation system, the only system in the country that allocates
water rights by adjudication. The lead article, a history of the 1969
Act, provides the landscape upon which this exploration necessarily
must occur. The subsequent articles provide an overview of many of
Colorado's water allocation issues: the right to water as a public
resource, the need for healthy aquatic ecosystems, the struggle
between water for the Western Slope and the Eastern Slope, and the
establishment of water supplies for our ever-growing state population.
When reading the Symposium articles, notice that the whole is
far more than the sum of its parts; the parts, when assembled, exhibit
emergent properties.
See if they lead you to question your
paradigmatic impression of water allocation in Colorado. Perhaps
intersecting water quality and water quantity issues makes sense.
Perhaps exempt wells pose a problem for water right administration.
Perhaps it is time to buck the traditional adjudication system. Perhaps
basin-of-origin protections are logical and fair. Regardless of how
you feel about these possibilities, we hope this issue provides food for
thought.
The Water Law Review staff hopes you enjoy this issue,
which, along with all of our previous issues, would not be possible
without the kindness and generosity of the Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation. The Water Law Review would like to thank the
Foundation for its generous support of our journal, both financial and
advisory. The Foundation has been one of our greatest advocates
since we commenced publication in the Fall of 1997. We would not
be where we are today without its help and without the advice and
guidance of its members.
Amy W. Beatie
Editor-in-Chief

FELIX LARRY SPARKS

IN TRIBUTE
Mr. Felix Larry Sparks has led a remarkable life. He was born and
raised in Miami, Arizona, a town where three mining companies employed
one hundred percent of the working population. At the onset of the
Depression, the companies closed, leaving all jobless and some homeless.
Mr. Sparks' family supplemented what food they had with government

provided staples-flour, lard, salt pork, oranges, grapefruit, and dried beans.
Right after high school and amidst the Depression, Mr. Sparks hopped trains
to travel the country in search of a job, leaving his family and home. He had
eighteen dollars to his name which his father had borrowed from a neighbor.
After spending some time in Corpus Christi, Texas, looking for a job, he
headed to California hearing there was work there. Upon arriving in
California, he did not have a cent left and had been sleeping in parks.
Walking down Market Street in San Francisco, Mr. Sparks encountered an
army recruiting sergeant who asked him if he wanted to join the army.
Surprising even himself, Mr. Sparks said yes. The officer gave him streetcar
fare and directions to the dock where the boat to Angel Island arrived to pick
up new recruits. At that time, the building of the Golden Gate Bridge had
just begun. That was only the beginning of Mr. Sparks' military service, a
service marked by unusually young promotions, liberation of a World War II
concentration camp, a number of injuries, and innovation.
He was by no means your ordinary enlisted man-early on in his
military career, he was an entrepreneur. While stationed in Hawaii at Fort
Kamehameha, Mr. Sparks constructed and ran his army base's photo lab
with virtually no experience (other than having read a how-to book), but
with persuasion, a loan from the base's Post Exchange, and enough demand
to keep him working until three o'clock in the morning, eventually needing
to hire three additional soldier-employees. When his enlistment ended, he
sold the business to his employees and arrived back in Arizona with "a
bundle of cash for those days."
Mr. Sparks completed undergraduate work at the University of
Arizona. He also enrolled in law school there, where, after enrolling for his
second semester, he received notice he had been drafted. This stint in the
military took him to Europe for World War II. In total, he spent forty years
of his life in active and reserve service for the United States Army. He is a
veteran of eight campaigns in the European Theater during World War II
with the 45th Infantry Division. When he retired, he had achieved the rank
of Brigadier General. For his service, he was awarded the Silver Star with
Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit, the Army Commendation Medal, the
Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Combat Infantry Badge, and the
French Croix de Guerre.
After the end of World War II, Mr. Sparks enrolled at the University
of Colorado at Boulder's law school in order to finish his law degree,
receiving his LL.B. in 1948. His past professional experiences include
serving as a senior partner in the Delta, Colorado, law firm of Sparks,
Conklin & Carroll; District Attorney for the 7th Judicial District of
Colorado; Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court; Director of the Colorado
Department of Natural Resources and the Colorado Water Conservation
Board; Colorado Commissioner for both the Upper Colorado River Compact
Commission and the Arkansas River Compact Commission; and legal
counsel for the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe.
It is with pleasure that the Water Law Review dedicates this issue to
Mr. Sparks. For an in depth examination of Mr. Sparks' career in water law,
see the Practitioner'sPerspective section of this issue.
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When you've walked a long time on the floor of a river,
And up the steps and into the different rooms,
You know where the hills are going, you can feel them,
The far blue hills dissolving in luminous water,
The solvent mountains going home to the oceans.
Even when the river is low and clear,
And the waters are going to sleep in the upper swales,
You can feel the particles of the shining mountains
Moping against your ankles toward the sea.'
+ Justice Hobbs authored a prior article appearing in the Water Law Review.
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 1 (1997). His experience with the 1969 Act commenced when he became a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General in January of 1975 and extended to his private
practice before taking the oath of office as a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
on May 1, 1996.
1. Thomas Hornsby Ferril, Time of Mountains, in

119, 122 (Alison Hawthorne Deming ed., 1996).
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THE LAY OF THE LAND

The Great Divide is the great reality of Colorado, the mother of
many rivers-the Platte (North and South), the Republican, the
Arkansas, the Rio Grande, and the Colorado complex (San Juan,
Dolores, Gunnison, Colorado, White, and Yampa)-and so many
tributaries magnifying them.
The authors of the Water Right Determination and Administration
Act of 1969' ("the 1969 Act") felt the many rivers powerfully. Like
Thomas Hornsby Ferril, they walked uphill into them from boundary
to source. They explored their currents' resistance but resisted the
temptation to settle for less than the fullest exploration they could
muster. They summitted. From the Divide they could clearly see the
lay of the land. From the cirques and seeps of the high range they saw
the waters form and flow like the fingers of two hands extending from
the spine of the earth's body towards two great oceans. Schooled in
the long climb and inspired by vistas, they resolved to have Colorado
water adjudication and administration track the contours of its major
watersheds.
At least one early visionary had called for political boundaries and
water jurisdictions to match watersheds. In 1889, addressing the
Montana constitutional convention, John Wesley Powell unsuccessfully
proposed that Montana employ divisions between hydrographic basins
when establishing county boundaries for the new state. Powell felt
this would make political and economic unity possible. Within a
drainage basin, the controlling element of water could tie together
timber, grazing, and agriculture. The state could establish local selfgovernment within each basin; the federal government could cede to
the basin-county entities all the public lands within its limits; and
locally elected water-masters could establish water rights within those
limits, enforceable by local courts.4
Powell arrived both too late and too early for Colorado. He was
too late because in 1859 the discovery of gold set into motion political
and organizational energy based on an "it's there, let's just take and
use it" approach to public domain resources. He was too early because
it took 110 years of water rights experience before the state decided
that adjudication and administration of water along major watershed
lines made more sense than dependence on county boundaries,
particularly since counties in Colorado did not encompass logical
hydrologic units.
Ironically, before Colorado became a territory, its land area lay
within large, loosely organized and sparsely populated watershed
boundaries. Between 1854 and 1861, the Territories of Nebraska

2. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
3. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL
AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 315-16 (1954).
4. Id. at 315.
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(Platte basin), Kansas (Arkansas basin), New Mexico (Rio Grande
basin), and Utah (Colorado basin) stretched to the Continental
Divide. But, in 1861, two years after the discovery of gold at the
confluence of the South Platte River and Cherry Creek, Congress
united the sources of these great rivers into one great headwaters
territory, Colorado.6 Local districts became the organizing principle.
Successful political energy in organizing mining districts led to
subsequent successful efforts to create the Colorado territory and,
then, the State of Colorado. By 1900, however, mining engaged only
five percent of the state's population, while farming and ranching had
become a major industry throughout the state.'
Where major
mountain streams met the plains on the Eastern slope, urban
Colorado began to take shape as the 20th century progressed.9 Many
of the mountain towns continued to serve as health spas and
recreational centers, despite boom and bust in the mining industry.0
All of these activities required water.
D~jA vu, Powell! In 1969, the State of Colorado-with a myriad of
beneficial uses in place, no end of continued growth in sight, and
federal and interstate demands for water pressing the contours of its
water law-replaced its seventy water districts with seven water
divisions organized along major watershed geography, with a water
court and division engineer in each, for adjudicating and
administering its most persistently valuable treasure, the water of its
natural streams."
The century's lessons led to this deft reorganization; the prospects
of a future century will follow its lead and, inevitably, the people's
future responses to the watercourses will reshape its terms.
II. WATERS OF THE NATURAL STREAM
For all his knowledge of the Western landscape, his audacious
physical and political explorations, his commitment to progressive
planning and management, and his fascination with irrigated
agriculture as the enduring heritage of the Western movement, Powell
could not have foreseen the multi-dimensional role of water in the
settled West's future economies. In his 1879 Arid Lands Report, for
example, he predicated that "[a]ll of the waters of all the arid lands

5. See LEROY R. HAFEN & ANNW. HAFEN, COLORADO: A STORY OF THE STATE AND ITS
PEOPLE 122 (1947).
6. See CARLABBOTr ET AL., COLORADO: A HISTORY OF THE CENTENNIAL STATE65 (3d
ed. 1994).
7. See id. at 63. In 1859-60, Boulder county had eight mining districts, Clear Creek
had twenty-seven, and Gilpin had another twenty-seven.
8. MEL GRIFFITHS & LYNNELL RUBRIGHT, COLORADO: A GEOGRAPHY 215 (1983).

9. See id. at 291-92.
10. See id. at 292-94.
11. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, §§ 148-211 to -6, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200-24 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3792-101 to -602 (1999)).
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will eventually be taken from their natural channels, and they can be
utilized only to the extent to which they are thus removed, and water
rights must of necessity be severed from the natural channels."' 2
But Colorado, like the other Western states, discovered that it
lacked the means, the right, and the will to dry up all the streams.
Downstream states; Native Americans; federal reservations; the utility
and joy of a flowing stream for fishing, boating, and walking along
through urban drainage ways and rural meanderings; in sum, the
people's changing values and customs at work and at play, intruded.
In his later writings, Powell's biographer, Wallace Stegner, turned
our attention to the need for settling in:
At least in geographical terms, the frontiers have been explored and
crossed. It is probably time we settled down. It is probably time we
looked aroundus instead of looking ahead. We have no business, any

longer, in being impatient with history. We need to know our history
in much greater depth, even back into the geology, which, as Henry
Adams said, is only history projected a little way back from Mr.
Jefferson. 1

Adjudication's essential purpose, to recognize and enforce water
rights, follows from the imperatives of necessity and livability in the
land of little rain. The 1969 Act deals with settling in. Posited firmly
on the state's antecedent water law yet still breaking major new trails,
the 1969 Act addresses determination and administration of water
rights to Colorado's natural streams and groundwater tributary
thereto. It defines procedural and substantive law in regard to: (1)
water divisions, division engineers, water judges, referees, and water
clerks; (2) application and notice for determination of water rights;
(3) tabulation of water right priorities; and (4) regulation and
enforcement of water rights.' This legislation, still known as "the 1969
Act" after thirty years of legislative and judicial attention, memorializes
its bedrock durability.
The Colorado Constitution provides that the "water of every
natural stream" is subject to the prior appropriation doctrine." In a
single momentous declaration of policy opening the 1969 Act, the
General Assembly confirmed that Colorado's surface and tributary
ground water is a public resource available for disposition according to
use rights that can be decreed and administered in priority.
Commencing with a recitation that "all waters originating in or flowing
into this state, whether found on the surface or underground, have
always been and are hereby declared to be the property of the public,
12. J.W.

POwELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES

42 (1879).
13.

WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS:

LIVING AND WRITING IN THE WEST 205-06

(1992).

14. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
15. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.

REV. STAT.
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dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation and use in accordance with law,, 16 the 1969 Act declares
its intent to "integrate the appropriation, use and administration of
underground water tributary to a stream with the use of surface water,
in such a way as to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of
this state."'" Comparison with prior adjudication acts clarifies why the
1969 Act constitutes a political, legal, technical, and administrative
breakthrough of major dimensions.

m. PRIOR ADJUDICATION ACTS
In 1879, three years after statehood, the Colorado legislature
recognized the authority of the Colorado judiciary to adjudicate water
rights.18 Prior to this legislation, in 1872, the territorial supreme court
had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudge the respective
water rights of mill owners' existing uses and a domestic water
company's proposed diversion for domestic, fire fighting, and
industrial uses in Central City.' 9 The mill owners claimed existing
water power rights through prior appropriation. They entered an
agreement with the domestic water company stipulating that each
would abide by the final decision of the district court or the supreme
court regarding their respective water rights. Each would select a
"competent engineer, who shall choose a third, who shall make an
accurate measurement" of the affected waters, and would submit the
results and other testimony to the district court. ° The territorial court
refused, however, to entertain the case without a showing of injury.
The court stated:
The question propounded in this record is interesting and probably
important, but we must decline to answer it.

When it becomes

necessary to determine the rights of these parties, for the purpose of
affording relief to either of them, we will cheerfully perform that
duty, but we cannot engage in an idle discussion which would be
without any definite result or legal character.2
But the needs of a growing state required a means for recognizing,
securing, and administering water rights. The competing needs of
irrigation ditches provided the initial context for adjudication statutes.
Commencing with the Adjudication Act of 1879 ("the 1879 Act"), the
Colorado legislature established state court jurisdiction over "questions

16. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 148-212(1), 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1200.

17. Id.
18. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, No. 99 SA 91
(Colo. Dec. 6, 1999) (discussing Colorado's adjudication acts and beneficial use as the
basis, measure, and limit of an appropriation).
19. Central City Water Co. v. Kimber, 1 Colo. 475, 478 (1872).
20. Id. at 477.
21. Id.at 479.
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of law and q[u]estions of right" regarding irrigation priorities."
Where a water district overlapped two counties, the district court for
the county that convened its first regular term the earliest in
December had jurisdiction. Through the 1879 Act, the legislature also
established the first ten water districts and the office of the district
water commissioner. The 1879 Act directed the water commissioners
to distribute water within their districts according to the "prior rights"
of "the several ditches taking water."23
The 1879 Act placed the judiciary in a proactive role. It assigned
referees the responsibility of gathering information and taking
The utilization of this
evidence regarding water rights claims.
procedure for claims to the Cache la Poudre River provoked the
district judge to question the judiciary's right to institute this inquiry in
lieu of the traditional judicial method of proceeding only when an
interested party brings a controversy to the court. The district court
refused to enter a decree, the supreme court denied a mandamus
petition, and the 1881 Adjudication Act ("the 1881 Act") resulted.24
The 1881 Act required irrigators to file their claims for priorities "on
or before the first day of June, 1881" with the district court "having
jurisdiction of riority of right to the use of water for irrigation in such
water district." Upon adjudication of the water right and payment of
the required fee, the water right owner received a certificate from the
district court clerk showing the dates and amounts of the
appropriation as well as its priority.2 6
Under the 1881 Act and subsequent statutes, a person proposing
to construct a new ditch, or an extension of an existing ditch,
submitted a map and statement of claim to the county clerk and state
engineer. 7 A typical "ditch statement" set forth the following
information under written oath: the name of the structure; a legal
description of the point of diversion and location of the length of the
ditch; the ditch's width, depth, and carrying capacity in cubic feet per
second; the name of the stream supplying the ditch; the date on which
work on the ditch commenced; the uses of water; the name of the
owner; and an accompanying plat map showing the stream and the
ditch from its point of diversion to the terminus of the claim.28
The district water commissioner for each water district had the
responsibility of checking and reporting on the condition of headgates
22. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 19, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99.
23. Id. § 18, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws at 99.
24. John E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications: Approaches And Alternatives, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 22.03(1) (a) at 22-6 (1996).
25. Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 1, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 142.
26. See id. § 2, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws at 144.
27. SeeAct of Feb. 11, 1881, §§ 1-2, 1881 Colo. Sess. Law 161, 161-62; see alsoJAMES
N. CORBRIDGEJR. & TERESAA. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 233 (Revised ed.

1999).
28. See, e.g., Ditch Statement and Platt of the Schuttee Ditches No. 1 and 2, Garfield
County, Colorado (Aug. 6, 1887) (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).
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and installing and measuring weirs and flumes.' When water became
scarce in a particular stream, the commissioner could curtail diversions
ofjunior priorities in favor of the seniors."0 The 1881 Adjudication Act
prohibited water commissioners from distributing water to any
structure except in accordance with the clerk's certificate evidencing
the court's judgment and decree." The commissioner also had power
to shut down wasteful diversions.3 ' By 1905, the General Assembly had
established seventy water districts existing within five irrigation
divisions.33 The irrigation divisions heralded a broader river basin
administration. The division superintendents had superior authority
34
over the water commissioners.
The General Assembly added a sixth
35
irrigation division in

1919.

Litigation revealed the limitations of the 1879 and the 1881 Acts.
First, only irrigation rights could be adjudicated under the special
statutory proceeding the legislature had instituted. Domestic users, for
example, could not obtain judicial recognition of their rights. The
court in Platte Water Company v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co. stated:
" [t] he proceedings under said acts are purely statutory, and cannot be
resorted to for the purpose of determining the claims of parties to the
use of water for domestic or other purposes not fairly included within
the meaning of the term 'irrigation.' ,36 Second, the adjudications
could not affect water rights of those who had not been served with
process. Thus, they must be allowed to claim their original dates of
appropriation despite two and four year reopening and acquiescence
provisions contained in those statutes.
Later recognizing that the legislature directed the water officials to
distribute water according to the "various decrees" as if they were "in
fact, one," the court held that challenges brought by water rights
claimants of another district must be brought within four years of the
decree fixing the rights in the district of the adjudication
The court
announced that "[p]arties to adjudication proceedings in one district
are bound to take notice of the rights adjudicated in other districts

29. See, e.g., Report of Water Commissioner for Dist. No. 7 (June 18, 1887) (on file
with the Office of the Colorado State Engineer).
30. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 18, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99; see, e.g., Letter fromJ.M.
McRay, Water Commissioner Dist. No. 7, to T. O'Connell, Superintendent of
Irrigation Div. No. 1 (Aug. 18, 1887) (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).

31.

SeeAct of Feb. 23, 1881, § 22, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 154-55.

32. Act of Apr. 13, 1895, ch. 85, § 1, 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws 197, 197.

33. Act of Apr. 10, 1905, ch. 111, § 2, 1905 Colo. Sess. Laws 243, 243; see Map
entitled Boundaries of Irrigation Divisions and Water Districts, State of Colorado,
Engineering Department 1915 (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).
34.
35.
36.
37.

Act of Mar. 25, 1889, § 1, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 469, 469.
Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 148, § 1, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 497, 497.
Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711, 712 (Colo. 1889).
Nicholas v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280-81 (Colo. 1893).

38. See Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co., 90 P.
1023, 1025 (Colo. 1907).
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whereby rights are fixed in the same stream, although they are not
adjudicated in the same action and in a common forum." 9
In the course of construing the adjudication acts and applying the
principles of res judicata to water decrees across water district lines
within the broader irrigation divisions, ° the court began to enunciate
the essential foundations of Colorado water law underpinning the
adjudication of priorities. Priority of appropriation for beneficial use
is the foundation upon which water rights depend in Colorado.4 1 A
diversion of water ripens into a valid appropriation only when the
water is actually used; however, "the priority of such an appropriation
42
may date.., from the commencement of the canal or ditch."
Adjudications could include ditches whose construction had
commenced but were unfinished. The decrees for unfinished ditches
were "conditional, subject to the completion of the ditch by the
exercise of due diligence within a reasonable time.4 3 When there had
been a lack of diligence, a conditional right, being inchoate, could
never become fully vested and superior to a right that has become fully
vested by reason of beneficial use. "[T] he court was without authority
to decree an absolute right 4 to a greater amount than was then actually
1
applied to a beneficial use."
Early, Colorado recognized water rights as property rights that
could be bought and sold. Powell advocated tying irrigation water
rights permanently to the land as the surest way to prevent monopolies
and assure settlement.46 However, Colorado chose to consider water
rights as transferable, so long as the owner accomplished the transfer
of the original appropriation without enlargement or injury to other
water rights." In 1893, the General Assembly established that the
formalities of conveying real estate would be applicable to water rights,
or in other
except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies
48
companies constituted the ownership of the right.
Needs of the rising towns and cities would inevitably lead to
legislative authorization for the adjudication of domestic, municipal,
and other beneficial uses. Without yet amending the special statutory
proceeding to so provide, the General Assembly, in 1891, recognized
water use for domestic purposes, so long as it was not applied to "land

39. Id.
40. See Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 60 P.2d 629, 630
(Colo. 1900).
41. Id.
42. Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711, 713 (Colo. 1889).
43. Id. at 712.
44. See Drach v. Isola, 109 P. 748, 752 (Colo. 1910) (holding that lapse of fifteen
years from date of decree and twenty-three years after the construction of the ditch in
putting additional claimed water to use constituted lack of diligence).
45. Id. at 751.
46. PoWELL, supra note 12, at 43.
47. Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891).
48. Act of Apr. 7, 1893, ch. 107, § 1, 1893 Colo. Sess. Laws 298, 298.
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or plants in any manner to any extent whatever."49 Using domestic
water for irrigation purposes constituted a misdemeanor punishable by
a justice of the peace subject to appeal, as in cases of assault and
battery.
The 1899 Act required adjudication for change of irrigation
rights. 50 The enactment of a comprehensive adjudication act occurred
early in the twentieth century. The 1903 Adjudication Act provided
the courts with authority to adjudicate all water rights "acquired by
appropriation and used for any beneficial purpose other than
irrigation" in the same manner as "the adjudication of water rights for
irrigation purposes in the water district in which said water rights are
situated."'
In 1919, the General Assembly enacted an adjudication limitation
act designed to settle the priorities of water rights. It required any
original claimant to an appropriation or a conditional appropriation,
or any successor in title, to submit a claim for adjudication by January
1, 1921. Failure to do so resulted in a conclusive presumption of
abandonment. 2 The legislature also established a biennial diligence
requirement for conditional water rights."
IV. ORIGINAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL ADJUDICATIONS
By the Adjudication Act of 1943 ("the 1943 Act"), the General
Assembly recodified the existing adjudication law drawing together the
provisions of separate acts and providing definitions. The 1943 Act
continued to anticipate the issuance of unitary decrees addressing all
surface rights within the water district through "original" and
"supplemental" adjudications. An original adjudication "adjudicat[ed]
water rights for all beneficial purposes in a single proceeding '54 and
could be commenced by "any owner or claimant of an unadjudicated
water right" when "there has been no previous adjudication of water
rights in said water district." 5 By "proper averment referring to the
original adjudication in the water district and to any subsequent
adjudication of a general nature, 56 a party could commence a
supplemental adjudication.
Publication of notice for original and supplemental adjudications
was by public newspaper in the water district and by mailing "to all
claimants of water rights in the water district who have filings in the
office of the state engineer of Colorado," and also to all persons
"shown to be water users by the certificate of the water commissioner

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Act of Apr. 1, 1891, § 1, 1891 Colo. Sess. Laws 402, 402.
Act of Apr. 6, 1899, § 1, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 235, 235-36.
Act of Apr. 11, 1903, ch. 130, § 1, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 297, 297.
Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 147, § 2, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 487, 488-89.
Id. § 7, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws at 494.
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 3, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 615.
Id.
Id. § 7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 618.
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or Irrigation Division Engineer."57 To implement this notification
requirement, the court ordered the state engineer to certify to the
clerk of court a true and a complete list of all claimants "who have
filed maps and statements, supplemental statements or claims of any
character in his office which
shall not have been theretofore cancelled
58
by him pursuant to law.,
Water right transfers aggravated problems of notice. Transferees
of a water right could present their assignments or conveyances of
water rights to the state engineer for inspection. The state engineer
indexed the transfer and kept a record of the name and post office
address of the transferee. Transferees who did not follow this
procedure were bound by service of notice to the last person noted on
the state engineer records.59 The statute did not require service to
occur on owners of water rights or claimants of rights previously
adjudicated. But, if "the proceeding be supplemental as to one class of
rights (i.e. irrigation) and original as to another class (i.e. nonirrigation) then service shall be necessary on those whose rights have
already been adjudicated." '
The court decree entered in an original or a supplemental
adjudication determined and established "the several priorities of
right" for each structure in the water district according to the evidence61
of "the time of its construction ...extension ... or enlargement.
The decree specified the appropriation's source, point of diversion,62
location of structure, purpose, priority date, and diversion amount.
In a subsequent adjudication suit, priority dates for water rights of "the
class theretofore adjudicated" could not be set any earlier than "one
day later than the latest priority date awarded in said prior decree., 63 If
a number of structures received the same priority date due to this rule,
the court could specify in the decree the relative order of priority
between them.
While the overall adjudication proceeded, the court on sufficient
proof could award an "interlocutory decree" for a "completed
appropriation." This individual interlocutory decree would "remain in
full force and effect" pending entry of a final comprehensive case
decree.6' An interlocutory decree served as the "warrant of the state65
water officials for regulating the distribution of water accordingly.,
The notice and statement of claim provisions contemplated that
petitions for recognition of conditional water rights and changes of

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 5(b), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 616.
Id. § 5(b), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 617.
Id.
Id. § 7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 618.
Id. § 13, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 622.
Id.
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 13, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 623.
Id.
Id.
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water rights could also be adjudicated.6
Changes of use were sub ject to two basic predicates that date from
19th century irrigation law. First, the extent of beneficial use under
the original appropriation limited the amount of water that could be
changed to another use. Second, the change must not injure other
water rights.
By his legal appropriation of the amount of water sufficient for his
original purpose he is entitled to that amount and may apply it to any
of the beneficial uses he may see fit, as against other parties whose
rights have accrued subsequently to his own, provided the amount of
water taken by him is not thereby increased beyond that of his
original ap ropriation, nor6the rights of those coming later injured

or

impaireTn
any manner.

Accordingly, under the 1943 Act, changes in "the manner of use"
could be made in Colorado "by proper court decree" but "only to the
extent of use contemplated at the time of appropriation" and "strictly
limited to the extent of former actual usage" pursuant to the
69
appropnation.
V. TOO LITTLE DIRECTION, TOO MANY DISTRICTS
The 1943 Act provided little direction for the listing of priorities by
providing too many options. The district court could number all
"irrigation priorities" in one series and "non-irrigation priorities" in
another series; number "direct water rights" in one series and "storage
rights" in another series; number "all" rights in one series; "use a
different series for each source of water in a district;" or follow "the
existing system of numbering theretofore used in said water district."'
The state water officials were then required to regulate "the
distribution of water accordingly"!!"7
The 1943 Act perpetuated the artificiality of small water districts,
allowing separate adjudication for streams tributary to the same river.
The district court could entertain a separate adjudication for "two or
more entirely distinct sources of water in any water district. 7 2 The
1943 Act defined "distinct sources of water" as "two or more natural
stream systems or other sources of water in any water district which do
notjoin within the boundaries of such water district."' 3 The petition of
a water user in another district could force reopening of a decree
66. Id. §§ 21-22, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 628-29.
67. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, No. 99 SA 91, slip
op. at 11-12 (Colo. Dec. 6, 1999).
68. CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 233 at 375 (1894).
69. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 783 (Colo. 1962) (quoting Farmers
Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954).
70. Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 14(e), (g), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 624.

71.

Id. § 15, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 624.

72.
73.

Id. § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 614.
Id. § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 615.
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entered by a district court for a water district within four years of its
entry. However, the user must not have received actual notice of the
adjudication and must have water rights "decreed or subject to decree"
in the other district." The 1943 Act did not allow for or require
adjudication of tributary groundwater.
Commenting on prior adjudication acts, George Vranesh
summarized the difficulty of administration arising from the multitude
of courts, water districts, and ways of listing priorities:
Priorities might have all been listed in one series, and there could
have been a different series for each source of water within a district.
Generally there were prefixes and suffixes to denote conditional
rights, or there might have been some peculiar historical method of

priority listing that was preserved in a particular district. In short, the
system did not provide a uniform method by which a water user could
accurately determine his priority within a particular watershed.
VI. GROUNDWATER MYSTERIES AND HYDROLOGIC
REALITIES

Colorado water law has taken shape in the interaction between the
water users, their advocates, the judiciary, the legislature, and the
water officials. Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court often
planted the seed. How to address tributary groundwater in the
absence of legislative direction, for example, became a
groundbreaking question.
In 1951, the court established a
presumption that all ground water which finds "its way to the stream in
the watershed of which it lies, is tributary thereto, and subject to
appropriation as part of the waters of the stream. 76
In response to emerging groundwater issues, the General Assembly
chose to focus first on the problem of aquifer depletion in the Eastern
high plains. In 1957, it established a Ground Water Commission,
required registration of existing wells with the state engineer, and
required
for a state engineer permit for a new well or an
•
• application
77
existing well.
Subsequently, the court: (1) determined that the
Ground Water Commission was empowered to declare and regulate
"critical ground water districts" in order to limit overdraft of aquifers;
(2) restricted the state engineer's authority to that of regulating the
drilling and construction of wells to prevent waste; (3) determined
that it had no authority to adjudicate rights to non-tributary
groundwater; and (4) determined that the state engineer had no
power to administer non-tributary groundwater. 8
In a 1961 decision, the court observed the dearth of legislation

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 17, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 625.
1 GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAw § 4.1 at 384 (1987).
Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
See Act of May 1, 1957, ch. 289, §§ 3, 5, 1957 Colo.Sess. Laws 863, 863-69.
Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131, 139 (Colo. 1963).
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governing the adjudication and administration of tributary
groundwater. It nevertheless asserted a judicial responsibility to
protect "relative priorities" of waters of the natural stream "whether
visible or not" and "even though they have never been made the
subject of a statutory adjudication."7 9 The case involved competing
well users drawing water from the same tributary aquifer. The court
held that each must effectuate a reasonable means of diversion and
that no one could command the whole source of the supply merely to
facilitate taking a fraction of the flow. But, it also held that junior
users might be required to bear the expense of seniors whose
historical diversions were reasonably efficient but whose wells must
now reach deeper as a result of the junior's use.80
In 1965, the General Assembly acknowledged and acted on the
court's cue that the state should administer surface water and tributary
groundwater together. However, it did not revise the adjudication
framework to assist in meeting this goal. Instead, it directed the state
engineer to "execute and administer the laws of the state relative to
the distribution of the surface waters of the state including the
underground waters tributary thereto in accordance with the right of
priority of appropriation."81 Further, the court authorized the state
engineer to "adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as
are necessary for the performance of the foregoing duties.""
The General Assembly chose to focus on the problem of
groundwater mining in areas with little surface water. It adopted the
1965 Ground Water Management Act ("the 1965 Act") authorizing the
Ground Water Commission to supervise the establishment of
designated ground water districts where the principal reliable source
of supply is groundwater. 3 Withdrawals of designated groundwater
could be made under a modified system of prior appropriation
through the issuance of state engineer well permits pursuant to
regulations of the Commission and the local ground water district to
maintain "reasonable ground water pumping levels."84 The 1965 Act
o well permits
also provided for state engineer review
of8applications for
basins.
groundwater
designated
of
outside
Three activities precipitated the 1969 Act. First, the state engineer
began to regulate tributary groundwater wells on a case by case basis.
Second, the legislature directed the Natural Resources Department to
conduct an investigation of the interrelationship of groundwater and
surface water and recommend legislation. 6 Third, in a contested
groundwater case involving state engineer well regulation in the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 556.
Act of May 3, 1965, ch. 318, § 1, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1244, 1244.
Id.
See Act of May 17, 1965, ch. 319, §§ 1-3, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246, 1246-68.
Id. § 148-18-10(1) 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1254-55.
See id. § 148-18-36, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1265-66.
See Act of Apr. 19, 1967, ch. 175, § 1, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 249, 249-50.
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Arkansas River Basin, the Colorado Supreme Court urged the state
engineer to take a more comprehensive approach by adopting
regulations.
Exclaimed Justice Groves: "It is implicit in these
constitutional provisions that, along with vested rights, there shall be
maximum utilization of the water of this state. As administration of
water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the
new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that
doctrine can be integrated into the law of vested rights.,87 Thus, the
court ratified the General Assembly's recognition of the necessity to
integrate the use, adjudication, and administration of tributary
groundwater and surface water. The very next year the legislature
took the starring role with the adoption of the 1969 Act.8
VII. SO THE WATERS GO
ADIVIDE
The mystery of a divide
Is this, you can stand on opposites
And not lose your balance.
Draw a straight line from the sky
Through the middle of your forehead,
Half of you belongs to the other ocean.
Half your mind and half your heart,
You share downstream equally
And never drift apart.89
Cartography follows the ground. Early mapmakers got it right
when they hoofed through the territory; " they didn't when guessing
its length, breadth, and features. The 1969 legislative drafters heard
Colorado's topography of rivers practically sing to them.
The 1969 Act created seven water divisions along major
hydrographic divides, from the great divide to the borders of the state,
each with a water court, water clerk, and division engineer. The water
clerks and courts for these divisions are headquartered in: Greeley,
Division 1 (South Platte and other northeastern plains rivers); Pueblo,
Division 2 (Arkansas and other southeastern plains rivers); Alamosa,
Division 3 (Rio Grande and San Luis Valley rivers); Montrose, Division
87. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (emphasis in original).
88. See Robert F. Welborn, Two Colorado Water Crises, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 307,
308-11 (1998).
89. GregoryJ. HobbsJr., A Divide (November 1999).
90. Frank N. Schubert, A Tale of Two Cartographers:Emory, Warren, and Their Maps of
the Trans-Mississippi West, in EXPLORATION AND MAPPING OF THE AMERICAN WEST:
SELECTED ESSAYS (Donna P. Koepp, ed., 1986); JOHN NOBLE WILFORD, THE MAPMAKERS
204 (1981).
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4 (Gunnison and other central Western rivers); Glenwood Springs,
Division 5 (Colorado River from source to state line); Steamboat
Springs, Division 6 (Yampa, White, North Platte, and other
northwestern rivers); and Durango, Division 7 (San Juan, Dolores, and
other Southwestern rivers). 9'
Each water court publishes a monthly resume of applications
received."'
The resume summarizes important details of an
application; the water courts supply standardized forms for filing. 9
The resume serves as notice to all interested persons for purposes of
subject matter and personal jurisdiction.94 Persons who do not enter
the noticed proceeding remain nonetheless bound by the result.95 The
adequacy of the notice is subject to a "reasonable inquiry" standard
regarding the nature, scope, and impact of the claim.
In every water division, Colorado's adjudication is ongoing.
Pursuant to the monthly resume notice, each application proceeds to
judgment and to decree separately. If appealed, the application
continues on to the Colorado Supreme Court for review and decision
without the need to wait for any other case.97 The state engineer
compiles a tabulation of decreed water rights with their priorities and
identifying features. 9 The priority date of a water right is a function of
the year of the application's filing and the date of initiation of the first
step of the appropriation." The first step to initiate an appropriation
consists of the appropriator's intent to appropriate a specified quantity
of water from a particular source at a particular location for specified
uses and of an action evidencing that intent.' The state engineer also
compiles an abandonment list.'
One may file an application for determination of surface water
rights, tributary groundwater rights, conditional water rights, perfected
water rights, findings of reasonable diligence for conditional water
rights, changes of water rights, augmentation plans, exchanges, and
applications for out-of-state water use.' 2 Augmentation plan decrees
allow a right to be exercised out-of-priority by providing replacement
water to otherwise senior rights in an amount suitable in quantity and

91. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-201,-203,-204 (1999).
92. Id. § 37-92-302(3) (a).
93. Id. § 37-92-302(2) (a); COLO. UNIF. R. WATER CT. 3(d).
94. See Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734
P.2d 627, 633-34 (Colo. 1987); see also Gardner v. Colorado, 614 P.2d 357, 359-60
(Colo. 1980).
95. Williams v. Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 525 (Colo.
1997).
96. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 24 (Colo. 1996).
97. See United States v. District Court ex rel Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529
(1971); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-304(7)-(9) (1999).
98. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(a) (1999).
99. Id. § 37-92-306.
100. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 924-25 (Colo. 1992).
101. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-402(1) (a) (1999).
102. Id. § 37-92-302(1)(a).
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quality to the affected right.'Y3
Persons with or without water rights may object to an application
and put the applicant to the required proof. Water rights holders may
insist on terms in the decree that will prevent injury to their water
rights. 04 The state engineer may object to applications and proceed as
a party. 0 5 The state and division engineers also file consultation
reports and recommendations on applications with the referees and
waterjudgesY 6
Review of an application commences with the referee for the water
division who may issue a ruling that is subject to entry by the water
judge if no objection is made. The referee may also re-refer the
application to the water judge without having made a ruling. 07 If the
referee enters a ruling, any person may file a protest with the water
clerk, and the waterjudge then hears the proceeding de novo.'0 8
The state engineer, division engineers, and water commissioners
must administer the waters of natural streams (i.e., surface water and
tributary groundwater) pursuant to judicial decrees!'
Federal
agencies and Indian Tribes are bound by the resume notice, each case
decree, and the Engineers' proper administration of decrees for waters
within Colorado, because the United States was properly joined to
Colorado's ongoing adjudication in each of the seven water divisions."0
Failure to claim one's rights in the first available adjudication,
including the failure of the United States to do so after its joinder,
results in postponement of the priority date to the year in which the
application is filed."'
Administration of non-tributary groundwater is not subject to the
doctrine of prior appropriation."2 By an amendment to the 1969 Act,
water courts may decree rights to non-tributary water outside of
designated groundwater basins according to overlying land ownership,
a hundred year aquifer life, and a withdrawal rate not exceeding one
percent per year.
Use of Denver Basin bedrock aquifer water is
subject to augmentation requirements.'
Use of designated
groundwater, which is regulated by the Colorado Groundwater
Commission pursuant to the Groundwater Management Act, is not

103. Id. § 37-92-305(3), (5), (8).
104. Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739, 747 (Colo. 1997).
105. Wadsworth v. Kuiper, 562 P.2d 1114, 1116-18 (Colo. 1977).
106. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(4) (1999).
107. Id. § 37-92-303.
108. Id. § 37-92-304(2)-(3); Wadsworth, 562 P.2d at 1118-19.
109. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-301(1), -301(3), -501 to 501.5 (1999).
110. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 808
(1976).
111. United States v. Bell, 724 P. 2d 631, 641-42 (Colo. 1986).
112. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(11) (1999); see COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-203(1).
113. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(4)(a)-(b) (1999).
114. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch Ltd. Liab. Partnership v. Bargas, No. 988A208,
1999 WL 711845, at *3 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1999).
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subject to the 1969 Act."5
The state prohibits recognition of claims that are based upon the
speculative sale or transfer of appropriative rights to persons who are
not parties to an appropriation.
Conditional water rights require
making due diligence applications every six years if the conditional
decree's antedated priority is to attach to the water right when it is
eventually perfected by actual beneficial use."' Changes of water rights
are subject to quantification by historic beneficial consumptive use and
the imposition of conditions to prevent injury to other water rights.
Conditions to protect other water rights include continuation of the
historic return flows that supply other appropriations, or through
replacing water by means of a decreed augmentation plan." 9
An amendment to the 1969 Act allows the Colorado Water
Conservation Board to appropriate instream flows and minimum lake
levels under state law for preservation of the natural environment to a
reasonable degree. 20 However, only the Board may do so; all other
appropriators must• capture,
possess,
or control water in order to
•
•
121
effectuate a valid appropriation.
The 1969 Act authorizes the state engineer to issue orders for the
enforcement of decreed priorities, to adopt rules for the
administration of water rights, and to enforce water rights within
Colorado to meet the downstream delivery requirements to other
states. Colorado must deliver water down stream pursuant to nine
interstate compacts and three equitable apportionment decrees of the
United States Supreme Court, all of which affect Colorado water use. 122
Rules shall have as their objective "the optimum use of water23
consistent with preservation of the priority system of water rights.',
The state and division engineer may issue diversion curtailment
orders,'2 4 order the release of water illegally or improperly stored, 5
administer
the movement of augmentation water and of water use
•
26
projects, require the installation of measuring devises, require the
submission of periodic reports based on data from the devise 27 and
require production of energy use records from suppliers of energy

115. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-103(8), -107 (1999); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92602(1)(a) (1999); see also Chatfield East Well Co. v. Chatfield East Property Owners'
Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1998).
116. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a), -305(9) (1999).

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. §§ 37-92-3"01 (4) (a), -305 (1).
See id. § 37-92-305(4)(a).
Id. § 37-92-305(8).
Id. § 37-92-102(3)-(4).
Id. § 37-92-305(9)(a)-(b).
Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 917 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Colo. 1996).
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501(2) (e) (1999).

124.

Id. § 37-92-502(2) (a).

125. Id. § 37-92-502(3).
126. Id. § 37-92-502(4).
127. Id. § 37-92-502(5) (a).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

used to pump groundwater.'28 The state engineer may seek an
injunction and damages for violation of diversion curtailment orders.12
The water officials should avoid curtailment of rights in futile call
circumstances, when shutting off diversions by juniors would not
reasonably make the water available to senior priorities. 3 °
The 1969 Act also provides for certain exemptions 3 from
1
administration, for example, for small capacity household wells.1
VIII. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE 1969 ACT
Major accomplishments of the 1969 Act include: (1) integration of
surface water and tributary groundwater into a unitary adjudication
and administration system; (2) specialized water court jurisdiction and
engineer administration on a watershed basis; (3) resume notice
procedure for obtaining jurisdiction for adjudication of rights; (4)
case-by-case decrees and appeals in the context of an ongoing and
comprehensive adjudication; (5) authorization of augmentation plans
to enable otherwise out-of-priority water use through the provision of
replacement water; (6) effective rulemaking and enforcement
authority in the state and division engineer for the protection of state,
federal, and interstate rights; and (7) explicit procedures for filing and
pursuing applications and objections to applications for water rights,
conditional water rights, changes of water rights, and augmentation
plans.
An immediate result of the 1969 Act was Colorado's ability to
proceed with adjudication and administration of federal reserved
water rights, Native American tribal rights, and state appropriative
rights. 32 The United States Supreme Court rejected assertions by the
Justice
Department
that Colorado's monthly
case-by-case
methodology did not comply with the McCarran Amendment. 33 It
vindicated the work of the 1969 Act by its opinion stating that "[t]he
present suit... reaches all claims, perhaps month by month but
inclusively in the totality; and, as we said ...if there is a collision
between prior adjudicated rights and reserved rights of the United
States, the federal question
' 34 can be preserved in the state decision and
brought here for review. ,
The 1969 Act's authorization for adjudication and administration
of augmentation plans has been particularly important to the
integration of tributary groundwater into the natural stream priority
system. An extensive well economy had grown up in over appropriated
stream systems, particularly in the South Platte and Arkansas River
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
(1971).

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-502(5)(b) (1999).
Id. § 37-92-503.
See id. § 37-92-502(2) (a).
Id. § 37-92-602(1)(b).
See generally United States v. City of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo.1982).
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
United States v. District Court ex rel Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529-30
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Basins. By utilizing such sources as mutual ditch company shares,
non-tributary water, and imported water, augmentation plans allow
Colorado to effectuate its water efficiency and optimum use policies by
allowing out-of-priority diversions that would be curtailed otherwise.
IX. CONCLUSION
The 1969 Act is a relief map to the State of the Great Divide. It
reflects the contours of Colorado's watersheds. It provides for unitary
adjudication and administration of state, tribal, and federal water
rights. Following its flow is to go the way the waters go.

135. Williams v. Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 521-22
(Colo. 1997).
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In 1969, the Colorado legislature enacted the Water Right
Not
Determination and Administration Act ("the 1969 Act").
coincidentally, the 1960s saw the beginning of the explosive
population growth that has nearly doubled the state's population since
the 1969 Act became law. As an inevitable result of that growth, public
water suppliers throughout Colorado, especially those on the Front
Range, became leading proponents of the principles and procedures
in the 1969 Act, as they raced to develop and manage water rights
portfolios to supply hundreds of thousands of new Coloradans each
decade.
This article explores the 1969 Act, and significant
amendments to the 1969 Act,' from the perspective of local public

I The authors are partners of the firm of White & Jankowski, LLP, in Denver,
Colorado, where they represent numerous local governmental water suppliers. The
views expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and are not necessarily
those of their clients.
1. Like any important and comprehensive legislation that has survived for thirty
years, the 1969 Act has been amended to address newly-identified concerns, and
simply to correct what could be called errors and omissions by the 1969 legislature.
Those amendments are now so intertwined with the 1969 Act itself as to require no
small effort to distinguish them. Given that the amendments are critical to an
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water suppliers; addresses ways in which those suppliers have relied on
the 1969 Act to develop and protect the water supplies necessary to
meet the sometimes staggering demands of Colorado's population
growth; and explores some of the benefits and disadvantages of the
1969 Act to public providers.!
I.

THE 1969 ACT'S FOCUS ON WATER DEVELOPMENT

The 1969 Act arose from distinguished ancestry. Colorado has had
laws regulating the determination and administration of water rights
since 1879.' Though the ancestral irrigation acts differed significantly
from the 1969 Act in many ways, they promoted the same fundamental
purpose-the development of the state's water supplies for beneficial
use by the public. In furtherance of this purpose, the 1969 Act
declares the state's policy "to maximize the beneficial use of all of the
waters of the state. ' Though the 1969 Act and amendments for the
first time provided protection of stream flows and lake levels, codified
restrictions against waste, and defined and proscribed water right
speculation, nothing in the 1969 Act or interpretive decisions is
contrary to its original, fundamental purpose. Given that public water
understanding of Colorado's process for adjudicating and administering water rights,
it is essential to include them here when appropriate to this discussion.
2. This article does not address S. 5, Colorado's legislation regulating the use of
nontributary groundwater, which is largely codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137
(1999). This legislation has unquestionably been particularly important to public
water suppliers located in areas along the Front Range that lack reliable surface
supplies.
Neither does the article discuss the 1965 Colorado Ground Water
Management Act, which has long been important to rural public water suppliers in
Eastern Colorado, and whose importance to public suppliers generally is increasing
along with Colorado's population.
3. Laws regulating the use of water were first enacted by the territorial legislature
in 1861. Act of Nov. 5, 1861, § 1, 1861 Colo. Sess. Law 94 (the state legislature enacted
a reasonably comprehensive statute which created a nascent system for adjudicating
priorities for irrigation within certain water districts). See Act of Feb. 19, 1879, 1879
Colo. Sess. Law 94. Legislation after 1876 was founded on the Colorado Constitution,
under which water is owned by the state, for the use of the people by appropriation.
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
4. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999). The term "waters of the state" was
itself broadly defined by the 1969 Act to maximize the 1969 Act's application. See
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (1999). Many Colorado Supreme Court decisions
have endorsed maximum use as an essential purpose of the Act. See, e.g., Consolidated
Home Supply Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Town of Berthoud, 896 P.2d 260, 271 n.12
(Colo. 1995) ("[Our system of prior appropriation is based on a strong public policy
that water, a scarce and valuable resource, should be put to its maximum beneficial
use"); State Eng'r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 505 (Colo. 1993); Fellhauer v.
People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968) (noting that the policy of maximum utilization is
implicit in the Colorado Constitution).
5. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 37-92-102(3), 103(4) (1999), regarding stream flow and
lake level protection; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999), regarding speculation;
and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-502(2)(a) (1999), regarding waste. The Colorado
Supreme Court has said that maximum utilization must be implemented to ensure
that water resources are utilized in harmony with other valuable state resources. City
of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 86 (Colo. 1996) (citing State Eng'r v.
Castle Meadows, Inc. 856 P.2d 496, 505 (Colo. 1993)). This embellishment of the
maximum use doctrine does not alter the Act's essential focus.
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suppliers are, first and foremost, water users and developers, the 1969
Act's focus on water development has been critical to its successful use
by water suppliers.
H. NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC WATER
SUPPLIERS
Public water suppliers, as the term is used in this article, are local
governments that provide water supplies, including cities and towns,
counties, and special districts.6 Whether the local government in
question is a general purpose governmental agency, or whether its sole
function is to provide water supplies to its customers, there is little
dispute that providing reliable and safe water supplies has historically
been and remains a crucial local governmental function upon which
millions of Coloradans depend.
The importance of local governmental water providers has
ascended with the size of Colorado's population. Colorado's water
judges observing local governmental litigants before them, especially
those on the Eastern Slope, may, at times, feel as though the litigants
are a branch of municipal government. That local suppliers have
assumed this role is unsurprising given their inherent stability as public
corporations, their power to plan for orderly growth and development
within their respective utility service areas, and their power to finance
water development and distribution projects to meet that growth
through their taxing and bonding authority. No less significant to the
expanding role of local governments as water suppliers is the public's
expectation that local governments will fill that role at a low cost,
along with the difficulties associated with private water supply
development for public use, including sometimes thin profit margins
and anti-speculation rules that favor public over private water
developers.
As a result, although the 1969 Act was not written for the purpose
of promoting local governmental water use, one can fairly say that
Colorado's rapid urbanization since 1969 has necessarily made the
1969 Act an indispensable tool for local governments, especially
general and special purpose municipal governments, to meet the water
supply demands of their new customers. Hence, local governments
have been among the chief beneficiaries of the 1969 Act, and have
found its purpose and the majority of its substance to be consistent
with their need for providing safe and reliable water supplies to their
customers.
6. For cities and towns, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-15-708; §§ 31-35-401 and -402
(1999); and the Colorado Constitution, article XX, § 6. For counties, see Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 30-35-201(15)-(20), (26)-(28) (1999); and the Colorado Constitution, article
XVI, § 16. For special districts, see Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 32- 4-401 & 37-45-101 (1999) et
seq. Water conservancy districts may also provide such a function. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to 37-48-195 (1999).
7. Compare City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37-40 (Colo.
1996), with Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594
P.2d 566, 568 (1979). See also infra Part III.B.1.
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H. BENEFITS OF THE 1969 ACT TO LOCAL WATER SUPPLIERS
A.

BASIN-WIDE WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATION

The benefits of the 1969 Act's establishment of basin-wide
adjudication' of water rights are not unique to local governments.
Under the 1969 Act, Colorado was divided into seven water divisions
along major river basin boundaries. 9 Within each division, one water
judge, with the assistance of water referees,"° is assigned to hear and
decide all applications for water rights." Notice of all water right
applications throughout each division is provided monthly by the
resume notice system, which was also created by the 1969 Act. The
resume notice is binding on all those who receive it whether or not
they elect to participate against an application . 12
Unlike its
predecessors, the 1969 Act also created a continuing system of
adjudication of water rights, allowing filing of water right applications
at any time, without the need to await the initiation of periodic
adjudications of all water rights in a given water district. 3 While the
pace of progress of complex water applications can seem interminable
to litigants, conclusion of individual applications occurs much more
rapidly than under preexisting adjudication acts.14 The ongoing,
basin-wide system of adjudication, coupled with the binding effect of
resume notice, promote the ability of local governmental water
suppliers to plan for the acquisition of water rights in an orderly
fashion, and provide an important degree of stability critical to local
governmental suppliers whose development of adjudicated water
rights will require years, if not decades, of effort.
By the same token, the 1969 Act also allows local governmental
providers who have confirmed water rights to protect those rights by
opposing later, potentially harmful, water right applications. Resume
notice of applications within water divisions provides a sure means for
water users to remain aware of competing applications for water rights,
and the liberal standing provisions of the 1969 Act assure access to the
water court to allow protection of one's rights against such
applications.' 5 Public suppliers have generously relied on the 1969 Act
8. The 1969 Act also provides for basin-wide administration of water rights by
division engineers, acting as direct subordinates of the state engineer.
9. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-201 (1999).
10. Some water judges also have "back-up" judges to help handle overloaded
dockets and potentially deal with cases in which the waterjudge may have a conflict.
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (1999).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(3) (1999). As to the binding effect of resume
notice, see, e.g., State Eng'r v. Smith Cattle, Inc., 780 P.2d 546, 551 (Colo. 1989)

("Upon receipt of adequate notice the engineers were bound by the water court's

order whether they chose to appear or not").
13. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (1999).
14. For example, the supplemental adjudication in Water District 7, Case No.

60052, decreed on May 13, 1936, began on May 13, 1915.
15. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(b) (1999) ("any person" may oppose a
water right application).
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for opposing applications by other public and private water users.
B. THE DEFINrrION OF "APPROPRIATION"
1.

Compliance with Anti-Speculation Requirements

A water right is created in Colorado by appropriation, 6 defined as
the "application of a specified portion of the waters of the state to a
beneficial use."' 7 An appropriation may not, however, "be held to
occur when the proposed appropriation is based upon the speculative
sale or transfer of the appropriation rights to persons not parties to the
proposed appropriation."" While public suppliers are prohibited from
appropriating water rights for speculative purposes, important legal
differences allow governmental appropriators greater flexibility in
complying with the anti-speculation rule than enjoyed by private water
developers.
Under the express terms of the 1969 Act, an appropriation is
speculative:
if the purported appropriator of record does not have either a legally
vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest
in the lands and facilities to be served by such appropriation unless
such appropriatoris a governmental agency or an agent in fact for the persons
proposed to be benefited by such appropnation.

Since local governments appropriate vast amounts of water for
customers, and not for lands and facilities in which they have or will
secure an interest, this exemption is critical to such appropriators. A
private appropriator may benefit from this exemption, but only if
acting on behalf of a governmental appropriator or other end user.
Furthermore, under ordinary circumstances, one may appropriate
for the anticipated future use of others only if the appropriator is in
privity of contract or has an agency relationship with the intended user
of the water sought for appropriation. ° The strict requirements of
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. do
not, however, apply to municipal appropriators, or arguably, to other
governmental agencies making appropriations to meet a proven need
for water within established service areas.' In City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co., the Colorado Supreme Court, citing the statutory
exemption, refused to apply the requirements of firm contractual

16. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101 (1999).
17. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999).
18. Id.
19. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I) (1999) (emphasis added).
20. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979).
21. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 40 (Colo. 1996). When a
municipal supplier is seeking to make an appropriation for sale outside its service area,
however, traditional anti-speculation requirements do apply.
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commitment or agency relationship to municipal appropriations for a
municipality's service area.2 Rather, the court held that, under the
exemption, "a municipality may be decreed conditional water rights
based solely on future needs, and without firm contractual
commitments or agency relationships" so long as the amount of the
conditional appropriation is consistent with the reasonably anticipated
needs of the municipality." The supreme court's application of the
exemption allows municipal and presumably other public
appropriators to plan for and acluire water rights to meet future
demands within their service areas.
2.

Elimination of the Diversion Requirement

Before 1973, the definition of "appropriation" required "a
diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state and the
application of the same to a beneficial use."25 A 1973 amendment to

the 1969 Act eliminated the diversion requirement from the
definition, requiring the appropriator only to plan to "divert, store, or
otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses. 2 1 Under this definition, local governments
may control water within the natural course of a stream to maintain a
certain level of water flow within the stream. In recognition of the
growing public awareness of and demand for the maintenance of
stream flows for aesthetic and recreational purposes, local
governments have applied for rights to maintain water within stream
channels. 8

22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. at 39 (ultimately holding Thornton demonstrated its need over a planning
period of fifty years); see also City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo.
1939).
24. Though the statutory exemption in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II)
(1999) applies only to public appropriators or those acting on an appropriator's
behalf, the precept that one may appropriate to meet one's own reasonably
anticipated needs probably also applies to private appropriators claiming water rights
to meet their own needs, and not for sale to others. Since local governmental
appropriators, by definition, appropriate for use by their customers (with the
exception of appropriations for direct benefit of public facilities), however, this
provision of the 1969 Act creates a particularly significant benefit to such
appropriators.
25. COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-21-3(6) (1963 & Supp. 1969).
26. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999).
27. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 930 (Colo. 1992). Fort
Collins protected a flow of water in the Poudre River Recreational Corridor. This is
not to suggest that the 1969 Act absolutely bars a public appropriator from claiming,
without further "control," an instream flow for a proper purpose. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 3792-102(3) (1999) states that the Colorado Water Conservation Board is vested with the
"exclusive authority" to appropriate the waters of natural streams and lakes to
maintain minimum flows or levels as may be required "to preserve the natural
environment to a reasonable degree." Under this section, it is arguable that local
governments may appropriate instream flows or lakes levels fulfilling other legitimate
governmental purposes even if they may have the effect of preserving the natural
environment.
28. Cases No. 98CW448, Division 1 (application of City of Golden); 94CW273,
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CHANGES OF WATER RIGHTS

Most of Colorado's major rivers have long been "overappropriated" by senior water rights for irrigation and other
purposes.' Even Colorado's oldest local governments, however, are
faced with a formidable need to supplement existing raw water
supplies to meet current and anticipated population growth. Many
newer Colorado local governments are just getting into the race, more
than 100 years after streams became over-appropriated. By acquiring
and changing large amounts of senior agricultural water rights to use
for municipal and other beneficial purposes, these governments have
attempted to meet these needs.
The 1969 Act did not invent the right of Colorado water users to
change water rights to uses for which they were not originally
appropriated; the right has long been embodied in the law.3 The
1969 Act did, however, establish comprehensive standards and
processes for changing water rights. Before the 1969 Act, the only
change of a water right that could be formally adjudicated was a
change in point of diversion. 3' The 1969 Act significantly broadened
the definition of "change of water rights" allowing adjudication of all
water rights changes, both absolute and conditional, including all
important changes of the type and place of use of senior rights.2 In
doing so, the 1969 Act incorporated the common law proscription
against changes that would result in material injury, extending the
protection to owners and users of vested water rights and decreed
conditional rights, 3 while expressly allowing the applicant for a change
of water right to propose terms and conditions to prevent such injury.
While water users seeking to make changes of water rights must
now undergo what may be an onerous water court process before they
may lawfully apply senior agricultural rights to new municipal uses, the
salutary result of the process is permanent decreed protection for the

Division 1 (application of City of Littleton and South Suburban Parks and Recreation
District); and 93CW86, Division 2 (decree of City of Pueblo). See also 83CW327,
Division 1 (application of South Platte River Greenway Foundation, Inc., a private
foundation, which was later withdrawn.) While these applications were to maintain
water levels in stream channels, there appears to be no legal reason why a local
government could not seek a water right to maintain a water level in a public lake, so
long as the requisite degree of control could be demonstrated under COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999).
29. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 102 (Colo. 1996);
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 716
(Colo. 1984).
30. SeeStrickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313 (Colo. 1891).
31. The earliest statutory recognition of the right to change a point of diversion
was enacted in 1899. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 429; See New
Cache La Poudre Irrigation Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 68 P. 781 (Colo. 1902).
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(5)* (1999) (broadly defining "change of water
right"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (1999) (permitting the filing of water court
applications to adjudicate such changes).
33. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1999).
34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(4) (1999).
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new changed uses. 5 Changes of water rights also include changes of
conditional water rights.3 6 Conditional water rights have great value to
governmental appropriators, who must initiate and adjudicate water
rights long in advance of actual need to meet the demands of
reasonably anticipated growth. While those appropriations are based
on reasonably anticipated needs, it is to be expected that such needs
will be refined over planning periods of forty or more years. It is
undoubtedly beneficial to municipal appropriators to have the ability
to change conditional water rights to adapt to changing conditions, so
long as they do not injure other water users in the process.
The 1969 Act's incorporation of broad standards and convenient,
if sometimes costly, processes for changes of water rights has promoted
the stability of water markets and the ability of local governments to
rely on the acquisition and change of senior water rights. Given that
many municipalities, even those that originated in pioneering times,
are late-comers to significant water right acquisition, this is one of the
1969 Act's principal benefits to public water suppliers.
D. PLANS FOR AUGMENTATION AND EXCHANGES
Plans for augmentation and exchanges37 permit junior water rights
to divert water out-of-priority while ensuring the protection of senior
water rights. Exchanges and plans for augmentation work best on
tightly regulated and heavily appropriated but well-watered stream
systems. 38 Not surprisingly, their proliferation has largely been an
Eastern Slope phenomenon3 9 driven by growth along Colorado's Front
Range. In the thirty years since the 1969 Act's adoption, local
governments coming to over-appropriated streams have increasingly
turned to plans for augmentation and exchanges as valuable water
management tools to supplement and fully implement portfolios of
expensive changed senior irrigation rights ° and foreign water."
Although exchanges had been recognized by statute in 189742 and
35. See Farmers High Line Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189
(Colo. 1999). This rule does not, however, protect water users who may expand or
otherwise additionally change water rights after a change decree is obtained. Id. at
202-03.
36. City of Thornton v. Clear Creek Water Users Alliance, 859 P.2d 1348, 1359 n.9
(Colo. 1993). The Alliance included a number of municipal water users. See id. at
1349 n.1.
37. It can be difficult to distinguish between the two. See generally Michael D.
White, Water Exchanges: A New Fracas East of the Divide, BASIN & PLANNING
MANAGEMENT-WATER QUANTITY & QUALITY 8 (1993).

38. John U. Carlson, Exchange of Water and Water Rights-A Summary of ColoradoLaw,
Water Transfer in Colorado: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? 5 NAT. RES. LAW
CENTER & BOULDER COUNTY BAR ASs'N 8-9 (1991).
39. For a rough tabulation of the number of plans for augmentation and
exchanges (1969-1992) see White, supra note 37, at 7-8.
40.
41.

See discussion supra Part III. C.
See discussion infra Part III.F.

42. Act of Apr. 9, 1897, ch. 58, 1897 Colo. Sess. Laws 176 (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -104 (1999)). Section 4 of the law authorized reservoir owners
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in 1899,"3 could be operated so long as other water uses were not
injured," and could be judicially protected by injunction, 5 the law did
not provide for the adjudication of exchange priorities until 1969.46
Until then, approval and oversight of exchanges was assigned to the
state engineer.4 7 In 1969, the legislature allowed adjudication of
priorities for existing exchanges in S. 105, which, though enacted
concurrently with the 1969 Act, was not a part of it.48 In addition to
allowing for adjudication of absolute exchanges, section eight of S.
10549 recognized a spectrum of exchanges wider than previous
legislation, allowing significant flexibility and creativity in devising and
operating exchanges. Authority to adjudicate conditional rights of
exchange followed in 1981, when S. 31 was enacted, extending to the
water courts jurisdiction for adjudicating both conditional and
absolute exchanges.52

to deliver stored water to downstream ditches, and in exchange, to take an equal
amount less stream loss as determined by the state engineer. Id. at 177.
43. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, § 3, 1899 Colo. Sess Laws 236 (codified at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-83-105 (1999)). Section 3 of the law, enacted as part of legislation
authorizing the adjudication of change in points of diversion, provided for the
notification of the water commissioner and the allowance of a temporary exchange or
loan of water between ditches for irrigation purposes in order to save crops. Id.
44. Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37, 40 (Colo. 1905).
45. King v. Ackroyd, 66 P. 906, 908 (Colo. 1901).
46. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 98 P. 729, 734 (Colo.
1908) (arguing that the question of exchanges of water between the same and
different owners of ditches or reservoirs has no place and is "wholly foreign" in a
general adjudication proceeding establishing priority rights).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -105 (1999). This historical assignment of
exchanges to the direction and determination of the state engineer explains why he
still maintains substantial control over operation of exchanges. See City of Denver v.
City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Colo. 1992) ("[The statutes] give the division
and state engineers significant responsibilities.")
48. Act of June 7, 1969, ch. 370, § 8, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1192, 1196-97.
Consistent with prior exchange history in Colorado, the rights of substitution or
exchange authorized in Section 8 were included in the act dealing with the state
engineer. Id. See William A. Hillhouse, II, Integrating Ground and Surface Water Use in
an AppropriationState, 20 ROCKYMTN. MIN. L. INST. 691, 702-03 (1975) (noting that S.B.
105 was one of seven water bills under consideration in the Senate).
49. § 8, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1196-97 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-80120(1)-(4) (1999)).
50. COLO.REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-104 to -105 (1999). These sections, which are still in
effect, were the pre-1969 statutory bases for exchanges.
Unlike the broad
authorization of the 1969 legislation, they allow only two types of exchange operations.
Id.
51. Act of Apr. 24, 1981, ch. 432, 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1786. Section 1 added "or
approval of a proposed or existing exchange of water under Section 37-80-120 or 3783-104" (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (1999)). Id. Section 2 was
added to grandfather in applications for existing exchanges so that original
appropriation date(s) could be awarded an antedated priority date, unless the priority
was contrary to the manner the exchange was administered. Id. (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(10) (1999)).
52. Prior to that time, "Colorado water law apparently did not provide for the
adjudication of exchanges." City & County of Denver v. United States, 935 F.2d 1143,
1150 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 148-6-1 to -5 (1963), repealed and
re-enacted COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to -104 (1999)). "It was only with the 1981
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Unlike exchanges, plans for augmentation were a creation of the
1969 Act. The 1969 Act defined the term "plan for augmentation" as a
"detailed program to increase the supply of water available for
beneficial use in a division or portion thereof' by various means.53
Like exchanges, plans for augmentation could be adjudicated in the
newly created water courts.'
In addition, the 1969 Act created a
procedure by which the state engineer could give administrative
approval for operation of temporary plans for augmentation and
exchanges, but that authority has since been repealed with respect to
plans for augmentation.55
With the statutory privilege of operating and adjudicating
exchanges or plans for augmentation comes the corresponding duty to
protect water users56 by: (1) preventing injury and impairment to water
rights;" and (2) providing a substitute water supply that is adequate,
amendments to the Water Right Determination and Administration Act, and in
particular Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302(1)(a), that provisions for judicial approval of
such exchanges through the filing of a water rights application were adopted." Id. But
see In the Matter of the Application of the City & County of Denver, for Findings of
Due Diligence, in Douglas, Arapahoe, Denver, Adams, and Jefferson Counties (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1999) (No. 96CW145), where the water court has ruled
contrary to this holding.
53. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1999). The definition may be of some utility
in distinguishing an augmentation plan and an exchange for some purposes, City of
Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990), but may be of little useful
value because "new water need not be injected to give life and validity to a plan for
augmentation." Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d
297, 303 (Colo. 1976).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (1999).
55. Act ofJune 7, 1969, ch. 373, § 1, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1212. (formerly
codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-23 (1963) & COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-307
(1973); repealed by S.4 (1977), ch. 483 § 6, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 1704.). On the
other hand, exchanges can still be operated on an administrative basis pursuant to
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-80-120 (1999) without a decree. Many municipal water suppliers
have chosen to adjudicate both their exchanges and plans for augmentation to take
advantage of integrating them into Colorado's priority system and protecting other
surface rights on the stream systems with decreed terms and conditions to compensate
for depletions. Some users, however, still rely on approval of temporary augmentation
plans said to issue under the authority of the State Engineer's Office. For example,
"GASP," a temporary plan approved annually on the South Platte River since the early
1970's, has never been adjudicated. In the Arkansas River Basin, however, both
agricultural and municipal users have taken seriously the responsibility to augment
depletions as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v.
Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) finding that Colorado's heavy well-pumping had
violated the Arkansas River Compact (COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-69-101 to -106 (1999)).
56. These protections have not, however, been extended to protect alleged injury
to a wastewater discharger's permit. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d
1, 89-102 (Colo. 1996).
57. COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(4) (1999) ("Whenever substitute water is supplied
to a senior ditch, the supplier or his designee may take an equivalent amount for
beneficial use from the waters of the state of Colorado to the fullest extent possible
without impairing the availability of water lawfully divertible by others."); COLO. REV.
STAT § 37-92-305(3) (1999) ([A] plan for augmentation, including water exchange
project, shall be approved if such ... plan will not injuriously affect the owner or users
of a vested water right or decreed conditional water right."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92305(5) (1999) ("In the case of plans for augmentation including exchange, the
supplier may take an equivalent amount of water at his point of diversion or storage if
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both58 for quality and quantity, to meet the seniors' requirements of
use. On their face, these broadly defined restrictions protect water
users from the effects of diversions and the provision of substitute
supplies under plans and exchanges." Furthermore, because plans for
augmentation and exchanges are operated on a daily basis, through
advance notification and approval of the state engineer's office, 60 there
is a continuing obligation to prevent injury or impairment of water
rights and to meet the downstream seniors' requirements regarding
quality and quantity of the substituted water each time the exchange is
operated.6 '
Though these statutory restrictions govern the operation of all
plans and exchanges, much attention has recently been given to their
application to what may be called "water quality exchanges." In such
exchanges, upstream diverters claim the right, by exchange or
augmentation, to make diversions of high quality water by providing
downstream diverters with a substitute supply comprised of
conventionally treated municipal wastewater effluent." When the
upstream junior diverter attempts to do so, enormously important
questions as to public health and the applicability and scope of the
above restrictions are raised." These questions have been and are still
such water is available without impairing the rights of others.") It should be noted
that, though the authority to adjudicate absolute exchanges was added by S. 105,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) was enacted as a part of the 1969 Act.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3) ("Any substituted water shall be of a quality
and continuity to meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has
normally been put."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1999) (" Any substituted water
shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of
the senior appropriator has normally been used ....
").It has been held that "[t]he
statutory scheme governing water exchange proposals places a clear limitation on the
'discharge' aspect of all exchanges-i.e., the provision of the substituted supply of
water." Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 92.
59. Given that exchanges and plans allow out-of-priority operations in
contravention of Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution, it is not surprising that the
legislature thought it necessary to impose such comprehensive conditions on their
operation.
60. City & County of Denver v. City of Englewood, 826 P.2d 1266, 1273-74 (Colo.
1992).
61. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 97 (emphasizing the state engineer's continuing
duty to ensure that the quality standards of the substituted water be met at the point of
discharge to ensure protection to downstream seniors).
62. See generally Michael D. White, Water Quality Exchanges, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 19 (1993). In cooperation with senior agricultural rights, a number of cities have
made exchange arrangements. To compensate for the poorer quality of water, cities
will often give those agricultural interests additional water, sometimes contribute
money, and may agree to water quality standards. See, e.g., City of Northglenn with
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co. in 1976; City of Thornton with Water Supply and
Storage Company in 1986. See also Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 95-97. The treated
effluent is generally sufficient for agricultural purposes and allows the junior
municipality to divert cleaner water higher on the stream.
63. Permits to discharge pollution to the stream under the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) et seq., are obtained in Colorado through procedures and
standards established under the Colorado Water Quality Control Act. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-8-101 (1999) et seq. Such permits do not address the permitee's right to use
the discharge as a substitute supply, a determination that is the responsibility of the
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being fought over in the Division 1 water court.14
The benefits of plans and exchanges to local governmental
providers cannot be underestimated. Local governmental suppliers
have been leading advocates of plans and exchanges in the water
court, for they represent a flexible and creative way to maximize
existing supplies, often without the need to spend additional public
funds on the acquisition and change of additional senior water rights
or on the construction of new diversion and storage facilities. By the
same token, the protection against harmful exchanges and plans
which is offered to owners and users of competing water rights by the
statutes is vital to allow local governmental suppliers to assure that
other's exchanges and plans will not harm their own interests. Given
that local governmental suppliers are in the business of providing
potable water supplies, the express protection from water quality injury
or impairment provided by the statutory scheme is of particular
importance to such suppliers.
E. REASONABLE DILIGENCE
The 1969 Act, for the first time, mandated biennial applications to
be filed in the water courts for findings of reasonable diligence 6 to
continue conditional water rights.6
Prior to 1969, diligence
water court under the existing statutory scheme.
64. One such case was 83CW361, Water Division 1, where the City of Golden's
proposal to provided treated wastewater effluent as a substituted supply to municipal
diverters was denied on water quality grounds. Another such case is 96CW145, Water
Division 1, an application by the Denver Water Board, which is pending.
65. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-301(4) made it mandatory for owners of conditional
water rights to file for biennial findings of reasonable diligence. Although initially this
biennial showing could be viewed as burdensome, as diligence laws have evolved,
especially with the 1990 amendments the benefits of diligence law outweigh the
detriments for municipal suppliers.
66. The concept of "reasonable diligence" first developed as a required element in
the first step for the initiation of a conditional water right, enabling the appropriator
to invoke the relation back doctrine. See Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, 162 P.
161, 163 (Colo. 1917) ("[T]he right acquired by diversion and application of water to
beneficial use may, with the aid of proper diligence, relate back to the first substantial
act of the appropriator.., frequently spoken of as the first step."). Most early water
rights were made absolute by diverting the water from the stream and applying it to
use prior to adjudication. As more complex projects developed however, the courts
created the relation back doctrine issuing interlocutory decrees which allowed the
priority date to relate back to the initiation of the appropriation if the claimant could
show the project was being developed with reasonable diligence. Dallas Creek Water
Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1997). For example, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 148-10-6 (1963)
subsection (1) required claimants to offer proof with respect to partially completed or
perfected appropriations in the same manner as the claims and proofs for completed
and perfected appropriations; and subsection (2) provided that if it shall appear that
the claimant "...

. has prosecuted his claims of appropriation and the financing and

construction of his enterprise with reasonable diligence under all the facts and
circumstances." Thus, it was in the context of the appropriation of a conditional water
right where the requirement of diligence first arose. Indeed, reasonable diligence is
still a required element in the definition of a conditional water right. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1999).
It has been noted that the intent and action
requirements for initiating water rights are mirrored in the diligence test. See also
David C. Hallford, Developments in ConditionalWater Rights Law, 14 COLO. LAw. 353, 356

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 3

proceedings could be considered on adjudication day in every evennumbered year.
In practice, few conditional water rights were
considered or cancelled. Since 1969, the period for filing diligence
applications was extended from two years, to four years, 69 and, finally,
to six years in 1990. ' The 1990 amendment, for the first time, also
defined the term "reasonable diligence"" by essentially codifying the
prior case law," but under a somewhat less stringent standard.
The 1990 amendment also added to the diligence statute several
important principles that benefit local governmental water suppliers.
First, the amendment made clear that, in an integrated project, work
on one feature of the project is considered in determining whether
diligence has been shown in developing various features of the
project. 4 Public suppliers have frequently relied on this provision to
(1985).
67. Procedures to continue conditional water right decrees were first enacted in
1919. Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 147, § 7, 1919 Colo. Sess. Law 493 (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 147-10-8 (1953), COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-10-8 (1963), and eventually
repealed by the 1969 Act). Under this law, in every even numbered year, (i.e., a
biennial requirement) an adjudication day was established for the hearing of further
proof in support of any conditional appropriations for the purposes of showing
reasonable diligence in the prosecution of the completion of the appropriation. Id.
No special notice was given. Id. On adjudication day any appropriator or claimant
may appear to argue for the cancellation, continuation, modification or other
disposition of the conditional right. Id. After hearing the evidence, the court or
appointed referee was to enter its decision within one year. Id. at 493-94.
68. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Twin Lake Reservoir &
Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1970). In applying this statute, the Court held that
failure to appear at adjudication day for twenty years (1944-1966) did not result in a
prima facie cancellation of the water right. Id. at 855-56. The Court reasoned that
neither the protestant nor other appropriators invoked the remedy of the statute to
cancel conditional water rights. Id. at 855.
69. Act of June 7, 1973, ch. 443, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1523, 1523-24 (codified in
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (1973) (requiring a quadrennial filing for
diligence)).
70. Act of Apr. 13, 1990, ch. 269, § 1, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1625 (codified in COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (a) (1990)). In addition, the amendment began the running
of the six-year filing from the month and year of entry of the decree. Darby v. All J
Land & Rental Co., 821 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1991). This eliminated the practice in which
numerous pending diligence applications would be determined in one consolidated
decree.
71. "The measure of reasonable diligence is the steady application of effort to
complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient manner under all
the facts and circumstances." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b) (1999).
72. Diligence proceedings have been, and still are, ad hoc proceedings where the
water court is given broad discretion to consider all relevant factors. Compare City &
County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730 (Colo.
1985), with Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron
Shale Oil Co., No. 98SA377, 1999 Colo. LEXIS 857 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1999).
73. For example, "steady application of effort" has been substituted for "project
specific activities" and "reasonably" has been substituted for "most" as to "expedient
and efficient manner" in which the project is to be completed under the
circumstances. See Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of
Comm'rs, 841 P.2d 1061, 1064, n. 7 (Colo. 1992), which reversed the water court's
premature application of the 1990 amendment to a diligence application pending
before that amendment was adopted.
74. "When a project or integrated system is comprised of several features, work on
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show diligence on various individual parts of the system. Second, the
amendment also made clear that, so long as other facts and
circumstances show diligence, neither economic conditions beyond
the applicants' control, nor the failure to obtain governmental permits
or approvals are a basis for denying a diligence application.75 These
provisions will, like many aspects of the 1969 Act, have their greatest
benefit in diligence proceedings on complex, long-term projects.
Since many local governmental water suppliers must rely on such
projects to meet expanding water demands,16 these provisions have the
potential to be very useful to such suppliers.
F.

REUSE OF TRANSMOUNTAIN AND DEVELOPED WATER

Colorado common law long recognized that appropriators should
be allowed more comprehensive use of "developed"
water that
77
normally would not be available in the stream.
The 1969 Act
codified 8 this tenet and specifically applied it to transmountain water. 79
An importer of transmountain water is allowed to reuse, make
successive uses, or contractually dispose of the return flow from the
first use of transmountain water. These rights arise simply from the act
of importation, regardless of whether the importer has an intent to
reuse at the time the water right is appropriated,80 which contrasts with
rights to reuse water native to a stream system, for which an intent to
reuse, in addition to a specific intent for the initial use, must be in
place at the time the appropriation is made."
one feature of the project or system shall be considered in finding that reasonable
diligence has been shown in the development of water rights for all features of the
entire project or system." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b).
75. "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection (4), neither
current economic conditions beyond the control of the applicant which adversely
affect the feasibility of perfecting a conditional water right or the proposed use of
water from a conditional water right nor the fact that one or more governmental
permits or approvals have not been obtained shall be considered sufficient to deny a
diligence application, so long as other facts and circumstances which show diligence
are present." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301 (4) (c) (1999).
76. In its recent decision in MunicipalSubdistrict,Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 98SA475 (Colo. Dec. 13, 1999), the Colorado Supreme
Court may have significantly raised the burden of proof for applicants in diligence
proceedings, including governmental applicants. In OXY USA, the court resolved the
uncertainty left by previous decisions regarding whether an applicant in diligence
proceedings is required to demonstrate that it can and will complete its project, and
whether it has the requisite non-speculative intent to use the water which is the
subject of the diligence application. Though some had thought that compliance with
these standards was necessary only at the time of the original decree, the court
squarely placed the burden on diligence applicants to show compliance with can and
will and anti-speculation requirements in diligence proceedings. For a discussion of
anti-speculation, see the discussion supra Part III.B.1. For a discussion of can and will
requirements, see the discussion infra Part IV.A.
77. See, e.g., Ripley v. Park Center Land & Water Co., 90 P. 75 (Colo. 1907).
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-106(1) (1999).
79. City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144 (Colo.
1972).
80. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 68-69 (Colo. 1996).
81. Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680 (Colo. 1987). Note
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Section 106 allows reuse of transmountain and developed water
only "to the extent that its volume can be distinguished from the
Local
volume of the streams into which it is introduced."
governmental suppliers can track water through their systems relatively
easily. Return flows to the stream of transmountain or developed
water after irrigation, whether agricultural or municipal, can also be
reclaimed and reused, 2 however, the engineering analyses necessary to
quantify the amount of stream accretion can be complex and
expensive, making reuse less likely to be feasible for a ditch company.
More recently, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the
statute also to mean that failure to exercise the right to reuse does not
result in abandonment of that right, provided the underlying water
right is not abandoned, 3 thus confirming the ability of local suppliers
to remain patient as their systems grow in response to increasing
demands.
Because an acre-foot of reusable water can be stretched farther,
transmountain and other reusable water rights are an important and
valuable resource for a number of municipal water providers,
including Denver, Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Fort Collins, Thornton,
and additional municipalities supplied by the Windy Gap Project.81
Due to environmental and related concerns, few new transmountain
water projects have been pursued in recent years, and those that have
been pursued have not fared well. 85 As Colorado's population
continues to grow, however, further development of transmountain
water supplies may well be unavoidable.
G. RIGHT To REFILL STORAGE VESSELS
Early on in the development of Colorado water law, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the amount of a storage appropriation was
determined exclusively by the actual capacity of the reservoir, and not

however, that native water that historically has been consumptively used, and
quantified in a change proceeding, as well as nontributary groundwater, are also
treated as fully consumable water for similar reasons: they have not been a part of the
stream on which other appropriators have been able to rely. Williams v. Midway
Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo. 1997); Public Service Co. v.
Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 833 n.8 (Colo. 1993).
82. Public Service Co. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 833 (Colo. 1993).
83. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 70-71 (Colo. 1996).
84. The original subscribers of the project were Loveland, Longmont, Boulder,
Estes Park, Ft. Collins, and Greeley. Some of these cities have sold all or part of their
interests to other Front Range water suppliers.
85. In the last fifteen years, the following transmountain diversion projects have
suffered setbacks: AWDI's San Luis Valley Project (See American Water Dev., Inc., v.
City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994)); the Union Park Project (See Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995) and decree on remand);
the Two Forks Reservoir Project (See U.S. EPA, REGION VIII, 1990 RECOMMENDED
DETERMINATION

OF TWO FORKS DAM AND RESERVOIR
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
(March 1990)); the

TO PROHIBIT CONSTRUCTION

PURSUANT TO SECTION 404(c)

Homestake II Project (See City of Colorado Springs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 895
P.2d 1105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)).
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by the intent of the appropriator.6 The Court reached this conclusion
based on its interpretation of the statute then in effect,"7 giving rise to
what became known as the One Fill Rule. That statute was repealed in
1943, however, and the 1969 Act provides no basis for limiting an
appropriation to the volume of a reservoir filled once when the
appropriator intends to store a larger amount. As a result, four times
in the last fourteen years the Colorado Supreme Court has expressly
upheld reservoir refill rights,'s although some vestiges of the One Fill
Rule remain. 9
Under the 1969 Act, and the case law, the size of the storage vessel,
or even the intended size of the vessel does not drive the amount of
the storage right. It is, instead, dependent on volume of water the
appropriator intends to appropriate, and can apply to use. 90 The
capacity of the storage vessel, which usually does not exist at the time a
conditional appropriation is made, is of only collateral importance.
Specifically, the 1969 Act's definition of "storage" makes no
correlation between structure capacity and the amount of water
appropriated. 9' It does, however, expressly authorize storage in
underground aquifers, despite the fact that the capacity of the aquifer
generally imposes no realistic physical constraints on the volume
capable of being stored. In City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., the
court referred to the One Fill Rule as merely a presumption which is
rebutted by notice of an appropriator's intent to fill and refill. 9
Ninety years ago, when the One Fill Rule came into being, the
draw on reservoirs was to meet an agricultural demand that was
confined to a span of a few months per year. Recent changes in the
86. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 98 P. 729, 733-34
(Colo. 1908).
87. Mills' Ann. Stats., § 2304, cited in Windsor, read in relevant part:
[The court shall] ... make and cause to be entered a decree determining
and establishing the several priorities of right... each according to the time
of its said construction and enlargement, or enlargements or extensions, with
the amount of water which shall be held to have been appropriated by such
constructionand enlargements or extensions, describing such amount by cubic
feet per second of time, if the evidence shall show sufficient data to ascertain
such cubic feet, and if not, by width, depth and grade and such other
description as will most certainly and conveniently show the amount of water
intended as the capacity of such ditch, canal or reservoir,in such decree.
See Windsor, 98 P. at 733 (emphasis added).
88. See City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 758
(Colo. 1985); Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1992); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 27-28
(Colo. 1996), and; City of Grand Junction v. City and County of Denver, 960 P.2d 675
(Colo. 1998).
89. See generally Austin Hamre, When You've Had Your Fill. A Review of the One Fill
Rule, COLO. LAw., Oct. 27, 1998, at 95.
90. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103 (1998); Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper
Gunnison River Water Conservancy District, 838 P.2d 840, 848-49 (Colo. 1992) ("A
conditional water right is established upon the concurrence of an intent to
appropriate water and the performance of overt acts in furtherance of that intent.").
91. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.5) (1999); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(3)(a)(II) (1999).
92. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co, 926 P.2d 1, 28 n.13 (Colo. 1996).
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traditional One Fill Rule are of real benefit to municipal water
suppliers in meeting a year-round demand for potable water at
reasonable cost, maintaining their drought preparedness, and serving
secondary uses such as wildlife and recreation. From the standpoint of
both economics and conservation of natural resources, it makes little
sense to require more reservoirs or larger reservoirs to be built when
fewer or smaller ones with the right to refill can do the same job.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF THE 1969 ACT TO LOCAL WATER
SUPPLIERS
Just as the benefits of the 1969 Act are by no means unique to local
governments, the obstacles to water development created by the 1969
Act also affect both public and private water suppliers. Nevertheless,
local governmental appropriators have traditionally been sponsors of
large projects that, if for no other reason than their size, stand to be
affected by difficult and aspects of the 1969 Act and amendments in a
significant way. Consequently, local governmental users view more
difficult aspects of the 1969 Act and amendments as disadvantageous.
A. THE CAN AND WILL DOCTRINE
In 1979, the legislature amended the 1969 Act with the
requirement that, in order to be entitled to a decree, an applicant for
a conditional water right must demonstrate that the claimed water
"can be and will be diverted, stored or otherwise captured, possessed
and controlled and will be beneficially used and that the project can
' The
and will be completed with diligence within a reasonable time."93
Colorado Supreme Court has opined on several occasions that the
purpose of the requirement is " 'to reduce speculation associated with
conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of administration of
water rights in Colorado.' s94
Since its enactment in 1979, the can and will doctrine has been
relied on by opponents perhaps more than any other legal
requirement as the basis for challenging applications for conditional
water rights and for findings of reasonable diligence. Many of the

93. COLO. REv. STAT. 37-92-305(9)(b) (1999). The "can and will" requirement
applies to absolute and conditional water rights, but its application to conditional
water rights has been of far greater importance than to absolute water rights. This
discussion focuses on its application to conditional water rights, under section 37-92305(9) (b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
94. Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 42 (quoting FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. State Div.
of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840 (Colo. 1990) and Board of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 891 P.2d 952, 960 (Colo. 1995)). The statute operates to do so by requiring a
showing that an intended appropriation can and will reach fruition. Id. In this sense,
"can and will" differs from the traditional anti-speculation test embodied in section
37-92-103(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which requires a showing of the
applicant's nonspeculative intent to put water to use for its own purposes. Id. Nothing
in the case law suggests that governmental appropriators will receive different
treatment than private appropriators in proving that they can meet "can and will"
requirements. See, e.g., Bijou IrrigationCo. and Board of County Comm'rs.
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applicants for such water rights have been municipal appropriators.9 6
Some of those applications have failed on "can and will" grounds.
While a municipal appropriator can also rely on "can and will" as a
basis for objection to a competing water project, given that most
growing local governments are likely, at some point, to become
appropriators of new conditional water rights, the requirement can be
fairly viewed as disadvantageous to this class of major water users. That
well-founded applications can survive "can and will" attacks does not
alter that conclusion, especially given the many guises that "can and
will" litigation can assume, and the many terms and conditions that
may be imposed even on a successful water right application as a
result.98 If for no other reason, the cost associated with the intense
litigation of "can and will" makes it a burdensome barrier to a decree.
Given the use of "can and will" to try to frustrate water projects of
local governmental appropriators, and the cost of meeting the "can
and will" burden, such appropriators may fairly ask whether such a
requirement is necessary at the time of the original conditional decree
to reduce speculation. One could argue that requiring an applicant to
offer detailed proof regarding the shape of a final project at its earliest
stage is, itself, an exercise in conjecture. The interaction of the antispeculation
requirements
codified
in
the
definition
of
"appropriation,"9 the other statutory and common law requirements
for adjudicating a conditional water right,"9 and diligence
requirements' can combine, without more, to assure that an applicant
will demonstrate the bonafides of its project at the decree stage and in
later diligence proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court seems, at
least implicitly, to have recognized this concern in holding that the
"requirement should not be applied rigidly to prevent beneficial uses
where an applicant otherwise satisfies the legal standard of establishing

95. See, e.g., Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d at 42; Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at
957; Southeastern Colo. Water Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 716 (Colo.
1984).
96. See Florence, 688 P.2d at 716 (where the focus was on the water availability
element of "can and will").
97. Application of the "can and will" requirements calls for proof of several
elements and factors, each of which can be approached in a myriad of ways in a given
matter. See Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at 960.
98. See City of Thornton v. Biou Irrigation Co. 926 P.2d 1, 42-43 (Colo. 1996).
99. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37 -92-103(3)(a) (1999); see supra Part III.B.1, Compliance
with Anti-Speculation Requirements.
100. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(1) (1999). See, e.g., Metropolitan Suburban
Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273 (Colo.
1961); Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.,
414 P.2d 478 (Colo. 1966); City & County of Denver v. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1985).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (1999). As noted in Reasonable Diligence,
supra Part III.E, after the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in OXY USA, an
applicant now plainly has the burden of demonstrating that it is able to meet can and
will requirements in diligence proceedings. Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colo.
Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA, Inc., No. 98SA475 (Colo. Dec. 13, 1999).
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a nonspeculative intent to appropriate for a beneficial use."'02
Nevertheless, whether viewed through the eyes of an appropriator or
objector, it must be acknowledged that the "can and will" statute has
made, and will likely continue to make, water litigation more
complicated and costly, to the overall disadvantage of local
government appropriators.
B.

EXEMPT WELLS

The 1969 Act allows certain small wells producing 15 g.p.m. or less
to be permitted and constructed free of the adjudication and
administration requirements of the 1969 Act.'
The Colorado
Supreme Court has ruled that, once an application to adjudicate these
"exempt wells" has been filed, the well owners obtain a legally
protected interest in the well subject to administration, and have
standing to oppose water right applications.""
While local
governmental appropriators also have the right to contest applications
for decrees for such wells, it is not reasonable to believe that they will
have the time or resources to contest the hundreds of such water court
applications filed yearly. Consequently, by applying for water rights for
their wells, exempt well owners may obtain the potential to challenge
large water projects by municipal and other appropriators.
V. CONCLUSION
On balance, the benefits of the 1969 Act, and its amendments, to
local governmental appropriators outweigh its disadvantages. A few of
the benefits are exclusive to governmental appropriators, but most are
general to all classes of water users. The frequency with which
municipal and other local governmental appropriators have found it
necessary to rely on the 1969 Act to meet the demands of Colorado's
burgeoning population has made such appropriators among the main
beneficiaries of the principals and procedures established by the 1969
Act.

102.

Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 43.

103. COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-602 (1999).

104. Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liability Co., 937 P.2d 739, 751-52 (Colo.
1997).
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INTRODUCTION

While the Western Slope is relatively small in terms of population
and large in terms of geographic area, different perspectives on water
emerge as one moves from busy ski resorts through "down-valley"
communities and past ranches, farms, and orchards. However, one
thing most Western Slope residents seem to agree upon is the
seemingly incomparable natural beauty of the area. In recent years,
the Western Slope's natural wonders have fueled recreational
industries such as skiing, rafting, mountain biking, fishing, and
* The authors practice with the Glenwood Springs law firm of Caloia & Houpt,
P.C. The firm focuses its practice on representation of Western Slope clients in the
areas of water law, local government law, municipal law, real estate law, land use
planning, and associated litigation. Sherry A. Caloia obtained aJ.D. from the Syracuse
University School of Law in 1980, Jefferson V. Houpt obtained a J.D. from the
University of Denver College of Law in 1988, and Mark E. Hamilton obtained a J.D.
from the University of Colorado School of Law in 1994.
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hunting. These industries not only bring growth to many areas of the
Western Slope, but bring new and, in some cases, nontraditional
demands on its natural resources.
One aspect of the Western Slope's unique natural environment is
its relative abundance of water in comparison to other Colorado areas.
Yet, Colorado water law fails, in some ways, to address this unique
condition. Most aspects of Colorado water law apply statewide,
regardless of whether one is on the Eastern Plains, along the Front
Range, in the San Luis Valley, or in the high mountains and valleys of
the upper Colorado River basin on Colorado's Western Slope.
From a water allocation perspective, Congress sealed Colorado's
fate as soon as it adopted the state's rectangular boundaries in 1876.
Colorado is a headwaters state, straddling the Continental Divide and
is the source of seven major river systems that send water out of the
state in all directions. In stark contrast to its adopted method of water
allocation by prior appropriation, many Colorado residents maintain a
deep-seated sentiment that water in local streams is "theirs" and local
residents have an inherent entitlement to develop, use, protect, and
preserve local water supplies for their own existing and future use.
After all, water in its naturally occurring location is as much an
essential feature of a place as its topography, flora, and fauna. Perhaps
more than any other natural feature, the existence of water dictates
the habitability of an area.
The Colorado General Assembly adopted the Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act of 1969' ("1969 Act") for the
primary purpose of integrating groundwater into the existing surface
water adjudication and administration system. Although the 1969 Act
contained a number of other substantive changes, the Act was
predominantly procedural.
It established seven water divisions
associated with each of the seven major river basins in Colorado and
provided for the appointment of a "water judge" for each division.' It
also provided for significant participation of the Division of Water
Resources, acting through the state and division engineers in each
division, in both adjudication and administration of surface and
groundwater rights.4
The 1969 Act encourages appropriation and use of all of the
State's water resources, not unlike mining and grazing policies that
brought Colorado's first settlers. Despite the new procedures set forth
in the 1969 Act, the concepts of "first in time, first in right" and "use it
1. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
2. For instance, the Act contained a provision allowing changes in location or use
of conditional water rights. "The term 'change of water right' includes changes of
conditional water rights as well as changes of water rights." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(5) (1999).
3. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-201, -203 (1999).
4. Id. § 37-92-202. According to Anthony W. Williams, Esq., a water attorney who
practices in Grand Junction, prior to the 1969 Act, the state engineer did not
participate in water rights adjudications on the Western Slope. Interview with
Anthony W. Williams, Esq., Colorado Water Attorney (Oct. 29, 1999).
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or lose it" remain deeply embedded in the State's water allocation
scheme. The 1969 Act contains a number of water allocation tools that
apply statewide. However, these tools were not necessarily designed to
serve the needs of a sparsely populated area like the Western Slope
which is located in the middle of the arid West yet has a relatively
abundant and accessible water supply. To some, the Western Slope's
unique geographic and hydrologic qualities, and its evolving
demographics, require reconsideration of a pure prior appropriation
system as applied on a statewide basis in Colorado. Others express
outrage at such a prospect and argue that Colorado has already strayed
too far from its hallowed status as a "pure" appropriation state.
This article examines the effect of the 1969 Act and other related
laws on modern water resource allocation on the Western Slope and
suggests that even a doctrine as deeply entrenched as the doctrine of
prior appropriation is evolving to accommodate changing values and
conditions. First, the 1969 Act integrated surface and groundwater
management throughout Colorado. While this necessarily caused
increased reliance on augmentation plans as a method of securing
protected water supplies within the priority system, the subsequent
creation of "exempt wells" suggests that Colorado's "pure" prior
appropriation system is not totally inviolate.
Second, although
operating within the priority system, the provisions in the 1969 Act
allowing for the adjudication of exchanges and plans for augmentation
have modernized water allocation by encouraging creative solutions.
Third, while the 1969 Act contains no express basin-of-origin
protections, water exports from the Western Slope have been
constrained by certain amendments to the 1969 Act and by other
legislation. Finally, although the original 1969 Act continued the
traditional definition of a water right as an "appropriation" for a
"beneficial use," these core concepts have evolved to recognize and
protect "instream" uses for the benefit of the environment. Each of
these modifications dramatically affected water resource allocation on
the Western Slope and may foretell that further changes lie ahead.
H. THE INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION OF SURFACE WATER
AND GROUNDWATER AND THE CREATION OF LIMITED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIORITY SYSTEM FOR SMALL
CAPACITY WELLS
The most significant substantive provision in the 1969 Act, the
integration of groundwater administration with surface water
administration, " passed without much input or involvement from
Western Slope interests." In the first years following the 1969 Act, the
5. "[I]t is the policy of this State to integrate the appropriation, use and
administration of underground water tributary to a stream with the use of surface
water in such a way as to maximize the beneficial use of all the waters of this State."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101 (1999).
6. Western Slope entities were not significantly involved in drafting of the
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Western Slope felt little effect because many river drainages had yet to
become over-appropriated. Well permits were readily available and
were issued in most areas, with the exception of over-appropriated
side tributaries. However, as water development proceeded, water
shortages occurred and major systems such as the Colorado and
Gunnison Rivers were declared to be "over-appropriated."'
Water
courts then required augmentation plans for most new wells on the
Western Slope. However, shortly after the 1969 Act's passage, the
Colorado legislature exempted certain small wells from administration
pursuant to the 1969 Act.8 These "exempt wells" constitute a
significant step away from "pure" prior appropriation doctrine and
play a major role in water resources planning in Western Colorado.
While most geologists agree that underground waters are
connected to surface waters in most instances, the concept of
integrated administration is not easily applied on the Western Slope.
According to Orlyn Bell, the Division Engineer for Water Division
Number 5,9 the cumulative total of all groundwater diversions within
Division Number 5 has no appreciable effect on total river
administration.'0 The integration of groundwater and surface water
administration remains a very significant issue on Colorado's Eastern
Slope and in Colorado's San Luis Valley because of the existence of
large capacity irrigation wells in these areas. Many wells on the Eastern
Slope produce hundreds of gallons per minute." In contrast, wells on
provisions of the 1969 Act which affected groundwater administration. Interview with
Anthony W. Williams, Esq., Colorado Water Attorney (Oct. 29, 1999). An article in the
Sunday, June 8, 1969 edition of the Grand Junction Daily Sentinel merely mentions
that "[t]hirty one legislative bills including ... the act revising the state's water laws
were signed Saturday morning by GovernorJohn A. Love." Gordon G. Gauss, 31 State
Bills Signed by Love, DAILY SENTINEL (Colo.),June 8, 1969, at 4A.
7. According to Orlyn Bell, Division Engineer for Water Division Number 5, the
Colorado River became over-appropriated in 1981. The Engineer cited a letter dated
May 22, 1981 from Colorado State EngineerJeris Danielson to Water Division Number
5 Division Engineer Lee Enewold. The letter declared that the Colorado River and its
tributaries, including the Roaring Fork and Eagle Rivers, had become overappropriated above Cameo, which constitutes the point of diversion for the Grand
Valley Irrigation Canal owned by the Grand Valley Irrigation Company. Interview with
Orlyn Bell, Division Engineer for Water Division Number 5, Glenwood Springs, Colo.
(Oct. 22, 1999). According to Water Division Number 4 Division Engineer, Wayne
Schieldt, the Gunnison River was considered over-appropriated in August 1984.
During this month the division engineer first established a "critical stream list" for the
Gunnison River. Interview with Wayne Schieldt, Division Engineer for Water Division
Number 4 (Oct. 24, 1999). According to Bob Plaska, Division Engineer for Water
Division Number 6, the main stem of the Yampa River has never been under
administration, although some side tributaries are administered on a regular basis.
Interview with Bob Plaska, Division Engineer for Water Division Number 6 (Oct. 26,
1999).
8. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-602 (1999).
9. Water Division Number 5 encompasses the Colorado River drainage basin, the
White River and all of the Colorado River's tributaries arising in Colorado except the
Gunnison River. Seeid. § 37-92-201(1)(e).
10. Interview with Orlyn Bell, Division Engineer for Water Division Number 5,
Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Oct. 22, 1999).
11. Id.
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the Western Slope produce an average of five to fifty gallons per
minute due to limited groundwater availability. 2 Appropriators on the
Western Slope typically obtain groundwater from fractured aquifers
and shallow alluviums which are not high producing and practical
sources for extensive irrigation. 3
Since the 1969 Act, the Colorado Supreme Court continues to
uphold increasingly tight administrative controls over tributary
groundwater. For instance, in Hall v. Kuiper, the court determined
that the state engineer could refuse to issue well permits in overappropriated areas because injury could result to the rights of others
even though unappropriated water may be available at certain times. 4
As noted above, augmentation plans were not common on the
Western Slope until the late 1970s and 1980s when the state and
division engineers began to deny well permits after determining river
systems had become over-appropriated. 5 In Fox v. Division Engineer,
the Colorado Supreme Court determined that a conditional water
right for a groundwater diversion could not be issued in Water
Division Number 5 absentjudicial approval of an augmentation plan. 6
Today, augmentation plans are common in most Western Slope areas.
Despite Colorado Supreme Court decisions such as Hall v. Kuiper7
and Fellhauer v. People,8 in the years immediately following the 1969
Act's passage, the Colorado legislature created a statutory exemption
from the 1969 Act's administrative procedures and a rebuttable
presumption of non-injury for certain small capacity commercial and
residential wells. 9 Due to the high cost of augmentation plans and the
12. Interview with William Lorah, P.E., Consulting Engineer for Wright Water
Engineers, Inc., Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Oct. 29, 1999).
13. Id.
14. "The position of the applicants is the same as if they sought to take surface
waters which were already appropriated and needed.... Under the present state of
technology to drill but not use a well in order to establish a priority date would be a
vain and futile procedure." Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo. 1973).
15. Interview with Orlyn Bell, Division Engineer for Water Division Number 5,
Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Oct. 22, 1999).
16. "We have consistently held that a conditional water right to divert water which
would injure senior appropriators may not be decreed except in conjunction with a
plan for augmentation assuring enough available water to exercise the right." Fox v.
Division Eng'r for Water Div. No. 5, 810 P.2d 644, 645 (Colo. 1991).
17. Kuiper, 510 P.2d at 329.
18. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1968).
19. SeeCoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-602(1)(b) to (e), -602(3)(b)(II)(A) (1999). The
General Assembly passed House Bill 1160, which provided for certain wells to be
exempt from the priority system as administered pursuant to the 1969 Act. See Act of
May 22, 1971, ch. 378, § 1, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1341. Less than a year later, the
Colorado Legislature passed House Bill 1042, which further amended the exemption
to the 1969 Act by including a presumption of non-injury for certain small wells. The
Act dictates "there shall be a presumption that there will not be material injury to the
vested water rights of others or to any other existing well resulting from such well,
which presumption may be rebutted by evidence sufficient to show material injury."
SeeAct of May 8, 1972, ch. 105, § 2, 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 629, 630. It is important to
note that these "exempt wells" are not completely exempt from the prior
appropriation system. The Act specifies that the limitations on use of these wells
merely create a rebuttable presumption of non-injury. If injury to downstream senior
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high demand for residential lots in rural mountain areas in Colorado
over the past several decades, these "exempt wells" have played a very
significant role in water resources planning and development on the
Western Slope.
The current exempt well statute includes three categories of
exemptions for small wells.20 The pumping rate from these wells is
generally limited to fifteen gallons per minute 21 and all waste water
must be returned to the stream system from which it originated.
Many ranch, rural, and mountain households receive their domestic
water via wells. If administered along with all adjudicated surface
water rights pursuant to the 1969 Act, many of these wells would not
be senior enough to avoid curtailment.23 Consequently, if exempt
wells did not exist, many landowners would have been severely
penalized by the 1969 Act's integration of groundwater with surface
water; hence, rural properties would be much more difficult to
develop.
The constitutionality of the exempt well statute has not been
addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court. Widespread reliance on
exempt wells, coupled with the minimal impact of individual exempt
wells, may explain the lack of significant challenges to this apparent
affront to the prior appropriation doctrine. Although the Colorado
Constitution articulates a hierarchy of uses when stating "those using
water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those using
water for any other purpose,"24 this clause has been interpreted by the
water users can be demonstrated, the state and division engineers must deny the well
permit. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-602(3) (b)(II)(A) (1999). This presumption of
non-injury is probably what saves the exempt well statute from a challenge that
exempt wells violate article XVI, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
20. The three types of exempt wells are as follows: In-house Use Only: These permits
are given to lot owners who do not have more than thirty-five acres and whose lots
were created prior to 1972. This allows some owners of small parcels to develop their
property but restricts the use of water to in-houses use only; 35-Acre Wells. One who
owns thirty-five acres or more is entitled to an exempt well which can service up to
three single-family dwellings, irrigate one acre of lawns and gardens and provide water
for domestic livestock; and Commercial Exempt. Parcels of property, which meet the
above criteria but are used for commercial purposes, can also obtain exempt wells in
limited circumstances. The uses of the water are very limited and are largely
controlled by policy statements issued by the State Engineer's Office. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-92-602(1)(e), -602(1) (b), -602(3)(b) (II) (A), -602(1) (c) (1999).
21. See id. § 37-92-602(1)(b) to (c). However, the 1969 Act excepts wells in
operation prior to May 22, 1971 used for ordinary household purposes by no more
than three single-family dwellings, for fire protection, stock watering and irrigating no
more than one acre. These wells can pump up to fifty gallons per minute. See id. § 3792-602(1) (e).
22. Id. § 37-92-602(3)(b)(II)(A).
23. Title 37, chapter 92, section 306 of the Colorado Revised Statutes allows for the
date of appropriation, as opposed to the date of adjudication, to serve as the priority
date for wells adjudicated prior to July 1, 1972. This recognized that wells were not
generally adjudicated prior to passage of the 1969 Act. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-306
(1999).
24. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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Colorado Supreme Court as a right to condemn, not a right to call out
senior appropriators making "inferior" uses.25
There is very little case law interpreting the exempt well statute or
giving guidance on its enforceability. 6 The current exempt well
statute provides owners of exempt wells with the option of adjudicating
water rights for such wells in the water courts." In such a case, the
court can award a priority date based on first use, as opposed to the
filing date."
However, there is some question as to what effect adjudication has
on an otherwise "exempt structure." In other words, although a
priority date can be assigned to an exempt well in an adjudication,
granting the owner of a well standing to object to injury in other water
proceedings, of what importance is priority if such a structure is not
administered pursuant to the priority system? Furthermore, can an
"exemption" to the priority system exist notwithstanding article XVI,
section 6, of the Colorado Constitution which provides that "[p] riority
of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the
water for the same purpose"?9
The necessity for augmentation plans for non-exempt
groundwater diversions has increased over the years as "exempt wells"
have been increasingly regulated and restricted. -0 However, the almost
thirty-year existence of exempt wells may indicate general acceptance
that Colorado's "pure" prior appropriation system has evolved to
include an exception based on amount and type of use as opposed to
appropriation date. Whether intended or not, the exempt well statute
constitutes legislative favoritism of small rural households and certain
businesses. Only time will tell if the priority system will continue to
evolve to permit other preferred uses outside of the priority system.
m. AUGMENTATION PLANS AND EXCHANGES-CREATIVE
TOOLS WHICH ENHANCE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION WTHIN
THE PRIORITY SYSTEM
Another major change contained in the 1969 Act greatly impacting
water resource planning on the Western Slope are provisions allowing
for the adjudication of augmentation plans, water rights changes, and

25. See Strickler v. Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 318 (Colo. 1891); Black v. Taylor,
264 P.2d 502, 506 (Colo. 1953).
26. Cf Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liab. Corp., 937 P.2d 739 (Colo. 1997)
(addressing standing of owners of exempt wells to assert injury in water rights
proceeding but did not involve challenge to statutory presumption of non-injury for
exempt wells).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-602(4) (1999).
28. "The original priority date of any such well may be awarded regardless of the
date of application therefor." Id.
29. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; Shirola, 937 P.2d at 744.
30.

See Act of July 18, 1975, ch. 274, § 2, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 1002, 1003 (adding

subsection prohibiting use of exempt wells in subdivisions).
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water rights exchanges."1 Although the original 1969 Act did relatively
little to alter Colorado's "pure" prior appropriation system, by
providing enhanced flexibility, these provisions facilitate creative uses
of water within the priority system. Without these major additions, it
would have been exceedingly difficult for the Western Slope to find
the water resources necessary to support newer uses, such as
snowmaking for ski areas and domestic water for small municipal and
local water systems.
The 1969 Act defines "plan for augmentation" as:
a detailed program ...to increase the supply of water available for
beneficial use in a division or portion thereof bythe development of
new or alternate means or points of diversion, by a pooling of water
resources, by water exchange projects, by providing substitute
supplies of water, by the qevelopment of new sources of water, or by
any other appropriatemeans.
When the Colorado legislature passed the 1969 Act, it was perhaps
thought that augmentation plans would relate principally to the
pumping of groundwater from large underground water supplies on
the Eastern plains when surface water rights would otherwise be outof-priority." Augmentation plans on the Western Slope typically
relate to the development of domestic water systems supplied by wells.
Such plans usually involve the establishment of a "bank" of
replacement water by using the dry-up of historically irrigated acreage
or water stored in priority for later release during times of shortage.
Appropriators use these waters to replace any water "taken from"
other vested water rights and thereby avoid injury. The 1969 Act's
change of water right provision"' allows owners of water rights to
change the place of use or type of use of a conditional or an absolute
water right.' The 1969 Act confirmed the right to claim "consumptive
use credits" for historical irrigation and applying such credits to new
uses such as domestic, municipal, or commercial as parts of approved
plans for augmentation.
An exchange of water rights permits an appropriator to dewater a
31. "A change of water right or plan for augmentation, including water exchange
project, shall be approved if such change or plan will not injuriously affect the owner
of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or decreed conditional
right." Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 1, 1969
Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1207 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)

(1999)).
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (1999) (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., David L. Harrison & Gustave Sandstrom,Jr., Project, The GroundwaterSurface Water Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 38-39
(1971).
34. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(5) (1999).
35. See id. According to Anthony W. Williams, Esq., the debates over the 1969 Act
showed that one of the few substantive changes to water law embodied in the Act was
the provision allowing changes in the location or in the use of conditional, as opposed
to absolute, water rights. Interview with Anthony W. Williams, Esq., Colorado Water
Attorney (Oct. 29, 1999).
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certain stream reach so long as the appropriator provides replacement
36
water at the correct time and place in order to satisfy calling seniors.
While exchanges allow flexibility in the development of protected
water supplies, they also affect flows on critical reaches used for
recreational use or fish and wildlife habitat. On the Western Slope,
most streams and rivers have certain reaches with water shortages, such
as mountain tributaries, and certain reaches with water abundance,
such as the lower Colorado River or the Gunnison River near Grand
Junction and the lower Yampa River in Northwest Colorado.
Exchanges allow upstream appropriators to divert out-of-priority
while satisfying lower basin rights with other sources, such as releases
from large on-channel reservoirs. Unlike other areas in Colorado, the
Western Slope benefits from a number of large storage projects that
make water available for contract, augmentation, or exchange
purposes. Such facilities include: Green Mountain and Wolford
Mountain Reservoirs on the Colorado River; Ruedi Reservoir on the
Frying Pan River; and Blue Mesa Reservoir on the Gunnison River."
These large "buckets" greatly enhance opportunities for new water
uses on the main channels of such river systems without the
tremendous expense required to construct individual storage facilities
for augmentation or for exchange purposes.
Appropriators implemented the 1969 Act's provisions for
augmentation plans, changes, and exchanges just prior to the resort
boom which hit Colorado in the 1970s. Although these concepts
operate within the prior appropriation system, they have facilitated
continued growth of the Western Slope by allowing for water
development of new uses such as domestic, municipal, and
snowmaking without causing injury to senior calling rights. Without
flexible "tools" such as augmentation plans, changes, and exchanges,
Colorado's pure appropriation system would have severely hindered
development in over-appropriated areas on the Western Slope long
ago. Once again, the "pure" prior appropriation system has arguably
shown that it continues to evolve in order to accommodate changing
demands and uses.
IV. TRANSBASIN DIVERSIONS AND BASIN-OF-ORIGIN
PROTECTIONS-CHALLENGES TO "PURE" PRIOR
APPROPRIATION ON COLORADO'S WESTERN SLOPE
Most Colorado residents unite in their resolve to protect the
unused portion of the state's compact entitlements from thirsty
downstream neighbors, despite rapid development by and urgent
needs of those neighbors. Among' Coloradans, it is generally accepted
that the state should preserve its unused share for its future needs.

36. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (1999).
37. See infra Parts IV and V for a more thorough discussion of some of these storage
facilities.
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Curiously, however, this rather provincial approach to interstate water
allocation does not carry over to intrastate water allocation.
The Colorado Constitution entitles Coloradans to appropriate the
waters of the State, which the public owns." The Constitution draws
no distinction between water appropriations for use within basins of
origin and for export to other drainages. Not only are transbasin
appropriations possible, they are encouraged by a longstanding
principle of Colorado water law that allows the importer to use, reuse,
and successively use imported water to extinction." By essentially
preserving Colorado's "pure" prior appropriation system, the 1969 Act
continued the right to appropriate water from one river basin for use
in another, without any preference for use within a native basin.
This situation has provoked frequent arguments by the Western
Slope for statutory basin-of-origin protection. Yet, the majority of
Colorado's population resides on the rapidly developing Eastern
Slope, requiring a constant need to acquire additional water supplies.
The Eastern Slope population commands a majority vote in the
General Assembly, and, as a result, Western Slope legislators have been
unsuccessful in securing statutory basin-of-origin protections which
apply to all potential transmountain diversions. 0 Nevertheless, other
Colorado statutes have indirectly assisted the Western Slope's ability to
protect its native waters.
In 1937, the Colorado legislature passed the Water Conservancy
Act ("the WCA") ,4 establishing water conservancy districts throughout
the state to provide for "the greatest beneficial use of water within this
state. " " The legislature clearly did not intend the WCA to preserve or
conserve water, but rather to encourage the control and the use of "all
unappropriated waters originating in this state to a direct and
supplemental use of such waters for domestic, manufacturing,
irrigation, power, and other beneficial uses. 43 However, a brief
provision in the WCA has significantly influenced the development of
Western Slope water resources over the past fifty years. The section
provides that any Water Conservancy District facilities which export
water from the Colorado River basin:

38. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
39. Whenever an appropriator has lawfully introduced foreign water into a stream
system from an unconnected stream system, such appropriator may make a succession
of uses of such water by exchange or otherwise to the extent that its volume can be
distinguished from the volume of the streams into which it is introduced. COLO. REXV.
STAT.

§ 37-82-106(1) (1999).

40. For example, Representatives Smith, Reeser and George introduced House Bill
1288 in the 61' General Assembly. This bill also included proposals regarding
statewide water planning, but was withdrawn because of a lack of consensus. Whether
basin-of-origin legislation would be constitutional and could coexist with the prior
appropriation doctrine is subject to debate. H.R. 1288, 61" Leg., 2"d Regular Sess.
(Colo. 1998).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-45-101 to -153 (1999).
42. Id. § 37-45-102(1).
43. Id. § 37-45-102(2) (a).
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shall be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the
present appropriations of water and, in addition thereto prospective
uses of water for irrigation and other beneficial consumptive use
purposes... within the natural basin of the Colorado river in the
state of Colorado, from which water is exported, will not be impaired
nor increasedin cost at the expense of the water users within the natural
basin."

This provision resulted in the construction of "compensatory
storage" projects by Eastern Slope appropriators and transmountain
diverters.
However, the WCA only applies to Water Conservancy
Districts and not to other water exporters such as municipalities (e.g.,
Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora) or private water users;
therefore, it provides only limited protection to the Western Slope.46
When the 1969 Act was passed, the Western Slope did not make a
serious effort to expand the basin-of-origin protection ostensibly
because it recognized that the 1969 Act would never pass with such a
provision. 47 Additionally, at that time, the Colorado River Water
Conservation District was occupied in attempting to secure funding for
large storage
projects, perceived to be in the Western Slope's best
48
interests.
In the absence of basin-of-origin protection applicable to all
transbasin diversions, the Western Slope has turned to other statutory
tools for protecting its native water resources. One example is House
Bill 1041, which the Colorado legislature enacted in 1974 and was
designed to allow local governments to protect "areas and activities of
state interest." ,9 House Bill 1041 gave local governments regulating
authority for the development of lands within their jurisdictions.
Western Slope counties have successfully invoked "1041 powers"
imposing restrictions on water development, including the
construction of reservoirs and diversion projects. In City & County of
Denver v. Board of County Commissioners,° the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld the rights of Eagle County and Grand County to regulate site
44. Id. § 37-45-181(1) (b) (II) (emphasis added).
45. Green Mountain Reservoir is an example of a compensatory storage facility. It
was built to compensate the Western Slope for impacts from the Colorado Big
Thompson Project, which is a United States Bureau of Reclamation project that diverts
water from the Colorado River basin to Northeastern Colorado for irrigation of lands
within the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. The availability of water
stored in Green Mountain Reservoir has greatly enhanced water development
possibilities on the main stem of the Colorado River. See generally Interior Department
Appropriation Act, ch. 570, 50 Stat. 564, 595 (1937).
46. Some previous attempts at basin-of-origin legislation have sought to extend
the protections contained in the Water Conservancy Act to other appropriators. See,
e.g., H.R. 1288, 61" Leg., 2nd Regular Sess. (Colo. 1998).
47. Interview with Anthony W. Williams, Esq., Colorado Water Attorney (Oct. 29,
1999). Williams participated in the debates over the 1969 Act.
48. Interview with Eric Kuhn, Secretary-Engineer for the Colorado River Water
Conservation District, Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Oct. 25, 1999).
49. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to-502 (1999).
50. City & County of Denver v. Board of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 753 (Colo.
1989).
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selection and construction of major new water systems as state interest
activities.51
While House Bill 1041 gives added powers to local
governments in headwaters areas, which are most susceptible to water
exports, it should be noted that this statute is not very useful to lower
counties on the Western Slope. Counties such as Garfield, Mesa,
Delta, and Montrose lie downstream on the Gunnison and Colorado
Rivers from many existing or proposed transbasin diversions.
Other tools used by basins of origin to discourage water exports
evolved through case law and later amendments to the 1969 Act. In
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunhel Water Co.," a
private water company applied for a conditional water right for a
90,000 acre-foot reservoir even though the applicant only had specific
uses for about 4,000 acre-feet. The Colorado Supreme Court held
that the Colorado Constitution "guarantees a right to appropriate,
[but] not a right to speculate. The right to appropriate is for use, not
merely for profit.""2 The Colorado legislature reinforced this decision
by amending the 1969 Act to include a provision commonly referred
to as the "can and will" statute. 4 The "can and will" provision further
refined the definition of "appropriation" by providing:
[n]o claim for a conditional water right may be recognized or a
decree therefor granted except to the extent that it is established that
the waters can and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured,
possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used and that the
project can and55 will be completed with diligence and within a
reasonable time.
The supreme court has held that the "can and will" statute allows
water courts to inquire into many issues relating to a claimed
appropriation, including water availability5 6 and, in certain
circumstances,
the status of required land use approvals or
57
easements.
The "can and will" statute applies statewide as part of the 1969 Act
and has served as a tool for challenging large transbasin diversion
projects. Perhaps the Western Slope's most significant use of the "can
and will" doctrine, to guard against transbasin diversions, occurred in
recent litigation involving an attempt by several Front Range local
governments to build a large new transbasin project known as the
Union Park project. The Union Park project would have delivered
water to the Eastern Slope from the headwaters of the Gunnison River.
51. Id. at 755-56.
52. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566 (Colo. 1979).
53. Id. at 568.
54. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (1999).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence,
688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984).
57. See, e.g., FWS Land & Cattle Co. v. Colorado Div. of Wildlife, 795 P.2d 837, 840
(Colo. 1990).
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In Board of County Commissioners v. United States," the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by the district court for Water
Division Number 4 of a 900,000 acre-foot claim for Union Park
Reservoir. In reaching its decision, the supreme court noted that the
"can and will" statute has gone "beyond the anti-speculation doctrine
of Vidler by adding the requirement that an applicant for a conditional
water right decree... demonstrate that water can and will be
beneficially used." 9 While the courts continue to refine the breadth of
the "can and will" limitation, the provision promises to be a focal point
in future adjudications.
While the 1969 Act certainly was not intended to protect native
waters from export, the "can and will" statute and other legislation,
such as the WCA and House Bill 1041, have, in some circumstances,
served to protect the Western Slope from water exports to other areas
in Colorado. Perhaps these provisions threaten the constitutional
right to appropriate. On the other hand, perhaps these provisions
confirm that Colorado water law, like the 1969 Act itself, continues to
evolve to meet changing values and conditions.
V.

MODERN CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF
"APPROPRIATION" AND "USE"

Many parts of the Western Slope are undergoing a major shift
from an economy centered around agriculture and ranching to one
primarily driven by recreation and resorts. 6° The natural beauty of the
Western Slope attracts visitors from all over the world to ski, hunt, fish,
kayak, raft, camp, hike, and bike. These demands have spawned a
modern-day land rush for slope-side condominiums, golf course
communities, gentleman ranches, remote hunting and fishing lodges,
and, for those who can afford it, their own slice of the earth's
remaining wilderness. This fundamental transition is perhaps most
apparent along the 1-70 corridor and in the Roaring Fork Valley. In
these areas, ranchland and irrigated pastures are being converted to
golf course communities and housing developments at a staggering
rate. Although the preservation of water flowing within its natural
streams is essential for fish and wildlife habitat and for other "nonhuman" interests, preservation is also essential to the Western Slope's
new economy. The prior appropriation system continues to struggle
with how to accommodate these new demands within a system
designed to facilitate rapid appropriation of water resources for

58. Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1995).
59. Id. at 961.
60. Colorado had 20.8 million pleasure visitors in 1997, making it the third most
popular destination among the fifty states. Colorado's tourism industry accounts for
$7.1 billion in revenue and for 112,000 jobs with a total payroll of $1.5 billion.
Approximately thirty-six percent of tourism dollars are spent in the mountain resort
region. See LONGWOODS INT'L, COLORADO TOURISM STRATEGIC MARKETING PLAN:
1999/2000 1 (1999).
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traditional "beneficial" uses such as agriculture and mining.
Despite changing needs and values in Western Colorado, the
state's "pure" appropriation system largely ignores the economic or
other values associated with leaving water in its natural water course.
In fact, one commentator observed that: "Colorado's system of
appropriative water rights has literally mandated the drying up of every
natural stream in the state. 6 ' The 1969 Act did nothing to improve
this situation. As originally adopted, the Act included no tools with
which to protect waters within natural streams for recreational,
piscatorial, aesthetic, or any other purposes. In fact, the 1969 Act
codified6 1 the common law requirement that water be removed from
its streambed in order to effectuate a valid appropriation, thereby
Nevertheless,
effectively preventing any instream appropriations.
heightened environmental awareness and changing values have slowly
eroded some of the "purity" reflected in the original 1969 Act.
A.

STATUTORY INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTIONS

In 1973, the General Assembly took what now seems like a very
small step away from the original prior appropriation system, but
which at the time constituted a controversial issue in Colorado law. 64
The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 97, amending the 1969 Act
to allow the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB")65
appropriate minimum stream flows for the limited purpose of
"protecting the natural environment to a reasonable degree."
The creation of instream flow protections required the relaxation
of the 1969 Act's original definition of appropriation. No longer
would "appropriation" be defined as "the diversion of a certain portion
of the waters of the state ..

,67

Instead, the General Assembly

redefined appropriation as "the application of a specified portion of
To acknowledge the
the waters of the state to a beneficial use ...."68
benefits to humans of water flowing in the state's natural streams, the
General Assembly amended the definition of "beneficial use" to read:
[flor the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations,
'beneficial use' shall also include the appropriation by the state of
Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such minimum flows

61. 2 GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW, § 6.7, at 700 (1987).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-21-3(6) (Supp. 1969).
63. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
64. Act of Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 442, §§ 1-3, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1521, 1521-22.
The Colorado Water
65. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-60-101 to -130 (1999).
Conservation Board consists of a fifteen member board chosen from various
geographic areas in the State. Id. § 37-60-104. In 1937, the legislature created the
board for the purpose of "aiding in the protection and development of the state for
the benefit of the present and future inhabitants of the state." Id. § 37-60-102.
66. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
67. COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-2-3(6) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
68. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999).
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between specific points or levels for and on natural streams and lakes
as are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable
degree.
There was little dispute that Senate Bill 97 represented a
significant departure from Colorado's pure appropriation system. The
Colorado River Water Conservation District argued that it was
unconstitutional.7"
Some commentators predicted that the
recognition of instream flows marked the beginning of a slippery slope
toward a public trust doctrine, while others characterized the
legislation as portending a "resurgence of riparianism.'
None of
these dire predictions have proven accurate, and the instream flow
program is now an accepted component of Colorado's prior
appropriation system.
Although Senate Bill 97 represented a departure from Colorado's
"pure" appropriation doctrine, recent history demonstrates that
it is
only a limited tool for protecting instream uses which was further
restricted by 1981 amendments.
Only the CWCB can create and
enforce instream flow rights. 73 Further, the CWCB can "preserve the
natural environment to a reasonable degree 74 but only if a natural
environment exists such that the CWCB can 9rotect the environment
without material injury to vested water rights. Additionally, any such
appropriation is junior to existing uses or exchanges, even if those uses
and exchanges are not confirmed by decree. 76 However, even with
statutory instream flow provisions, it is important to recognize that
Western Slope recreational industries like fishing guides and rafting
companies rely on water flowing in streams to the same extent that
traditional industries rely on water diverted from streams. These
recreational industries still have no tool to appropriate or protect their
continued use of water within the stream.77
69. Id. § 37-92-103(4).
70. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo. 1979).
Immediately after the Colorado Water
Conservation Board began to implement Senate Bill 97, the Colorado River Water
Conservation District challenged the constitutionality of an instream flow
appropriation on the Crystal River. The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately ruled
that Senate Bill 97 was constitutional. See id. at 577. Prior to the enactment of
statutory instream flow provisions, the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled that the
attempted appropriation of a minimum stream flow by the Colorado River Water
Conservation District was unconstitutional because no diversion of any portion of the
water would take place. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power
Co., 406 P.2d 798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
71. 2 VRANESH, supranote 61, § 6.7, at 701.
72. Act ofJune 23, 1981, ch. 431, § 1, 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 1784.
73. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 37-92-102(3)(c).
76. Id. § 37-92-102(3)(b).
77. Cf City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 930-31 (Colo. 1992)
(holding in relevant part that it is not essential to a valid appropriation that water be
diverted from it natural streambed but that a valid appropriation can be made by
controlling water within its natural course for, among other things, recreational
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Despite various shortcomings of the instream flow program, many
Western Slope residents embraced the concept. Headwater streams
comprised the early focus of the CWCB's instream flow adjudication
program. Many Western Slope residents have appeared before the
Although
CWCB to support instream flow appropriations."'
misconceptions about the priority of instream flows in relation to
other senior water rights remain common among lay people, many
Western Slope residents recognize the importance of minimum flows
to maintain the health of local creeks, streams, and rivers.
Western Slope municipalities are finding that the maturing
instream flow program is a mixed blessing. Many towns on the
Western Slope are experiencing tremendous growth largely due to
healthy recreation, tourism, and resort industries. These newcomers
often demand continued flow of water in local streams. Yet, as towns
expand and water requirements grow, even relatively junior instream
flow rights can present substantial obstacles to the development and
protection of municipal water supplies.
B.

COMPETING WATER DEMANDS IN THE NEW WEST: THE RUEDI
RESERVOIR EXAMPLE

The modern economic and political climate on the Western Slope
differs from that of fifty years ago. Water resources incur new
demands as needs and perspectives change. Ruedi Reservoir presents
a good example of the competing demands for water resources in the
New West. Ruedi Reservoir was originally built as the compensatory
storage component of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, which supplies
Colorado River basin water to Southeastern Colorado.79 Under
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District decrees, the
project can export up to 120,000 acre-feet of water from the Colorado
River basin in any one year, but must not exceed 69,200 acre-feet per
year over a thirty-four year running average. 8° The District diverts
from the headwaters of the Fryingpan River and the Hunter Creek
drainage to the Eastern Slope through the Boustead Tunnel.8 ' The
operating principles for the project designate fifty-one percent of such
water for municipal use and forty-nine percent for agricultural use.

purposes).
78. Interview with Eric Kuhn, Western Slope Colorado Water Conservation Board
Member and Secretary-Engineer for the Colorado River Water Conservation District,
Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Oct. 25, 1999).
79. Fryingpan-Arkansas Project-Colorado, Pub. L. No. 87-590, 76 Stat. 389 (1962)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 616-616f (1994)). The operating principles for
the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project are set forth in House of Representatives Document
130, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., adopted by the State of Colorado on August 16, 1972. Pub.
L. No. 87-590, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 389, 391 (1962).
80. Interview with Steve Arveschaug, General Manager of the Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District (November 12, 1999).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Ruedi Reservoir has a total capacity of about 102,000 acre-feet. 83 A
"regulatory pool" of stored water totaling approximately 55,000 acrefeet is available for use on the Westem Slope pursuant to contracts
with the United States Bureau of Reclamation.84 A "replacement pool"
of approximately 28,000 acre-feet was created for the Southeastern
District for augmentation releases.85 The Bureau of Reclamation
contracted with many Western Slope water users, including the West
Divide and the Basalt Water Conservancy Districts, for water delivery
from the regulatory pool. Revenues from these contracts
8 6 are allocated
towards construction, operation, and maintenance costs.
Despite the seemingly clear purposes of Ruedi Reservoir, people's
ideas radically differ as to how it ought to be operated and managed
today. As the primary contractual beneficiary of the FryingpanArkansas Project, the Southeastern District naturally wants to see
Ruedi Reservoir operated in a manner that maximizes allowable
transbasin diversions while remaining consistent with the operating
principles for the project. 7 The federal government has conflicting
mandates. The Bureau of Reclamation, which owns and operates the
Reservoir, wants the costs of construction recouped, while the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service views Ruedi Reservoir as a large vessel
of unused water that could be released for the benefit of endangered
fish species. 8
Many Western Slope residents, especially those living in the
Roaring Fork Valley and Colorado River drainage between the Town
of Basalt and the Utah border, view Ruedi Reservoir as a source of
present and future water supply. These residents struggle to preserve
the unused capacity of the reservoir for future Western Slope uses even
though present demands for water appear to be fully satisfied. These
demands include: the growing Grand Junction metropolitan area; the
smaller cities of Palisade, Rifle, Glenwood Springs, Carbondale, and
Basalt; and large agricultural interests.
Recreationalists have their own priorities. Flat water boaters want
water levels managed to maintain optimum boating conditions, while
anglers, on the Frying Pan River below the dam, seek to limit the
maximum rate of release in order to protect wading conditions.
Rafting companies and whitewater enthusiasts want consistent flows in
the Roaring Fork River below the reservoir. And finally, a consortium
of Eastern and Western Slope water users have proposed a project that
would pump water from Ruedi Reservoir back through the
Continental Divide delivering more water to the Eastern Slope to

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Southeastern District is responsible for approximately twenty percent of
such costs. Interview with Steve Arveschaug, General Manager of the Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District (November 12, 1999).
87. Id.
88. See discussion infra Part VI.
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enhance opportunities for diversions on the upper Eagle River. 9
Thus, although the facility was ostensibly built to compensate the
Western Slope for water exports, the lack of immediate demand for
Ruedi water has made it a convenient and susceptible target for
radically different purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1969 Act provided a new procedural framework for the
adjudication and the administration of water resources in Colorado
while retaining most of the substance of the "pure" prior
appropriation system. However, since its enactment thirty years ago,
changing values and conditions have prompted some significant
relaxation of prior appropriation principles. Small quantities of
groundwater can now be produced and used completely outside the
priority system. Out-of-priority uses of water are commonplace
pursuant to augmentation plans and exchanges which require that
senior rights accept replacement sources. Additionally, water rights
can now be created in some circumstances without a diversion.
Accepted beneficial uses now include the preservation of the natural
environment.
While calls for basin-of-origin protection will
undoubtedly continue, existing laws have been interpreted to provide
some limited protections to native water supplies.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the continued viability of the prior
appropriation system comes not from Coloradans themselves, but from
the federal government. Most lands on Colorado's Western Slope are
owned and managed by the United States Forest Service or the United
States Bureau of Land Management. These agencies have not been
very successful in acquiring water rights for their various water needs
through the reserved rights doctrine. This lack of success has led the
The
federal government to explore alternative approaches.
government has attempted to acquire small portions of numerous
senior rights from those who divert water on federal lands as a
condition for permit renewals for diversion, storage, and conveyance
facilities located on federal land. This concept is often referred to as
"bypass flows." 9'
In addition, where a federal nexus exists, the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service demands water to increase the flows of the
Colorado, the Gunnison, and the Yampa Rivers for the purpose of
recovering four endangered fish species." The Fish and Wildlife
89. Heather McGregor, Ruedi Studied for Water Diversion, GLENWOOD INDEPENDENT
(Colo.), October 18, 1999, at 1,7.
90. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
91. See generally Thomas. K Snodgrass, Bypass Flow Requirements and the Question of
Forest Service Authority, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 641, 652-56 (1999).
92. The Colorado Water Conservation Board sought minimum stream flows on the
Colorado and the Gunnison Rivers. Application for Water Rights to Protect the
Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, Case No. 95-CW-296 (Colo. Water Ct.,
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Service has recently published a Programmatic Biological Opinion
which provides that in exchange for water releases from various
sources and other habitat enhancements to benefit the endangered
fish in the Colorado River reservoir, the Fish and Wildlife Service will
agree to allow the development of up to 120,000 additional acre-feet
per year." Once this amount is consumed, however, any additional
water diversion projects that require federal approval will likely be
denied unless the appropriator agrees to provide additional water for
the endangered fish.'
The distinct possibility of limited federal control over water
resources allocation in Western Colorado which is presented by
concepts such as bypass flow requirements and the Endangered
Species Act 9 is perhaps the prior appropriation system's greatest
threat. Will the system endure? Although the 1969 Act was primarily
intended to codify and continue a century-old system, the first thirty
years since passage of the Act have shown that the system has a capacity
for change which may be essential to its preservation.

Div. No. 5, Dec. 25, 1995); Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural
Environment to a Reasonable Degree, Case No. 95-CW-297 (Colo. Water Ct., Div. No.
5, Dec. 25, 1995). Additionally, it sought instream flows on the Yampa River.
Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable
Degree, Case No. 95-CW-155 (Colo. Water Ct., Div. No. 6, Dec. 25, 1995); Application
for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, No. 95CW-156 (Colo. Water Ct., Div. No. 6, Dec. 25, 1995). As part of the multi-state
program to recover these endangered fish, the Colorado Water Conservation Board
attempted to adjudicate instream flows for the benefit of the endangered fish in the
Colorado River. They sought an amount equal to the entire remaining flow of the
Colorado River less a "carve out" of 100,000 acre-feet per year. The state's remaining
share of Colorado River Compact water is about 1.5 million acre-feet per year. The
practical result of the Colorado Water Conservation Board's filings would have been
the reduction of Colorado River water available for future development within the
State from 1.5 million acre-feet to 100,000 acre-feet. The mechanism for allocating
the "carve out" was never clarified, and the applications were voluntarily dismissed by
the Colorado Water Conservation Board. However, many Western Slope water users
predicted that this would convert the prior appropriation system to a permit system
with the United States Fish and Wildlife or its surrogate deciding who would receive a
share of the carve out. The Colorado Water Conservation Board is widely expected to
file new instream flow applications by December 31, 2000.
93.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, MOUNTAIN-PRAIRIE

REGION, DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S
OPERATIONS AND DEPLETIONS, OTHER DEPLETIONS, AND FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION

OF RECOVERY PROGRAM ACTIONS IN UPPER COLORADO RIVER ABOVE THE CONFLUENCE OF
THE GUNNISON RIVER 2 (October 25, 1999) [hereinafter FWS DRAFr PROGRAMMATIC
BIOLOGICAL OPINION].

94. The authors' assertion that any further water development will be subject to
federal approval is an inference from the Fish and Wildlife Service's Draft Biological
Opinion. See generally FWS DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supranote 95.

95. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
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INTRODUCTION

In taking stock of the 1969 Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969 ("Act") on its thirtieth anniversary, even a
critique must take note of its many positive features. Most important
as a substantive matter, the Act integrated the administration of
surface and ground water.' Too many of Colorado's sister states in the
West continue to ignore the hydrologic facts supporting such
integration to the detriment of resource protection or meaningful
administration.
The procedural innovations of the Act-water
divisions, judges and referees, the rolling adjudication, and the
tabulation and abandonment lists2--are so much a part of today's
working status quo that few recognize them any longer as
revolutionary. As a policy matter, with its adoption of the doctrine of
maximum utilization of water, the Act reinvigorated a state system
described as "stagnant."3
The latter innovation, however, is not one that engenders
unanimous praise, even among water users and their advocates; the
Act did not incorporate most of the management techniques necessary
to make maximum utilization work in an accountable system. Such
practices should have included, "metered water, measured crop use,
strong management, waste control, and strict adherence to the
constitutional concept of public property."4 Viewed from the vantage

I Melinda Kassen is the Western Water Project Colorado Office Director for
Trout Unlimited.
1. David L. Harrison & Gustave Sandstrom, Jr., The Groundwater-Surface Water
Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 28-29, 38 (1971).
2. See Gary L. Greer, A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law, 47 DENV. L.J.
181 (1970).
3. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 24-25.
4. Id. at 24.
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of one concerned about protecting Colorado's magnificent aquatic
resources and about fostering open decision-making processes, the
Act is deeply flawed.
The Act's failings derive from conscious decisions on the part of
the legislature, both to include features that perpetuated the status
quo and to reject reforms. This commentary will focus on three such
issues. First, the Act failed to take the opportunity to change
Colorado's archaic court-based system into an administrative permitbased one.
Second, by creating the new tool of "plans for
augmentation, ''5 the Act paved the way for further depletions of overappropriated streams, thereby, in many cases, stressing the
environment beyond its capacity to sustain living aquatic systems.
Finally, the Act's definition of beneficial use has led to severe and
unnecessary stress on aquatic ecosystems and resources. This has
occurred because the Act's drafters incorporated the state supreme
court's policy of "maximum utilization"7 of water without qualification
either by the addition of a public interest test or any requirement to
encourage conservation of the scarce water resource.
II. COURT-BASED WATER ALLOCATION

Of all the Western states, Colorado alone adheres to a purely
court-based system of adjudicating water rights. The Act did not
conform Colorado's system to the permit systems used elsewhere.
Apparently, no true consideration of this reform ever occurred; the
legislature even defeated a modest proposal to increase the authority
of the state engineer.9 By 1969, those analyzing the system dismissed
the possibility of such a transformation out-of-hand, asserting that,
after a century of court-based decision-making, it was too late for
Colorado to adopt a permit system.' ° In fact, the Act was "generally
characterized in terms of the absence of a clear delegation of
regulatory authority ....
[I]t set down a legislative policy in favor of
limiting direct regulatory authority to maintain the status quo with
regard to existing water rights."" The legislature chose not to impose
a regulatory system even though water experts conceded that the state

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(5) (1999).
6. For a description of the needs of healthy streams and ecosystems to all parts of
the hydrograph, see N. LeRoy Poff, et al., The NaturalFlow Regime, 47 BIOSCIENCE 769
(1997).
7. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (1999), derivedfrom Fellhauer v. People, 447
P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968).
8. SeeJohn Undem Carlson, Report to GovernorJohnA. Love on Certain Colorado Water
Law Problems, 50 DENV. L.J. 293 (1973).
9. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 44-45.
10. Id. at 25.
11. Id. at 37. Ironically, the authors noted that it was also generally the case that
consolidating authority in a water manager/administrator had many advantages,
including: "(1) more efficient use of water, (2) full development of the ground and
surface resources, (3) better production, (4) a more stable supply, (5) better
availability at times needed, and (6) improved quality." Id. at 44.
5.
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did have the authority to regulate such rights through the police
power.
The cumbersome mechanism of using the courts to adjudicate all
water matters has many disadvantages. First, the high costs and need
for representation in the court system limits the likelihood that certain
types of transactions will occur. Such costs create a barrier favoring
those with resources in disputed cases. 4 The closed nature of the
court system also generally minimizes public access to the process."
The courts also weaken the potential of Colorado's water market.
While it may not always be desirable to move water to money, powerful
arguments support the viewpoint that a truly open water market could
enhance stream protection.
Second, the court-based forum strongly discourages interested
members of the public (as opposed to water rights holders) from
participating in allocation decisions for this publicly owned resource.
This is so notwithstanding the fact that the Act changed the law to
allow any person to file a statement of opposition.
Barriers to
effective public participation arise not only from the high transaction
costs discussed above, but also from the fact that the system allows
non-water rights holders to raise only very limited arguments in
opposing water rights applications.' 8 Thus, for example, "changes [are
12. Carlson, supra note 8, at 321.
13. One example occurred in 1973 when the state legislature gave the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB" or "Board") the authority to appropriate water
without diversion to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999). In 1986, the legislature expanded the instream flow
program to allow the CWCB to acquire-by purchase or donation-instream flow
rights. Since passage of this statutory expansion, the Board has accepted over a dozen
donations of water. However, one recent donation of a water right valued at over one
million dollars cost $100,000 to effect in water court. Due to the high costs involved
with changing a right to allow an existing user to lease water to the Board, the Board
has not been able to establish a leasing program to augment the water rights it holds.
By contrast, Montana, which has a permit system, has an effective and active leasing
program.
14. The city of Minturn reportedly settled a case with Vail Associates by giving up a
water right because the town did not have the resources to defend its right in water
court. Steve Lipsher, Minturn, Vail Lawsuit Settled-Ski Resort Gains in Water Dispute,
DENY. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at B6.
15. In a case involving quantification of the U.S. Forest Service's reserved rights,
Trout Unlimited intervened in order to be privy to the proposed settlement. In re
United States, Case No. 81-CW-183, Water Division 3. While civil litigation typically
requires an entity to become a party to a case to engage in settlement, here the issue is
allocation of a public resource by government entities. Limiting the participation by
members of the public is not easy in an administrative forum. In most agency
proceedings, even where party status conveys certain privileges, any member of the
public can nonetheless participate before the agency at some level.
16. See generally CLAYJ. LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAMS THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (1998).
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-304(2) (1999). The statute states in relevant part that
"any person... who wishes to protest or support a ruling of the referee shall file in
writing a pleading ....
".Id.
18. Carlson, supra note 8, at 325-26. While the Act did expand standing, it did not
expand the arguments that persons could make in opposition to a new or changed
water right. Id at 326.
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not] restricted or denied in order to accommodate the proprietary
interest of the 'public' or the 'people' in water."' 9 All that a member
of the public can force by opposing an application is "strict proof' of
the facts necessary to support the new or changed right." This does,
however, include the ability of a member of the public to challenge an
applicant to prove water availability, or in the case of a conditional
right, that the applicant "can and will" be able to make the right
absolute.
Third, using a court-based system to determine appropriations of
water makes it substantially more difficult to integrate water quality
regulation with decisions about quantity. Where there is a single
administrative agency responsible for both sets of decisions, as is the
case for the Department of Ecolog in the State of Washington, for
example, integration simply occurs. Such integration makes sense in
light of the obvious connections between quality and quantity. While
in 1969 the federal Clean Water Act did not exist, a federal water
quality statute delegated substantial responsibility to the states.
Moreover, there is no evidence that in 1969, Colorado's legislature
considered incorporating environmental values in the Act.
And,
when given the opportunity to address quality-quantity integration a
decade later, the legislature responded by building a high wall
between regulation of water quality on the one hand and
administration of water rights on the other.25 The wall creates real,
adverse consequences to aquatic systems. As the Colorado Supreme
Court recognized, "this dual system limits the ability of both the water
court and the water quality control agencies to address certain water

19. Id. at 318.
20. Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739, 747 (Colo. 1997).
21. See In re Board of County Comm'rs, Case No. 88-CW-178, Water Division 4,
Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, Judgment and Decree Order, (April 6, 1998); In re
Natural Energy Resource Co., Case No. 96-CW-257, Water Division 4, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, (May 28, 1998).
22. See PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994) (state
agency responsible for both water rights and water quality permitting imposes flow
requirements in a water quality certification).
23. Water Quality Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (prior to
1972 amendment by the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments, later renamed
the Clean Water Act).
24. The legislature did not adopt a provision providing any environmental
protection within the 1969 Act until 1973 when it created the state's instream flow
program. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999) (creating Colorado's modest
program for preservation of instream flows, following the threat of a citizen
referendum); Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd.,
594 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo. 1979) (upholding the Colorado statutory instream flow
program as constitutional).
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-104 (1999); see generally City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91(Colo. 1996) (state supreme court ruling that, beyond a
"general prohibition on unreasonable discharges, the system of water quality
regulation in Colorado reflects a continued conflict with and subordination to the
prior appropriation system," such that water judges may not consider many water
quality impacts in their decisions). But see discussion of the court's statements in
cases addressing the policy of maximum utilization, infra Part IV.
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quality issues... [or] provide remedies for all types of injuries. 6
Finally, courts, due to case-by-case determinations, fail as a forum
for effective water resource planning. Were an agency determining
water rights, that agency could also engage in resource management
and planning activities that might lead not only to greater efficiencies
in allocation of the resource, but also greater certainty.27 Neither in
1969 nor in the subsequent thirty years has Colorado's legislature
shown much interest in water resource planning. Thus, the choice to
continue Colorado's court-based system has been correct from the
standpoint of the state's legislative agenda, even though the natural
environment, necessarily sustained by waters within streams, suffers.
M. AUGMENTATION PLANS

One of the Act's major innovations opened over-appropriated
watersheds to additional appropriation through the use of "plans for
augmentation." 8 Any "sensible plan of water management which
increases the supply available for beneficial use will S ualify" provided,
of course, there is no injury to an existing water user.
Some augmentation plans have increased stream flows by putting
non-tributary ground water into a surface stream. The consequences
of these plans are neutral, if not beneficial, to the surface water
system."0 Other plans have increased stream flow in one basin to the
detriment of another by using water diverted out of the so-called
basin-of-origin to satisfy seniors in the receiving basin.
Many
augmentation plans, however, rely on releases from water in storage to
satisfy seniors. In these cases, the water in storage is almost invariably
captured during snowmelt runoff, thus denying the river system the
benefits of high water, or seasonal flood, periods.3
Wringing ever more water out of the system is certainly consistent
with the state policy enunciated in the Act of "maximum utilization" of
Colorado's waters."2 As the supreme court noted in construing this
new tool for water users, "the fact that the rivers involved are overappropriated, rather than being an argument against the plans for
augmentation, is the very reason for the valid exercise of ingenuity of

26. Bijou IrrigationCo., 926 P.2d at 92.
27. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 44.
28. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(5) (1999); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(9) (1999) (originally defining a plan for augmentation as "a detailed program...
to increase the supply of water available for beneficial use ... by the development of
new or alternate means or points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by
water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water, by the development
of new sources of water, or by any other appropriate means."); Cache LaPoudre Water
Users Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 293 (Colo. 1976) (upholding the
validity of the plans for augmentation).
29. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 28.
30. The overall environmental effect of these plans is less clear given the quick
depletion of ground water that took eons to accumulate.
31. See generally Poff, supra note 6.
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999).
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of water. .
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One

contemporaneous analysis of this new "major tool" in the Act
described the effect of augmentation plans as allowing a water "user
[to] propose an operation which increases his own supply to the
detriment of no one. 04
From an ecological perspective, however, it is simply a fallacy that
additional depletions that do not adversely affect any other water user
are to the "detriment of no one." Such further depletions in an
already over-appropriated stream may, all too often, harm the aquatic
environment that the water in the river sustained, particularly if the
compensation comes at the expense of the seasonal flow variations that
a natural environment needs. The loss of water may adversely affect
both the economic value (as a result of diminishing recreational use,
such as boating or angling) and the environmental or social value of
the natural system (for example, if the injured stream might otherwise
have sustained a wild trout fishery or endangered fish habitat). Thus,
the further depletions that augmentation plans allow are to the
detriment of the river itself and to these values. 5 Yet, at the time of
their creation (and perhaps still), augmentation plans were seen as a
way to develop "new water from the elimination of waste in the natural
stream system.5 6 In fact, one example given was to drain a bog. If
nothing else, the last thirty years have demonstrated that there are
powerful reasons not to destroy more of this
nation's wetlands,
8
particularly to provide water for inefficient users.3
In creating augmentation plans, the Act took a strikingly different
approach from that in other Western states that adhere to the prior
appropriation system. The states of Washington, Idaho, and Montana,
for example, have closed over-appropriated river basins to additional
depletions by agency-imposed moratoria or by statutory fiat5 9 Such
closures protect both existing users and the remainder of the riverine
environment. In some instances, these closures may also favor the
33. Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304

(Colo. 1976).

34. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, 28 & 38.
35. See generally Poff, supra note 6.
36. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 41.
37. Id. The Clean Water Act, passed in 1972, made it more difficult to drain a bog
by adding the requirement of obtaining a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
38. There is, of course, no requirement that an applicant for an augmentation plan
demonstrate that the new use will utilize the water efficiently or that it will benefit
anyone other than the applicant.
39. In the State of Washington, this can happen pursuant to a statutory process. See
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.38 & 90.42 (1992). In 1999, the state closed the Yakima River
basin. In Idaho, the state's Department of Water Resources recently extended
moratoria on new depletions in the Salmon and Clear Water Rivers that the
Department initially ordered in 1993; the Idaho legislature statutorily closed the Snake
River Plain by statute. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1806 (1996) (null and void December 31,

1997) (a moratorium the Department extended administratively). In Montana, the
legislature adopted a basin-specific statute in 1999 to close the Bitterroot basin to
further water development. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-344 (1999). This legislation
passed with the support of most agricultural users in the valley.

WATER LAW REVEW

Volume 3

existing economy, for example, existing agriculture over new housing
developments." In Colorado, irrespective of the Act, some, if not
most, water lawyers would argue that closing a river to further
appropriation is unconstitutional because Colorado's Constitution
proclaims "[t]he right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied., 4' Given that
the constitutional right is limited to unappropriated waters, it is
unclear whether this argument would prevail before the supreme
court. However, regardless of how such a case would turn out, it is
highly unlikely that the state legislature would adopt laws to effect
basin closures. Thus, the drafters of the Act's decision to choose
further depletions over protection of over-appropriated streams will
remain a feature of Colorado water law in the foreseeable future, with
all its attendant adverse environmental consequences.
IV. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION, BENEFICIAL USE, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST

Colorado's Constitution declares that "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado,
is... the property of the public and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation. ' 4' Notwithstanding
this provision, Colorado water law is and always has been the province
of those who divert water for use out of the stream; nothing in the Act
changed this fundamental construct. 4 Colorado has never-before, in,
or since the Act-adopted an express "public interest" test through
which to screen the determination of what constitutes a beneficial use,
or of whether an applicant is entitled to a water right decree. In fact,
the supreme court has rejected any implicit public interest test as a
result of the constitution's declaration that the public owns the water.
Thus, the court has held that, "a public interest argument is not a valid
objection to a decree for a new conditional water right because such
an argument conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation."44 The
Act does not define the term "beneficial use" when applied to
diversionary uses to include any consideration of the societal
consequences of the use, whether good or bad; the only limit on what
constitutes a beneficial use is that the water not be wasted.45
What the legislature did codify was the doctrine of "maximum

40. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-344 (1999) (The situation facing traditional water
users in Montana's Bitterroot valley that led to the legislation).
41. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 6; Carlson, supra note 8, at 322.
42. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
43. In fact, one water expert opined that the Colorado public's right to water was
antithetical to the state's system of prior appropriation. Carlson, supra note 8, at 320321.
44. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands, 929 P.2d 718, 725 (Colo.
1996) (quoting In re Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972-73
(Colo. 1995)).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999).
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utilization" of state waters. 46 This doctrine encourages water use, as it
is not limited either by a public interest screen or any requirement
that the holders of water rights conserve water to the maximum extent
possible. Moreover, the policy is a keystone to Colorado's system in
which the environment almost always loses water to its detriment,
regardless of the social benefits of a particular water diversion. 7
In a pivotal decision holding that cutting down certain trees
(phreatophytes) does not produce developed water free from the
priority system, the Colorado Supreme Court limited the doctrine of
maximum utilization.4 ' The court used language implying that the
doctrine of maximum utilization and water law in general should not
be used to ravage the state's natural resources. "Efficacious use does
not mean uplifting one natural resource to the detriment of
another., 49 At the same time, however, the court exhibited a striking
hostility towards the water needs of the environment, calling the
cottonwood trees lining irrigation ditches "water thieves" and
lamentin0 its inability to allow a water user to reclaim the water these
trees use.
The supreme court suggested that the doctrine of maximum
utilization must be balanced with other societal objectives, such as
environmental protection. Thus, the court stated that "the objective of
'maximum use' administration is 'optimum use.' Optimum use can
only be achieved with proper regard for all significant factors,
including environmental and economic concerns."5 However, while

the court has cautioned against using the policy of maximum

46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (a) (1999). "[I]t is the policy of this state to
integrate the appropriation, use, and administration of underground water tributary
to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize the beneficial
use of all of the waters of this state." Id.
47. The one component of Colorado water law that allows some protection of the
natural environment is the state's instream flow program, which the legislature created
in 1973. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999). Through this program, the
Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB" or "Board") is authorized to
appropriate water "for minimum stream flows.., to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree." Id. For the most part, unfortunately, the program is severely
limited in the quality of the environmental protection it can provide. With few
exceptions, the CWCB's rights are quite junior. In addition, the Board subordinates
to undecreed uses; the amounts of water that the Board can claim are minimum, not
optimum flows; and the Board has limited its appropriations almost exclusively for
protection of cold water fisheries. Moreover, the Board has no field personnel and
quite limited equipment to monitor its rights; thus, enforcement rarely occurs.
48. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d
1321(Colo. 1975). The court seemed particularly concerned that to approve Shelton
Farms' application, given the source of water, would lead to a future where too many
users had water rights free from call, threatening Colorado's prior appropriation
system. Id. at 1326.
49. Id. at 1327; see also City of Thornton v. Biou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91
(Colo. 1996) (water judges must consider potential impact of water use on other
resources).
50. Id. at 1325.
51. Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935
(Colo. 1983).
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utilization to wring every drop of water from our rivers for diversionary
uses, the court has also consistently refused to consider environmental
impacts in individual cases.5 Rather, the court found that the state's
instream flow protection program constituted the state-wide balance
between the policies of maximum utilization and environmental
protection 5
Ironically, at the same time that Colorado adopted the Act, a
National Water Commission ("the Commission") was examining the
nation's water policies, including states' water law systems. 4 Not
surprisingly, the Commission recommended a different approach
from that which Colorado adopted. To promote the "efficient,
equitable and environmentally responsible management of its water
resources," the Commission noted five legislative actions aimed at
protecting instream values:
(1) reserving portions of streams from development and setting
them aside as "wild rivers;"
(2) authorizing a public agency to file for and acquire rights in
unappropnated water;
(3) setting minimum streamflows and lake levels;
(4)
(5)

establishing environmental criteria for the granting of permits
to use water; [and]
forbidding the alteration of watercourses without State

consent.
In the aftermath of the Act's passage, Colorado's Governor
apparently sought advice regarding how to respond to the
Commission's work. The report he received observed that "Colorado
water law is ... vulnerable to the criticism ...

that state law is

wrongheaded in its failure to provide recognition for the social values
of water."56 This report also noted that Colorado law did not
"recognize the possibility that appropriators [could] seek to develop
water rights which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are
none-the-less socially undesirable for the public at large. 57 The
report recognized that Colorado's water law system, as embodied in
the Act, "assumes that58 all growth and development give rise to
beneficial uses of water.
52.

Compare Alamosa-La Jara, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983) with Board of County

Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 952 (Colo. 1995); Aspen Wilderness
Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands, 929 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1996); Bijou Irrigation Co., 926
P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).
53. RJA, Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n, 690 P.2d 823, 828 (1984); see also Alamosa-La
Jara,674 P.2d 914, and Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952.
54. UNITED STATES NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES

FOR THE FUTURE:
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1973).

The Commission convened in 1968 pursuant to National Water Commission Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-515, 82 Stat. 868.
55. Id. at 228.
56. Carlson, supra note 8, at 301.
57. Id.at 324.
58. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
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The report rejected most of the Commission's recommendations
as either unconstitutional or antithetical to Colorado's system of prior
appropriation.9 However, the report concluded that Colorado could
address the Commission's underlying concerns. First, the state could
vigorously prosecute waste and the application of water to nonbeneficial uses by existing users. Second, to control new uses the state
could establish legislative standards to define the public interest in
what constitutes a beneficial use. In addition, the state could create a
new agency to assert the public interest in water court proceedings. 6
Unfortunately, Colorado has ignored the second and third
recommendations entirely. With regard to the first, prosecuting waste,
the Act was of little help and there have been few such cases in the
intervening thirty years. While the effective regulation of waste
requires legal quantification of every water right by calculating
volumetric limits, the Act only defines waste qualitatively, in terms of
beneficial use.61 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the
"owner of a water right has no right as against a junior appropriatorto
waste water, i.e., to divert more than can be used beneficially. 62 Thus,
where the injury falls only on the stream itself, and not on a junior
water rights holder,6 3 it is unclear how Colorado law provides for
curtailment of the waste.
Not only has the Act proved ineffective in stopping waste, but it
also works to discourage active conservation. This is notwithstanding
its definition of beneficial use: "the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is
lawfully made." 64 While some cases do address what constitutes a
reasonable means of diversion, no published cases interpret the phrase
59. Id. at 328-30. For example, the report asserted that allowing a public agency to
file for unappropriated water and setting minimum stream flows would be
unconstitutional. Id. at 529. As noted above, it was to the surprise of many in
Colorado's water community that the Supreme Court ruled the state instream flow
program constitutional in 1979. See Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. Colorado
Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979).
60. Carlson, supra note 8, at 347-48.
61. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 31. In the two supreme court cases
addressing waste handed down in the intervening thirty years, the court noted that a
water right is "limited to an amount sufficient for the purpose for which the
appropriation was made, even though such limitation may be less than the decreed
rate of diversion." Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo.
1981); see also Weibert v. Rothe Brothers, Inc., 618 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Colo. 1980).
However, it is also the case that many types of decrees in Colorado include express
volumetric limits. Groundwater and storage decrees always do, and change of use
cases result in decrees limited to a quantified historic use. SeeJames Corbridge, 69U.
COLO. L. REV. 503, 525 (1998); Farmers Highline Canal v. Golden, Case No. 97SA343
(Colo. Mar. 3, 1999). The lack of volumetric limits thus arises primarily when dealing
with older, original (i.e. unchanged) rights.
62. Weibert, 618 P.2d at 1371 (emphasis added); see also Rominiecki, 633 P.2d at 1067.
63. Relaxed enforcement against waste has adverse consequences for water users
generally because it results in excess evaporation, time delays, and unnecessary
curtailments. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 32.
64. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999).
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"reasonably efficient practices." The two concepts are not identical.
Thus, for example, some irrigators hold rights and divert water
through a reasonable structure, but in a quantity well in excess of the
duty of water for their crops.65
Where the Colorado Supreme Court has examined issues related
to conservation, its holdings offer little support for conservation
The Act codified the requirement that users effect a
values.
"reasonable means of effectuating... diversion." 6 However, the court
found that changing a senior water user's method of diversion could
be the financial responsibility of a junior appropriator, because
neither the court nor the State Engineer can force senior
appropriators "to improve their extraction facilities beyond their
economic reach. 67 With the financial burden shifted, a senior has
little incentive even to conserve the quantity diverted, let alone its
Moreover, without express statutory incentives to
application.
conserve, the manner in which Colorado values a water right at the
time of sale (based on historic use) provides a powerful disincentive to
68
conserve.
In its cases discussing water that may be used outside the priority
court has distinguished "developed" from
system, the supreme
"salvaged" water.68 While a user may take full advantage of developed
water, the same is not true for salvaged water, which is merely tributary
to the stream. Even if salvaged water would not have been available for
use but for the actions of the person seeking a right to its use, because
the water was none-the-less tributary to the stream, the user who freed
it for use cannot claim a right to use outside the priority system. Thus,
the water simply returns to the stream and is available for use in
priority. Ironically, it has been in the context of salvaged water that
the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized the adverse
environmental impacts of water development, rather than conceding
that those same adverse impacts arise from virtually every diversion.7'
65. Harrison & Sandstrom, supra note 1, at 19 n.56.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(2) (b) (1999); see also Colorado Springs v. Bender,
366 P.2d 552, 556 (Colo. 1961).
67. Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 931, 935
(Colo. 1983) (citing Bender, 366 P.2d 552).
68. See Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977, 980
(Colo. 1981).
69. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, 529 P.2d 1321,
1325 (Colo. 1974).
70. Id.; see also Giffen v. Colorado, 690 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo. 1984); RJA, Inc. v.
Water Users Ass'n, 690 P.2d 823, 825-26 (Colo. 1984). By citing these cases, the author
in no way indicates approval of the tactics that the applicants were using to develop
water. In fact, in each case the applicants' practices-draining marshes and cutting
down trees-adversely affected the natural environment.
71. In RJA, Inc., the applicant drained a marsh to provide augmentation water.
RJA, Inc. 690 P.2d at 824. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the
application on the grounds that the marsh was a tributary to the stream and therefore
the water saved did not qualify as development water. Id. at 825-26. The court went
on to note that, "[a]lteration of natural conditions and vegetation in order to save
water carries with it the potential for adverse effects on soil and bank stability, soil
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Ultimately, in Colorado, the "use it or lose it" doctrine of the prior
appropriation system prevails. One notable exception is that the state
encourages municipalities and other urban water providers to
conserve water.7 For the most part, all other users are likely to be
penalized by investing in conservation, because they do not receive any
benefit for such an outlay since the water conserved returns to the
river only to be diverted by other water users in priority. Since a water
user may not sell or convert the water conserved, whether to another
diversionary use or to maintenance or restoration of the aquatic
environment, there is no incentive for conservation. In this respect,
Colorado again differs from her sister prior appropriation states.
Oregon, for example, allows a user who conserves to sell or convert
seventy-five percent of the conserved water provided that the user
dedicates the other portion to instream flow protection. ,7
V. CONCLUSION

The Act has undoubtedly worked well for traditional entities that
divert and use water. The system has proved flexible to accommodate
new beneficial uses. 7" But notwithstanding the public's ownership in
and great interest in preserving the water resource, the Act
perpetuates a system that does not incorporate all public values into
water allocation decision-making; does not welcome public
participation in the determination of water rights; and allows everincreasing adverse effects on natural river environments. Meanwhile,
Colorado's population explodes. 5 Its citizens worry about growth.76
Polls also show that its citizens value natural resource and
environmental protection. 77 Whether the system the Act underlies can
or should continue unreformed is the real question that those
interested in Colorado's water resources must address at the dawn of
the millennium.

productivity, wildlife habitat, fisheries production, water quality, watershed protection
and the hydrologic cycle." Id. at 828.
72. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-124 to -127 (1999).
73. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455 to .500 (1997).
74. And even some non-diversionary instream uses beyond what the CWCB can do.
See City of Thornton v. City of Ft. Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992).
75. Colorado's state demographer estimates that the state will grow to more than
five and a half million residents by the year 2020, from around four million now.
Colorado Department of Local Affairs, County and State PopulationProjects(lastmodified
July 1, 1998) <http://www.dlg.oem2.state.co.us/demog/project.htm>.
76. Because growth is at the top of the list of concerns, plans for growth control top
the state's political agenda as well. See, e.g., Mark Eddy, Growing Smarter: Owens Unveils
Plan to Ward Off Runaway Sprawl, DENVER PosT, Nov. 30, 1999, at B-i; Renata Robey,
Ideas Bandied at Growth Summit, DENVER POsT, Dec. 9, 1999; Mark Eddy, Blocking Dams
Won't End Growth, Ex-Senator Says, DENVER PosT, Dec. 3, 1999, at B-6.
77. See Pamela Case & Gregory Alward, Patterns of Demographic,Economic, and Value
Change in the Western United States, USDA FOREST SERVICE 17-24(1997) (appendix to the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Committee Report).
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INTRODUCTION

This essay might appropriately be subtitled "A Short Subject"
because intersections between the 1969 Water Right Determination
and Administration Act' ("the Act") and environmental protection
have been few, quite by design. The Act addresses environmental
concerns through a single narrow prism: the provision establishing an
instream flow program under the control of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board ("CWCB" or "Board") . This article briefly surveys
the various efforts put forth in an attempt to fit environmental issues
under the Act's narrow umbrella.
II. THE BACKDROP: COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM
In 1973, the Colorado legislature enacted Senate Bill 97 to create a
program with the modest goal of "preserv[ing] the natural
environment to a reasonable degree. The program sought to fit new
flow rights into the prior appropriation system, a phenomenon that by
1973 had begun to flourish around the West. These rights, instream

* Ms. Potter practices environmental, public land, and water law as a member of
the firm of Kelly Haglund Garnsey & Kahn LLC, Denver, Colorado. She represented
parties in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water ConservationBoard and City of
Aurora v. Division Engineer of Water District5, two cases described in this article.
1. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
2. COLO.REv. STAT.§ 37-92-102(3) (1999).
3. Id.
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flow rights, left water in the stream. The instream flow water rights
adjudicated under the new program were assessed priorities "70 years
junior to the senior rights on most rivers in settled areas," consistent
with the prior appropriation principle of first in time, first in right.'
The law allowed for the establishment of instream flows by
accomplishing two important things: (1) recognizing that instream
flows constituted a beneficial use of water; and (2) eliminating
the
5
diversion requirement for an appropriation of a water right.
A number of water districts soon challenged the constitutionality
of the instream flow program, as well as particular appropriations on
the Crystal River.6 They based their constitutional challenge on the
provision in Colorado's constitution that "[t]he right to divert the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall
never be denied.0 The Colorado Supreme Court held that the use of
the term "divert" did not require diversion as a prerequisite for an
appropriation, but only negated the notion that Colorado would
follow the riparian doctrine." In short, the law survived the challenge,
but soon underwent the first of several amendments intended to
respond to fears that the program might outgrow the modest goals
initially set in Senate Bill 97.
In 1981, the legislature added four new subsections 9 designed to
address the fear that the instream flow program would interfere with
development and consumptive use of water in the state. These
amendments affected the CWCB's appropriations in many ways,
including that the Board commenced appropriation of "separate
winter and summer flow rates for its instream flow reaches and divided
the reaches to be preserved.., into shorter segments," results caused
by a water availability finding required in one of the limitations."
In 1986, the legislature authorized the CWCB to acquire water
rights for the instream flow program "by grant, purchase, bequest,
devise, lease, exchange or other contractual agreement."" The 1986
amendment also required the CWCB to request recommendations
from the United States Departments of Agriculture and Interior prior
to appropriating instream flows. The purpose of this was to give the
federal government the option of participating in the state instream
flow program instead of relying on acquisition of federal reserved
water rights, which were regarded as a far more intrusive means of

4. Steven 0. Sims, Colorado's Instream Flow Program: Integrating Instream Flow
ProtectionInto a PriorAppropriation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECriON IN THE WEST
12-1, 12-2 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
5. Id.
6. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 571 (Colo. 1979).
7. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 6.
8. ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDist., 594 P.2d at 573.
9. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)(a)-(d) (1999).
10. Sims, supranote 5, at 124.
11. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999).
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protecting the environment.
In 1987, the legislature amended the instream flow statute once
again. This time it clarified that the CWCB is the only entity vested
with the authority to appropriate instream flows."3 The exclusivity
language responded to several attempts by private parties to
appropriate or assert instream flow rights, as described below in more
detail.
In 1994, the legislature added a detailed provision to the Act which
limited the authority of the CWCB to acquire conditional water rights
or to change conditional water rights to instream inflow uses. The
amendment limited the acquisition of conditional rights to water
rights located in the Yampa Basin which the CWCB could use to
recover a threatened or an endangered species as part of a species
recovery program and to4 benefit the species in a way that an initial
appropriation could not.1
Finally, in the wake of the Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision
described below, the legislature once again amended the instream flow
statute to specify the procedure by which the CWCB could decrease an
instream flow.'5

I. ESTABLISHING PRIVATELY-HELD INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS

Citizen acquisition of instream flows began immediately after the
Colorado legislature enacted the instream flow law. In 1975, a group
of ranchers and citizens in Gunnison County appropriated flows in
several mountain streams and obtained rights to significant instream
flows for stock water, recreation, wildlife, fish, and heritage
preservation in the Taylor River and in eight of its tributaries. 6
In 1986, the City of Fort Collins applied for instream rights in the
Poudre River through a reach in the city designated as the Poudre
River Recreational Corridor. The CWCB objected on the ground that
only the CWCB could appropriate such rights. The CWCB settled its
objections with Fort Collins prior to trial on the condition that the city
formally delete the claim of an instream flow use and designate
specific, discrete points of diversion for the water rights claimed.
Other objectors continued to oppose the "thinly disguised minimum
stream flow" application. 7 The Colorado Supreme Court issued a
ruling that confirmed the right of the City of Fort Collins to
appropriate both of the rights that it originally sought. The opinion
distinguished the Fort Collins appropriation, which incidentally
protected a stretch of river between two definite points of diversion,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Vader
17.
18.

Id.; see also Sims, supra note 5, at 12-4 to -5.
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999); see also Sims, supra note 5, at 12-5.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (c.5) (I) to (III) (1999).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(4) (a) (1999).
Amended ruling of water referee, In re Application for Water Rights of R.I.
& Sons, Inc., No. W-1991 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 4,Jan. 21, 1975).
City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 920-21 (Colo. 1992).
Id. at 933.
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from the CWCB's instream flow right, which ordinarily signifies the
complete absence of diversion structures.'9
In 1992, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a water court
decree to the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District for a
second fill of Taylor Park Reservoir for releases to produce fishery
habitat, rafting flows, and supplemental irrigation supplies.2 0 The
CWCB opposed the application, but here, too, withdrew its opposition
once the water district limited its application to use of previously
stored waters for instream uses within a defined stream reach. The
court based its affirmation of the water court on the fact that the water
district controlled river water by storage and release to accomplish the
designated beneficial uses, uses distinct from the CWCB instream flow
right purposes. Interestingly, the court affirmed the water district's
right on the basis that it provided year-round protection to the fishery,
while the CWCB right only protected fish for short periods of time.
In the eyes of a CWCB attorney, these cases:
illustrate an alternative type of instream flow right recognized in
Colorado. The alternative instream flow right is not equivalent to the
CWCB's instream flow rights since it apparently cannot exist in the
absence of diversion structures. Nonetheless, this right does allow
parties to claim an instream use of water if the applicant can prove
that prevously diverted water is being used instream for a beneficial
purpose.
Because these decisions postdated the amendment of the instream
flow statute giving the CWCB an "exclusive" right to appropriate, this
alternative
type of instream flow right apparently remains viable to this
24
day.
IV. ENFORCING THE STATE'S INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS

While on its face the instream flow program was a nearrevolutionary development in Colorado water law, the program soon
received a variety of harsh criticisms from citizens' organizations,

19.

Id. at 931.

20. Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d 840, 847, 856 (Colo. 1992).

21. Id. at 854.
22. Id.
23. Sims, supra note 5, at 12-6.
24. In Board of County Commissioners v. Collard, the Colorado Supreme Court
the validity of a private instream flow right acquired prior to enactment
statutory exclusivity language, turning back a collateral attack on the water
subject matter jurisdiction to grant that water right without endorsing the

upheld
of the
court's
court's

reasoning. Board of County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 549, 551-53 (Colo. 1992);
see generally Christopher H. Meyer, Instream Flows: IntegratingNew Uses and New Players
Into the PriorAppropriation System, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993); Lori Potter, People PreservingRivers:
The Public and its ChangingRole in ProtectingInstream Flows, INTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
INTHE WEST (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell &Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
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fishing groups, and environmental organizations.
These groups
criticized the program for appropriating very minimal rates of flow
and for limiting the purposes of the appropriations to preserving cold
water fisheries, while ignoring other instream uses such as rafting,
maintaining riparian and wetland vegetation, aesthetics, and channel
maintenance.
Organizations and individuals also scrutinized the CWCB for
deciding not to enforce or to protect its instream flow rights in a
number of instances. The CWCB's decisions to reduce or not to
enforce its decreed instream flow rights gave rise to several instances of
citizens' organizations taking enforcement action to the courts on
their own.. These types of actions culminated in a direct challenge to
the CWCB's authority to reduce an instream flow by failing to enforce
the full effect of the right when a developer's plans to consume water
would have reduced the CWCB's right below the decreed amount.
In City of Aurora v. Division Engineerfor Water Division Number 5,26 the
Colorado Mountain Club and Holy Cross Wilderness Defense Fund
opposed a change in the diversion points of conditional water rights
for the Homestake II water project. The change would have moved
the diversion points further upstream and deeper into a federal
wilderness area. The stream reaches that the city's water rights would
dewater were subject to decreed, junior instream flow rights held by
the CWCB, but the CWCB did not oppose the change in point of
diversion. The conservation groups argued that the CWCB's rights
and the federal reserved water rights for the wilderness would be
harmed by the diversions associated with the water project. The water
court rejected the conservation groups' challenge for three reasons:
(1) the CWCB withdrew its statement of opposition to the change; (2)
the United States Forest Service did not oppose the change; and (3)
the Forest Service had imposed bypass requirements on the affected
reaches, and the CWCB retained lowered instream flow rights there. 7
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed those aspects of the water
court's holding but vacated an inconsistent ruling that the state
instream flow rights be administered as senior to the changed points of
diversion notwithstanding the findings just outlined.
The City of Aurora case squarely raised the question of citizens'
standing to object to injury to the CWCB instream flow rights. The
water court found that such standing existed, a finding not later
appealed.
Likewise, a later case raising essentially the same issue received no
definitive ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.8 In Aspen Wilderness

25. See, e.g., Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the Acquisition and Enforcement of Instream
Flows, 23 LAND & WATERL. REv. 419, 429-31 (1988).
26. City of Aurora v. Division Engineer for Water Div. No. 5, 799 P.2d 33 (Colo.
1990).
27. Id. at 36.
28. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929
P.2d 718, 726 n.15 (Colo. 1996).
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Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Limited Partnership,the court found
that "[t]he issue of whether the appellants have standing to assert
injury to the CWCB's instream flow rights is not before us and we do
not address it. '' 9 The court noted that the extent to which the citizens
argued injury to the decreed instream flow rights remained unclear,
but reasoned that since the CWCB was itself a party to the
proceedings, had satisfied itself that its interests were being protected,
and did not oppose entry of the decree, the argument of injury
asserted by the citizens was unpersuasive. 30
The CWCB's policies for enforcement of its instream flow rights
came under direct attack in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board.31 In that case, the CWCB held decreed
instream flows on Snowmass Creek of 12 c.f.s. year-round.32 Faced
with a proposal by the Aspen Ski Company to increase snowmaking
diversions from Snowmass Creek in the winter, the CWCB examined
the year-round 12 c.f.s. flow and determined that, among other things,
the winter flow could be reduced in amounts sufficient to allow the
snowmaking proposal to proceed.33 The Aspen Wilderness Workshop
filed suit against the CWCB in Denver District Court pursuant to the
State Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the "decision not to
enforce the full instream flow appropriation... amounted to a
'
permanent relinquishment of a public instream flow right. 34
The
district court held that the CWCB had acted within its power to modify
its appropriation. Further, the court held that like any other water
right holder, the CWCB need not enforce its rights or use a portion of
its decreed right in excess of the amount needed. Any such correction
by the CWCB did not require water court adjudication.35
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop argued on appeal that the CWCB
breached a fiduciary duty to the public by failing to enforce the right
as decreed.36 The Colorado Supreme Court agreed. The court found
that the statutory provision authorizing the instream flow program
limited the CWCB's authority in two important respects. First, it
burdened the Board's actions by "creating a unique statutory fiduciary
duty between the Board and the people of the state so that the Board
may only appropriate the ...minimum amount of water necessary to
preserve the natural environment.3 1 Second, once the CWCB
adjudicated the minimum stream flow required to preserve the natural
environment, it was required to fulfill its unique statutory
responsibility to the public by administering its water rights
29. Id.
30. Id. at 726.
31. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995).
32, Id. at 1260.
33. Id. at 1255.
34, Id.
35. Id. at 1256.
36. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1255.
37. Id. at 1256-57.
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accordingly.3 8 If the CWCB determined that a previously adjudicated
right needed change in order to maintain necessary stream flows, it
could return to the water court to change the decree. But until and
unless that determination and change had been made, the supreme
court agreed that the CWCB's fiduciary duty to the public barred it
from administratively relinquishing a portion of the instream flow
decreed for the benefit of the public. 9
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision precipitated the 1996
amendments to the instream flow law. The decision and the later
statutory modification also caused a flurry of agency rule-making to
establish procedures for appropriation, for modification of instream
flows, and for addressing the related issue of when an instream flow
could be modified by inundation."

V.

THE QUEST FOR A PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW OF WATER RIGHT
APPLICATIONS

Most Western states' water codes require that the entity vested with
power to review and grant water rights applications ensure the right
will conform with the public interest or public welfare.4 1 Such
provisions allow denial of water right applications if approval runs
contrary to the public interest.
Lacking such a public interest condition in the 1969 Act, a
coalition of fishing, environmental, and citizens' groups attempted to
establish one as a matter of common law as part of their challenge to a
major trans-basin diversion from the Gunnison Basin to the Front
Range. 2
While these objectors prevailed in arguing that the
application should be denied as speculative, both the water court and
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that a water court is not required
to consider the environmental factors such as effects on wildlife
habitat, recreation, water quality, and property values in determining
whether the agplicant had proved that the water would be put to
beneficial use.
The crux of the objectors' argument was that the
trans-basin diversion, known as the Union Park project, would have
widespread and adverse impacts on the fisheries, wildlife habitat,
recreation, tax base, and general quality of life in the Gunnison
Basin. 4 Both courts flatly rejected this objection, holding that "[t]he
limited inquiry required to determine whether to issue a conditional
rights decree in this case does not include evaluation of environmental

38. Id.
39. See Lori Potter, Putting Some Teeth in Public Enforcement: The Colorado Supreme
Court'sDecision in the Snowmass Creek Case, 17 U. DENV. WATER CT. RPTR. 1, 2 (1995-96).

40. See2 COLO. CODE REGs. § 408-2 (1998).
41' Lori Potter, The Public'sRole in the Acquisition and Enforcement of Instream Flows, 23
LAND & WATER L. REv. 419, 432 (1988).
42. Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 971 (Colo. 1995).
43. Id.at 973.
44. Id. at 971.
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factors. 4 ' The court specifically rejected arguments that the statutory
definition of beneficial use encompassed the public policy of
protecting the environment. Rather, it found that the statutory
provision providing for instream flow protection through the CWCB
program was the mechanism whereby the state could protect the
interests of concerned citizen objectors.4 In sum, the supreme court
directed the objectors' concerns back to the legislature. The justices
stated that:
[w]e have consistently recognized that the General Assembly has
acted to preserve the natural environment by giving authority to the

Colorado Water Conservation Board to appropriate water to maintain

the natural environment, and we will not intrude into an area where
legislative prerogative governs. The degree of protection afforded
the environment and the mechanism to address state appropriation
of water for the good of the public is the province of the General
Assembly and the electorate.

Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the
doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the
absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based
on public policy. Arapahoe County offered evidence that it intended
to divert water for municipal use; this use of water has always been
deemed a beneficial use under Colorado law and has been given
priority over other competing beneficial uses by the General
Assembly. [The objectors] do not cite any authority that authorizes a
water court to deny an application for a conditional decree because
of environmental concerns, and we reject [their] invitation to create
a complex system of common law to balance competing public
interests.

VI. THE TWO LrTLE WORDS THAT CAN'T BE SPOKEN

Many Western hands have been wrung over the prospect that
Colorado water rights would someday be argued as subject to the
doctrine of the public trust.4' The dreaded day has not come to pass
here, however. The plaintiffs in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board were careful to base their challenge to the
CWCB's inaction upon a statutory fiduciary duty and not a common

law notion of the public trust.4 Nonetheless, the dissent went out of its
way to state that "[tihis court has never recognized the public trust

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at 972-73.
48. See generally Harrison C. Dunning, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 4-1 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds.,
rev. ed., 1993).
49. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1255 (Colo. 1995).
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doctrine with respect to water.""0 The dissent argued that "the concept
of a public trust has no independent content....
Where the
legislature has provided statutory directives for the management and
protection of public resources, those statutory duties comprise all the
responsibilities which defendants must faithfully discharge."" Thus, in
the dissent's view, the CWCB's statutory responsibilities and its public
trust obligations-if any-were coterminous.
In defense of a charge of criminal trespass against boaters who
rafted through private property, the public trust was advanced as the
basis of a use right to float through the property and to touch the bed
and banks of the river.53 The Colorado Supreme Court made short
work of the argument, concluding that the common law rule giving
the riparian land owner title to the stream bed and banks was "of more
force and effect 5 4 than the public trust principle. Again, the court
noted that the argument in essence sought a change in longestablished judicial precedent and, therefore, needed to be taken to
the legislature.
VII. IMPORTING WATER QUAL=TY CONSIDERATIONS INTO WATER
RIGHTS MATEFRS

The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the relationship between
water quality and appropriative rights in detail in City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation Co.,' where it held that the water court was explicitly
required to consider water quality issues only in the case of an
exchange whereby water was being actively substituted into the stream
for the use of other appropriators.
An appropriator who alleges
water quality impacts as a result of appropriative depletion, rather than
substandard discharge or supply water, receives no relief under the
present system. 58 The court stated that by requiring maintenance of
sufficient volume in the stream to preserve the effluent limits of a
downstream appropriator, a water court effectively would be creating a
private instream flow right for waste dilution, which the instream flow
statute did not allow.59
The extent and nature of water quality considerations which are
relevant to diligence applications, exchanges, and applications to
make conditional rights absolute are at issue in a case litigated in

50.

Id. at 1263 (MullarkeyJ., dissenting).

51.

Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979).
Id.
Id.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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Water Division No. 1 in November, 1999. 6' Additional issues related to
the water quality restrictions on exchanges were concurrently litigated
in another case in Water Division No. 1. The results of both cases will
have important ramifications for the relationship between water
quality and water rights in Colorado.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Presently in Colorado, it would seem, all avenues for
environmental protection in water rights cases lead back to the same
intersection: the explicit terms of the 1969 Act, and, in particular, its
instream flow provision. Attempts to import common law concepts or
other non-statutory innovations into water rights matters have
generally hit a dead end. The cases make for interesting reading, but
the story has a tendency to come out the same every time:
environmental protection in water matters is what the legislature has
said that it is, nothing more and nothing less.

60. Application for Finding of Reasonable Diligence and to Make Absolute a
Conditional Water Right, In reApplication for Water Rights of the City and County of
Denver, No. 96-CW-145 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 1,June 28, 1996).
61. Motion by the City of Black Hawk to Consolidate for Trial All Water Quality
Issues, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92-CW-168, No.
92-CW-059, No. 94-CW-036 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 1, Apr. 17, 1998).
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OVERVIEW

The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund ("OSLTF") was established, in
the wake of the EXXON VALDEZ oil spill, to provide funds for those
who have suffered loss or damages due to an oil spill.' Generally, a
party who incurs a loss or cost or both as a result of an oil pollution
incident must submit claims against the Responsible Party ("RP") or its
guarantor for reimbursement and compensation.
Under certain
circumstances, such a claimant may be entitled to submit claims
I George M. Chalos, Esq. of The Chalos Law Firm, LLC, Americana House, 10
Audrey Avenue, Oyster Bay, New York 11771.
1. Michael G. Chalos, Esq., a senior member of The Chalos Law Firm, was the
lead defense attorney for Captain Joseph Hazelwood, Master of the EXXON VALDEZ,
in both the civil and criminal litigation that arose after the VALDEZ oil spill.
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directly to the OSLTF. In a similar fashion, an RP and its insurers may
make a claim against the fund for reimbursement of certain costs and
expenses incurred, as expressly authorized by the relevant regulations.'
On August 18, 1990, the Oil Pollution Act ("OPA") was enacted
into law in response to the need for specific legislation governing the
discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil into navigable waters,
adjoining shorelines, and exclusive economic zones of the United
States.' OSLTF was designated the funding source for carrying out the
statute. Administration of the fund was delegated to the Coast Guard,
sparking the creation of the National Pollution Funds Center
("NPFC"). The NPFC is an independent Coast Guard unit, which is
the fiduciary agent for the OSLTF. In accordance with OPA, and
other pertinent laws and regulations, the NPFC executes programs to,
inter alia: (1) provide funding to permit timely removal actions
following pollution incidents; (2) provide funding for the initiation of
natural resource damage assessments ("NRDA") for oil spill incidents;
and (3) compensate claimants who demonstrate certain types of
damages caused by oil pollution.5
The general requirements for submitting claims to the OSLTF are
set forth in 33 C.F.R. § 136. This section prescribes regulations for
presenting, filing, processing, settling, and adjudicating claims
authorized for presentation to the OSLTF' Specifically, 33 C.F.R. §
136.107 provides that all claimants must sign the presented claim.
Claims of a subrogor and subrogee for removal costs, and damages
arising from the same incident, must be presented together.7
Accordingly, it is important to assemble a well-qualified and
experienced oil spill response and crisis management team to address
any pollution incident, as the interests of the insurer and its assured
will necessarily merge with respect to claims for reimbursement from
the OSLTF. Third-parties may also present claims to the OSLTF
pursuant to applicable statutes.'
Congress established the OSLTF in 1986.' It was authorized for
use as part of OPA and is primarily funded by a five cents per barrel
tax on oil produced and imported to the United States.'0 The OSLTF
provides necessary funding for oil spill removal, natural resource
assessment, and restoration, as well as compensation to authorized
claimants. An RP may also successfully claim against the OSLTF for
removal costs and damages allowed under section 2708 of OPA if. (1)
2.

NATIONAL POLLUTION FUNDS CENTER, USER REFERENCE GUIDE 569 (1999).
3. Id. at 571.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id.
6. 33 C.F.R § 136.1(a)(1) (1998).
7. 33 C.F.R. § 136.107(a) (1998), which, in pertinent part, provides: "The claims
of subrogor.. .and subrogee... for removal costs and damages arising out of the
same incident should be presented together and must be signed by all claimants."
8. 33 U.S.C. § 2713 (1994).
9. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (1994).
10. Id.
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the responsible party is entitled to OPA § 2703 defenses to liability;
and (2) no exceptions to limitation of liability apply."
The defenses to liability apply if the sole cause of discharge is: (1)
an act of God; (2) an act of War; (3) an act or omission of an
independent third-party, if the responsible party establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that it acted with due care and took
precautions against foreseeable acts of such third-party; and (4) the
responsible party reported the incident and provided cooperation in
removal activities.
There are certain exceptions to an RP's limitation of liability
including an act of gross negligence, an act of willful misconduct, or
the violation 13
of a federal safety, construction, or operating regulation
caused a spill.
I.

CLAIMS THAT MAY BE SUBMITrED TO THE OSLTF

A person or party may submit claims to the OSTLF for
uncompensated removal costs and damages that result from an oil
spill's damage to natural resources, real or personal property,
subsistence
use, revenues, profits and earning capacity, and public
4
services.'
An RP, under OPA § 2708, may recover for damages in excess of
the limits of liability provided in OPA § 2704. Under OPA § 2704, the
limits for tank vessels is the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $10
million for vessels 3,000 gross tons or greater ($2 million for vessels
less than 3,000 gross tons). The limit is the greater of $600 per gross
ton or $500,000 for vessels other than tanks. 5
However, as stated above, under OPA § 2708, an RP may assert a
claim to the OSLTF only if it can demonstrate its entitlement to a
defense or limitation of liability under OPA.' 6 In fact, this is the first
step which an RP must successfully complete before the NPFC will
proceed with the review of any claim.'7
III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESENTING A CLAIM AGAINST THE

OSLTF
Pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations the claimant bears
the burden of providing all evidence, information, and documentation
deemed necessary by the Director of the NPFC to support the claim."'
In addition to complying with the general regulation
11.

33 U.S.C. § 2708(a) (1994).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

33
33
33
33
33

U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1994).
U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (1994).
U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1994).
U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
U.S.C. § 2708(a) (1994).

17. Presently, we are in involved with the presentment of a claim against the
OSLTF, wherein the NPFC legal counsel requests that we demonstrate entitlement to
limitation of liability prior to continuing with the claim review process.
18. 33 C.F.R. § 136.105(a) (1998).
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requirements, a claimant must specify all of the claimant's known
removal costs or damages arising out of a single incident and
separately list, with a certain sum attributed to each, all removal costs
and each separate category of damages when submitting a claim.' 9
Further, the NPFC's Director retains the discretion to treat removal
costs and each separate category20of damages for claims submitted
separately for settlement purposes.
With respect to insurance, a claimant must provide any
information that may cover the removal costs or damages for the
21
claimed compensation. In this regard, the claimant is to provide the
name and address of each insurer, the kind and amount of coverage,
the policy number, and whether any insurer has paid the claim in full
or in part.
IV. TIME LIMITS FOR THE FILING OF CLAIMS

The applicable period of limitations for the filing of claims are set
forth in the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations.23
The actual time limit varies depending upon the specific nature of the
claim being presented and reasons fully detailed below. The OSLTF
will only consider a claim if presented in writing to the NPFC's
Director.24 A claim is deemed presented on the date it is actually
received at the NPFC office, unless otherwise indicated in writing by
the NPFC'S Director.5
V.

REMOVAL COSTS

A claim for recovery of removal costs must be presented in writing
to the NPFC's Director within six years after the date of completion of
all removal actions taken as a result of the oil spill. 26 Date of
completion of all removal actions is defined as the earlier of either the
actual date of completion of all removal actions for the incident, or
the date the Federal On-Scene Coordinator ("FOSC") determines that
the removal actions forming the basis for the cost being claimed are
completed.
VI. DAMAGES

A claim for the recovery of damages may be presented within three
years after the date on which the injury and its connection with the oil

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

§§ 136.105, 136.109.
§ 136.109(c).
§ 136.111(a).
Id.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2712(h) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 136.101 (1998).
33 C.F.R. § 136.101 (a) (1998).
See§ 136.101(2)(b).
33 U.S.C. § 2712(h)(1) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 136.101(a)(2) (1998).
33 C.F.R. § 136.101(a) (2) (1998).
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discharge were reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due .care.8
If the claim is for recovery of natural resources damages, the claim
must be presented within the later period of either the date prescribed
in 33 C.F.R. § 136.101(a) (1), or within three years from the date of
completion of the natural resources assessment under 33 U.S.C. §
2706(e).2 Ostensibly, the relevant statute of limitations time period in
question is the later of either: (1) the date the injury and its reasonably
discoverable connection with the incident in question in the exercise
of due care; or (2) three years from the date of completion of the
natural resources assessment.30
VII. PROOF REQUIRED FOR EACH CLAIM FOR REMOVAL COSTS OR

DAMAGES

A. REMOVAL COSTS
Any claimant may present a claim for removal costs.3"
The
claimant must, however, establish that the actions taken were necessary
for preventing, minimizing, or mitigating the effects of the oil spill; the
removal costs were incurred as a result of those actions; and the
actions taken were determined consistent with the National
Contingency Plan by the FOSC or directed by the FOSC 2 The
amount of compensation allowable "is the total of uncompensated
reasonable removal costs.., that were determined by the FOSC to be
consistent with the National Contingency Plan or were directed by the
FOSC."3
B. NATURAL RESOURCES DAMAGES
An appropriate natural resource trustee may present claims for
uncompensated natural resource damages."4 In order to adequately
prove such claims, a claimant must provide documented costs and cost
estimates for the claim; identify all trustees who may be potential
claimants for the same natural resources damaged; certify the accuracy
and integrity of any claim submitted to the Fund; certify that any
actions taken or proposed were or will be conducted in accordance
with the applicable laws and regulations; certify whether the
assessment was conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions
of the natural resources damage assessment regulations (33 U.S.C. §
2 7 06(e) (1)); and certify that, to the best of the trustee's knowledge
and belief, no other trustee has the right to present a claim for the
same natural resources damages and that payment of any subpart of
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

33 U.S.C. § 2712(h)(2) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 136.101(a)(1)(i) (1998).
33 C.F.R 136.101(a) (1) (ii) (1998).
Id.
33 C.F.R § 136.201 (1998).
§ 136.203.
§ 136.205.
§ 136.207(a).
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the claim presented would not constitute a double recovery for the
same natural resources damages."'
The amount of compensation allowed for these claims is the
reasonable cost of assessing damages, and the cost of restoring,
rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged
natural resources. 6 If any amounts received from the Fund exceeds
the amount actually required to accomplish the activities for which the
claim was paid, the trustees must reimburse the Fund for such sums."
C. REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGES
Destruction of real or personal property claims may be presented
only by a claimant either owning or leasing the property. 8 A claimant
must establish an ownership or leasehold interest in the damaged
property; the property was injured or destroyed; the cost of repair or
replacement; and the value of the property both before and after the
injury occurred 9
For each economic damages claim, the claimant must establish
that the property was not available for use and, if it had been, the value
of that use; whether or not substitute property was available and, if
used, the costs thereof; and that the economic loss claimed was
incurred as the result of the injury to or destruction of the property. 0
The amount of compensation allowable for damaged property is
the lesser of three options. Allowable compensation is either the
actual or estimated net cost of repairs necessary to restore the property
to substantially the same condition that existed immediately before the
damage; the difference between the value of the property 4before and
after the damage; or the replacement value of the property. '
For economic losses resulting from the destruction of real or
personal property, the amount of allowable compensation is the
reasonable costs actually incurred for the use of substitute commercial
property, or if substitute was not reasonably available, in amount equal
to the net economic loss resulting from not having use of the
property.4
However, where substitute commercial property is
reasonably available, but not used, "the allowable compensation for
the loss of use is limited to the cost of the substitute commercial
property, or the property lost, whichever is less. ' ,43 No compensation is
44
allowed for the loss of noncommercial property use.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

§ 136.209(f).
33 C.F.R § 136.211(a) (1998).
§ 136.211(b).
§ 136.213(a).
§ 136.215(a).
§ 136.215(b).
§ 136.217(a).
33 C.F.R. § 136.217(b) (1998).
Id.
Id.
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D. SUBSISTENCE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES
The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth the applicable
regulations governing the procedure for obtaining compensation for
the loss of subsistence use of natural resources. 5 A claim for the loss of
subsistence use of natural resources may be presented only by a
claimant who actually uses the natural resources for subsistence which
have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership
or management of the resources. 6 A claim for loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity caused by a loss of subsistence use of
.
natural resources must be included as part of the claim 47
For subsistence claims, a claimant must specifically identify natural
resources for which compensation for loss of use is claimed; describe
the actual subsistence use made of each specific natural resource;
describe how and to what extent the claimant's subsistence use was
affected by the injury to or loss of each specific natural resource;
describe efforts mitigating the claimant's loss of subsistence use; and
describe alternative sources or means of subsistence available to the
claimant during the period of time for the claimed subsistence loss
and any available compensation to the claimant for loss of
subsistence.48
The amount of allowable compensation for subsistence claims is
"the reasonable replacement cost of the subsistence loss suffered by
the claimant, if, during the period of time for which the loss of
subsistence is claimed, there was no alternative source or means or
subsistence available."4 9 Such amounts must be reduced by all
compensation made available to the claimant compensating for
subsistence loss; all income derived by utilizing the time that would
have been used to obtain natural resources for subsistence use; and
expenses of subsistence use not incurred as
overheads or other normal
50
a result of the incident.
E.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES

The applicable regulations governing claims for lost government
revenue are set forth at 33 C.F.R. §§ 136.225, 136.227, and 136.229.
Only an appropriate claimant sustaining the loss may present a claim
for net loss of revenues due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real or
A claim for lost revenue
personal property or natural resources.
includes taxes, royalties, rents, fees, and net profit shares5 2
When seeking compensation, claimants must identify and describe

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See§§ 136.219; 136.221; 136.223; 136.225.
§ 136.219(a).
33 C.F.R. § 136.219(b) (1998).
§ 136.221.
§ 136.223(a).
§ 136.223(b).
§ 136.225.
Id.
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the economic loss, including the applicable authority, property
affected, method of assessment, rate, and method and dates of
collection.53 Additionally, the claimant must establish that real or
personal property or natural resources were injured, destroyed, or lost,
resulting in a loss of revenue. 54
The amount of allowable
compensation for this type of claim is the total net revenue actually
lost.
F.

PROFITS AND EARNING CAPACITY

A claimant sustaining the loss or impairment may present a claim
for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury
to, destruction of, or loss of real or personal property or natural
resources.16 The claimant does not have to own the damaged property
or resources to recover for lost profits or income.57 A claim for loss of
profits or impairment of earning capacity involving a claim for injuries
or economic losses resulting from the destruction of real or personal
property must be claimed under 33 C.F.R. § 136.213.58 A claim for loss
of profits or impairment of earning capacity involving a claim for loss
of subsistence use of natural resources must be claimed under 33
C.F.R. § 136.219. 5'
Several factors are necessary to substantiate a claim for lost profits
or earning capacity. Claimants must establish that real or personal
property or natural resources were injured or lost; the claimant's
income was reduced resulting from injury to, destruction of, or loss of
property or natural resources, and the amount of the reduction; and
the amount of the claimant's profits or earnings in comparable
periods and during the period when the claimed loss or impairment
was suffered, established by income tax returns, financial statements
and similar documents. 6° Additionally, a claimant must state whether
alternative employment or business was available and undertaken and,
if so, the amount of income received.
All income that a claimant
received as a result of the incident must be clearly indicated and any
saved overhead and other normal expenses not incurred as a result of
the incident must be established.
The amount of allowable compensation for claims of lost profits
and earning capacity is limited to the actual net reduction or loss of
earnings/profits suffered. Calculations for net reductions or losses
must clearly reflect adjustments for all income resulting from the

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

33 C.F.R. § 136.227(a) (1998).
§ 136.227(b).
§ 136.229.
§ 136.231(a).
Id.
§ 136.231(b).
33 C.F.R. § 136.231(c) (1998).
§ 136.233(a)-(c).
§ 136.233(d).
Id.
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incident; all income from alternative employment or businesses
undertaken; potential income from alternative employment or
business not undertaken, but reasonably available; saved overhead or
normal expenses not incurred as a result of the incident; and state,
local, and federal taxes.
G.

GOVERNMENT PUBLIC SERVICES

Only a state or state political subdivision incurring the costs may
present a claim for the net costs of providing increased or additional
public services during or after removal activities, including protection
from fire, safety or health hazards, caused by a discharge of oil.6
An authorized claimant must establish the nature and need of the
specific public services provided; that the services occurred during or
after removal activities; that the services were provided as a result of an
oil discharge and would otherwise not have been provided; and the
net cost for the services and the methods used to compute those
costs."' The net cost of the increased or additional service provided by
the state or political subdivision is the amount of allowable
compensation.
VIII. SETILEMENT AND NOTICE TO CLIUMANT
A settlement payment in full or the acceptance a settlement offer is
final and conclusive for all purposes, and upon payment, constitutes a
release of the NPFG from the claim." Upon completion of review, the
NPFC will issue its recommendation and offer for each claim
submitted. Once an offer is made, it is a firm and final offer. There
will be no negotiation of the claim unless additional proofs are
M
submitted.6
Acceptance of any compensation precludes the claimant from
filing any subsequent action against any person to recover costs or
damages that are the subject of the compensated claim, and
constitutes an agreement by the claimant to assign to the NPFC
subrogation rights. 9 The claimant's failure to accept an offer of
settlement within sixty days after the date the offer was mailed by the
NPFC voids the offer automatically."
If the NPFC denies a claim, the claimant will be notified by
certified or registered mail.7 Furthermore, failure of the NPFC's
Director to make final disposition of a claim within six months after

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

§ 136.235(a)-(e).
§ 136.237.
§ 136.239(a)-(d).
33 C.F.R. § 136.241 (1998).
§ 136.115 (a).
NATIONAL POLLUTION FUNDS CENTER, supra note 2, at 579-80.

33 C.F.R. § 136.115(a) (1998).
§ 136.115(b).
§ 136.115(c)
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filing shall be deemed at the claimant's option a final denial of the
claim.2 Upon written request, including the factual or legal grounds
for relief, the NPFC's Director may reconsider any claim denied. 7 The
NPFC Director must receive such requests within sixty days after the
date the denial was mailed to the claimant or within thirty days after
74
receipt of the denial by the claimant, whichever date is earlier.
Disposition of the request for reconsideration will be made within
ninety days after its receipt by the NPFC 5 If the NPFC denies any
motion for reconsideration, the claimant may then commence a
federal court action, addressing the issues of obtaining reimbursement
or compensation from the OSLTF. 76
IX. REMEDY FOR DENIAL OF CLAIM

The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") provides judicial
review of a final agency action.77 Based on the precedent of
InternationalMarine v. Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, a denial of appeal
for reconsideration is considered to be a final agency action. 7 A court
will reverse a final agency action if an RP can affirmatively prove an
abuse of discretion or that the agency action was arbitrary and
capricious. 7
If a claimant disputes a final determination by the NPFC, there are
certain recourse avenues available. In Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States,s°
the plaintiff, Gatlin Oil Co., ("Gatlin"), commenced a suit seeking
reimbursement for costs incurred in removing fuel that was discharged
from its onshore storage tanks onto the surrounding land and into a
1
local river.8
Initially, Gatlin sought compensation from the OSLTF for

removal costs.1 The NPFC determined that some claims for
compensation made by Gatlin for were not compensable under OPA.5
Gatlin then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina. The court, applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review for agency actions, reversed the NPFC's
ruling holding that the Fund Director had acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. The court determined Gatlin was entitled to

72. Id.
73. § 136.115(d).
74. Id.
75. 33 C.F.R. § 136.115(d) (1998).
76. The jurisdiction of the relevant district court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)
(which deals with issues of federal question); 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b) (1994) (original
jurisdiction granted under the Oil Pollution Act); and section 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
78. International Marine v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 n.3
(S.D. Tex. 1994).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
80. Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 209.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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compensation for all its recovery costs and damages with interest. 4
Gatlin was entitled to a complete defense because the discharge had
been caused by an unknown and unidentified vandal."' The court
remanded the matter to the NPFC for further fact finding and
reconsideration in accordance with its opinion. 6
The United States appealed the district court's ruling. The Fourth
Circuit reiterated that the Fund Director's findings must not be
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 7 The Fourth Circuit
further held that a reviewing court should determine the
reasonableness of the Fund Director's allowance or disallowance of
compensation. 8 After reviewing the case, the Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court's rulings and concluded that the Fund Director's
findings were correct and remanded the matter to the district court for
further proceedings.
X. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PRESENTING CLAIMS ON BEHALF
OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES"0

When presenting a claim to the OSLTF, each claimant has the
burden of proving its entitlement to receive compensation. When
presenting a claim on behalf of an RP, the RP is responsible for
demonstrating its defenses and right to limitation of liability.
Ostensibly, the RP must affirmatively prove that the spill was not
caused by its own gross negligence. In meeting this burden, the RP
can rely on the Coast Guard investigative findings, judicial
determinations, and any other evidence the RP wishes to submit.
Difficulty may arise if the Coast Guard investigation report is
delayed. The bureaucratic nature of the Coast Guard infrastructure
tends to lend itself to requiring a substantial amount of time and
internal review before the final findings are available. This may create
an obstacle for a party proving its entitlement for further review of its
claim.
While the NPFC provides an initial claim form for presenting a
claim to the NPFC, there is no prescribed format for presenting a
claim against the OSLTF. The claim regulations provide some
guidance as to the content of general claim submissions.' A claim
submission must be a signed written document with a sum certain
stated. In addition to identifying the date, time, place of incident, and

84. Id.
85. Id.at210.
86. Gatlin Oi4 169 F.3d at 210.
87. Id. at 212.
88. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. §§ 136.205 and 136.235, providing for the type of
compensation allowable under these regulations).
89. Id. at 214.
90. Based on the experience of The Chalos Law Firm, LLC in presenting claims
against the OSLTF and the NPFC, this section is intended as a summary of experience
and suggestions which may prove useful to others in presenting claims to the NPFC.
91. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 136.105-136.113 (1998).
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identity of claimant, the claim submission must contain a statement
certifying that all material facts are included therein and are accurate.
In providing factual narratives and other evidence as part of the
claim process, the claimant must be very careful in selecting what
statements to make. Such statements may be used as admissions in
third-party litigation or by the Coast Guard to supplement its own
findings.
The NPFC review process can be painstakingly slow, as undertaking
such a review is a complex and tedious task. Once a claimant has
demonstrated its entitlement for claim submission, an NPFC Claims
Adjuster must review each and every item on each and every document
submitted. In order to facilitate review and processing, a neat,
detailed, and organized claim is necessary. The use of summary sheets
and spreadsheet software is recommended. Summaries are useful as
guides for reviewing supporting documentation such as invoices and
daily job reports. Additionally, backup or supporting documentation
segregated in binders for each spill responder or contractor with clear
delineation of sub-contractor support, documents, and invoices is also
recommended.
The neater and more organized a claim, the more likely it will be
reviewed and adjusted "in-house" by the NPFC. A claimant may
present summary spreadsheets by hard copy or on computer diskette,
utilizing any major spreadsheet applications. Presenting a claim in this
manner not only saves the NPFC time by way of facilitating its claim
review process, but also may speed up the claim determination
process, saving the claimant time and money. Haphazard submissions
may result in unnecessary delay in the processing of a claim.
Some problems can arise, even when a neat and organized claim
has been submitted. The NPFC Claims Adjuster will necessarily review
each and every item on all invoices. Thorough review often reveals
problems inherent in the supporting documentation. Due to the
chaotic nature of an oil spill response, support documents, including
sign-in logs or daily reports, are often missing or incomplete. Illegible
documents and
inconsistent subcontractor
documents are
problematic. Computation and transcription problems may become
evident in summaries or support documents. Other discrepancies may
occur when a response contractor's notes are inconsistent, missing, or
otherwise objectionable to the NPFC Claims Adjuster.
The government, in an effort to pay what it deems to be an
appropriate rate, will attempt to pay Basic Ordering Agreement
("BOA") rates rather than the contractor's actual response rate.
However, in evaluating a claim, the government may allow for some
reasonable mark-ups.
In reviewing claims including overtime
payments, "overtime" is generally considered only after the eight hours
per day and forty hours per week threshold has been surpassed. New
policy directives may be issued in the near future, providing better
guidance in this regard.
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XI. CONCLUSION

The relevant guidelines and regulations for presenting a claim
against the OSLTF are clearly set forth in the United States Code and
the Code of Federal Regulations. However, despite such legislation
and the fact that OPA and the NPFC have been in existence for nearly
a decade, the case law precedent concerning what is or is not a valid
claim on behalf of an RP is scarce. In this author's opinion, the claims
procedure and its controlling legislation are well drafted, however,
without supplementation
by specific court interpretations,
comprehensive guidance is lacking.
There is a scarcity of case law interpreting the provisions of OPA,
specifically section 2704, and case law defining when an RP has a
limited liability entitlement.
As discussed above, an RP must
demonstrate its entitlement to a limitation of liability prior to the
NPFC undertaking the task of reviewing a claim presented. However,
from the current precedent available and the statutory legislative
history, it seems clear that only a finding of gross negligence or willful
misconduct will defeat the assertion of a limitation of liability under
OPA § 2704.
In National Shipping Co. v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., the court
interpreted OPA § 2704 with respect to a case of a tugboat that
collided with another vessel and resulted in an oil spill. 92 The collision
in that case was caused by the tugboat captain's "failure to properly
control his vessel.""3 The court found that the captain's actions
constituted a "lack of due care" amounting to "negligence under
maritime law. 94 In discussing whether section 2704(c) (1) (a) should
deny the tug operator's right to limit its liability, the court
distinguished the captain's ordinary negligence from the "gross
negligence or willful misconduct" language contained in the statute."
Holding that section 2 7 04(c)(1)(a) did not apply, the court stated,
"[t]his is simply a case of ordinary negligence, a failure to exercise
reasonable care." 6
The National Shipping decision does not elaborate on the
distinction between ordinary negligence and the requisite level of
gross negligence or recklessness required before an RP would
otherwise be denied its right to limit its liability pursuant to OPA §
2704. Notwithstanding, it has been successfully argued to the NPFC
that the only reasonable reading of the language of the governing
statute and the court's decision in National Shipping must recognize
that in order for section 27 04(c)(1) (a) to apply, there must be a
finding of something significantly more than mere carelessness or
ordinary negligence.
92. National Shipping Co. v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436 (E.D.
Va. 1996), aff'g, 1998 A.M.C. 163 (4th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 1452.
94. Id. (citing Benedict on Admiralty § 3.02[B] [4] (7th ed. 1995)).
95. Id. at 1453.
96. Id.
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The legislative history of OPA supports this interpretation. One
congressman summed up section 2704(c) (1) (a) as follows: " [W]here
gross negligence is the case, where there is willful misconduct, there is
no limit on liability in this bill. Where there is simple negligence,
where there is human error involved, there is a limit on liability."
In speaking during a congressional debate concerning the removal
of the "gross negligence or willful misconduct" language from §
2704(c) (1) (a), Mr. Miller of California stated to the House that "[t]he
standard of breaking liability limits [under the unamended Act] ...is
gross negligence or willful misconduct."98 He further stated that
"[b] oth are very difficult to prove. "99 In describing the high burden of
proving gross negligence, Mr. Miller stated, "Prosser on Torts
describes gross negligence as the failure to exercise even that care
which a careless person would use. Is that really the standard we want
to attribute to the people who would ship oil in ships that hold up to a
million barrels of oil?" o
Similarly, Mrs. Kenneally of Connecticut used a famous example by
Justice Holmes to illustrate why she thought mere negligence should
be the standard contained in section 2704(c) (1) (a). She stated:
Take the simple law school banana peel example. If an individual
shopping in a supermarket slips on a banana peel and breaks his leg,
the supermarket is liable if negligence is proven; that is, if normal
and reasonable maintenance was not performed to eliminate
obstructions in the aisles of the store. If the liability standard was
gross negligence, the burden of proof would rest on the prosecutor
to show that the store owner knowingly, and in fact, intentionally
placed the banana peel on the floor.10
Based upon the foregoing, it has been our position and contention
that Congress envisioned a high standard of negligence when it
ultimately enacted the final version of OPA. However, there has been
no case law upon which to concretely rest such assertion. While it
seems to be the clear and logical conclusion drawn from the legislative
history and the case law most closely related, this author looks forward
to the day when the issue of what constitutes mere negligence and
what constitutes gross negligence in an oil pollution incident is
decided. Accordingly, when such bright line distinctions are available,
an RP may have some guidance and authority to rely upon in
presenting its claims for reimbursement to the NPFC, and will not be
required to rely so heavily upon the NPFC Director's learned
discretion.

97. 135 CONG. REc. H 8120, 8134 (1989) (statement of Mr. Carper).
98.

135 CONG. REc. H 8157, 8157(1989).

99. Id.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at H 8165.

ARTICLE UPDATE
Volume 2, Issue 2 of the Water Law Review provided readers with a
dialogue between two authors, Ms. Alison Maynard and Mr. Scott
McElroy, on the Southern Ute Tribe's claims to reserved water rights
with a priority date of 1868. Ms. Maynard's article, Deconstructing a
Water Project, presented the view that an 1880 Act of Congress
extinguished the Ute Reservation, consequently extinguishing any of
the Southern Ute Tribe's claims to reserved water rights.
Mr.
McElroy's article, History Repeats Itself- A Response to the Opponents of the
Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, presented the
view that the Tribe's claims were viable. The following, a Department
of the Interior Solicitor's Opinion addressing the issues raised by Ms.
Maynard and Mr. McElroy, presents an update to their dialogue.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
September 9, 1999
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Acting Deputy Secretary David Hayes

FROM:

SolicitorJohn Leshy

RE:

Southern Ute Tribe's Water Rights Priority Date

You have requested that this Office evaluate the validity of the
Southern Ute Tribe's water rights claims, as a result of issues raised
during the NEPA process associated with the Administration proposal
for final implementation of the Colorado Ute Water Rights
Settlement. Specifically, you requested an analysis of whether the
Tribe has reserved water rights with an 1868 priority date or whether
such rights were extinguished by the Act of June 15, 1880. For the
reasons explained below, we conclude that the Southern Ute Tribe's
water rights have a priority date of 1868.
As a threshhold matter, it is important to note that the Southern
Ute Tribe's 1868 priority date was judicially established through
approval of Consent Decrees on December 19, 1991, by Colorado
District Court, Water Division 7.
Under the 1986 Settlement
Agreement, as implemented by Congress through the 1988 Settlement
Act, all tribal water rights claims in the Animas and La Plata rivers,
including the priority date of those water rights, were properly before
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the Court in 1991, and included in the order of the Court accepting
the Consent Decree. Accordingly, further judicial review on the
propriety of the 1868 priority date is now barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 761 (Colo. 1981) (an
issue is res judicata if it was before the court in proceedings which
resulted in a decree.) Thus, even if we were to find a basis on which to
question the validity of the Tribe's priority date, which for reasons
explained below we do not, the time to raise this issue has long since
passed.
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar to raising such an issue at
this time, the Southern Ute Tribe never lost its 1868 priority date. The
Tribe's reserved water rights arise from its 1868 Treaty with the United
States which established the Ute reservation in southwestern Colorado.
It is well-settled that establishment of an Indian reservation carries with
it an implied reservation of the amount of water necessary to fulfill the
purposes of the reservation with a priority date no later than the date
of creation of the reservation. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 576-77 (1908); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599601 (1963); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
No congressional action has done anything to change the priority
date of the Tribe's water rights.
Two statutes did, however,
substantially affect the Tribe's land ownership. In 1880, Congress
passed an act to allot the Southern Ute reservation. See Act of June
15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 199 (1880). Under this Act, all "surplus"
lands of the Reservation (lands not allotted) were deemed to be public
lands of the United States, available for entry by non-Indians. Then in
1943, the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 463 et seq.
(1994), officially ended the allotment era and authorized the Secretary
to restore unclaimed "surplus" lands of any Indian reservation to tribal
ownership. Restoration of the present Southern Ute reservation
occurred on September 14, 1938. See 3 Fed. Reg. 1425 (1938).
The 1880 Act did not extinguish the Tribe's rights in "surplus"
lands and did nothing to affect the Tribe's water rights for unclaimed
"surplus" lands later restored to tribal ownership under the IRA.
Termination or diminution of treaty rights "will not be lightly
inferred," Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984), and requires
express litigation or a clear inference of congressional intent gleaned
from surrounding circumstances and legislative history. Bryan v. Itasca
CZ., 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1975). The 1880 Act did not contain clear
congressional intent to change the boundaries of the Tribe's
reservation and did not provide the Tribe with full compensation for
the land ceded, the combination of which might have indicated that
the reservation had been diminished. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S.
at 469-70. Similarly, the 1880 Act's complete silence on the issue of
water rights must be interpreted as leaving in place, not terminating,
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these valuable rights. Although much tribal land did, in fact, become
divested from tribal ownership, the overwhelming majority of land
which now makes up the Southern Ute Indian Reservation was
retained in federal ownership and never conveyed to non-Indian
parties.
Because lands declared "surplus" by the 1880 Act could be sold
only under certain conditions, including for the benefit of the Ute
bands, the Tribes retained an interest in the unsold land. This interest
included all property rights not specifically divested.
As the
Department has noted previously, during the time between allotment
in 1880 and restoration of unclaimed lands in 1938, the United States
became a "trustee in possession" for the disposal of the ceded land and
the Tribe retained an equitable interest until it received payment for
the land. Restoration to Tribal Ownership-Ute Lands, I Dep't of
Interior, Op. Solicitor 832, 836-37 (1938). The promise of payment
created a trust between the United States and the Tribe. See
Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 394-95 (1902); Ash Sheep Co. v.
United States, 252 U.S. 159, 164-66 (1920).
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Southern
Ute Tribe, 402 U.S. 159 (1971) has been put forth as a reason why the
Southern Ute's water rights were extinguished.
However, this
Supreme Court decision is not relevant to the current inquiry.
Southern Ute discussed the res judicata effects of the Tribe's claims in
front of the Indian Claims Commission (ICC). The ICC claims at
issue, however, concerned "surplus" lands which had passed into
private ownership or were reserved for other federal purposes, not, as
is the case here, unclaimed lands which were later restored to tribal
ownership. Some have suggested that the Southern Ute decision also
affected the water rights claims of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe.
However, the western half of the pre-1880 reservation, which is today's
Ute Mountain Ute reservation, was never allotted. See Southern Ute,
402 U.S. at 171.
Neither the 1880 Act nor any subsequent
congressional action affected the Ute Mountain Ute's water rights
which also retain an 1868 treaty date priority.
All cases which have addressed the issue conclude that the original
treaty-date priority to water applies to unclaimed "surplus" lands which
are restored to tribal ownership. See United States v. Anderson, 736
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Big Horn River System, 753 P2d 76
(Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I), aff'd without opinion be an equally divided
court; and In re Big Horn River System, 899 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1995) (Big
Horn IV). Anderson developed a three-prong test for extinguishment
of a Winters right; namely, there must be: 1) cessation of the
reservation, 2) opening of that land to homesteading, and 3)
conveyance into private ownership. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
While the Ninth Circuit held that no Indian reserved water rights exist
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"on those reservation lands that have been declared public domain,
opened to homesteading, and subsequently conveyed into private
ownership," id. at 1361 (emphasis added), it left in place the district
court's decision which awarded a treaty-date priority for water rights to
"lands open to homesteading which were never claimed." Id. at 1361
(emphasis added). In the case of the Utes, the land restored to the
Southern Ute Indian reservation was never conveyed into private
ownership. Since the land was never conveyed into private ownership,
the 1868 priority date was never affected.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reached the same conclusion when
it found a treaty-date priority for "all the reacquired lands on the
ceded portion of the [Wind River] reservation." 753 P.2d at 114 (Big
Horn I). Similarly, Big Horn IV held that a treaty-date priority for
reserved water rights extends to "restored, retroceded, undisposed of,
and reacquired lands owned by the Tribes; fee lands held by Indian
allottees; and lands held by Indian and non-Indian successors to
allottees." 899 P.2d at 855.
The Department notes that Big Horn IV also held that the
reservation purpose and reserved water rights "no longer existed for
lands acquired by others after they had been ceded to the to the
United States for disposition." Id. at 854 (emphasis added). This
reasoning, which comports with Anderson's three-prong test, was used
by the Court to conclude that non-Indian settlers, under the
Homestead Act and other land-entry statutes, did not have a treatydate priority. This holding, however, does nothing to alter the fact that
lands ceded by the Southern Ute Tribe, which were opened to
settlement but were unclaimed by settlers and later restored to tribal
ownership, retain water rights with a treaty-date priority. Anderson,
Big Horn I, and Big Horn IV stand for the proposition, and the
Department concludes, that the Tribe retains its original 1868 priority
date for all restored "surplus" lands.
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THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES
REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN THE
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INTRODUCTION

In its recent decision of Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District v. Chevron Shale Oil Co., the Colorado
Supreme Court addressed the law with respect to reasonable diligence
in the continuation of a conditional water right.'
The Subdistrict appealed the water court's finding of reasonable
diligence in Chevron's development of its conditional water rights.
Chevron's rights related to its shale oil project in Western Colorado.
The conditional water rights originated in the early 1950s, which
Chevron had appropriated to three structures for use in proposed
pumping plants and pipelines.
The Subdistrict claimed that Chevron did not demonstrate
reasonable diligence in the development of its rights. It further
claimed that Chevron's intent to hold the rights for over 100 years
without development amounted to unlawful speculation in conditional
water rights.
II. BACKGROUND
Under Colorado's Prior Appropriation Doctrine, one may receive
a decree for a conditional water right before actually applying water to
'I Darrell Brown is a 1999 graduate of the University of Denver College of Law,
where he served as Water Court Editor of the Water Law Review. He received his A.B.
from Stanford University in 1975, and his M.B.A. from the Amos Tuck School at
Dartmouth College in 1979.
1. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. 1999) (hereinafter Municipal District).
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beneficial use. A conditional water right is "a right to perfect a water
right with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable
diligence of the appropriation upon which such water right is...
based.",2 The primary value of a conditional right is that "a prospective
water user may reserve its place in line in the priority system by seeking
a conditional decree, provided that the user demonstrates to the water
court that the water can and will be put to beneficial use within a
reasonable time."'
The public policy surrounding a conditional right is to "encourage
the pursuit of projects designed to place waters of the state to
beneficial uses by reserving an antedated priority, in light of the
necessity to obtain and complete financing, engineering, and the
construction of works that will capture, possess, or otherwise control
the water., 4 By design, a conditional right fulfills the "fundamental
policy underlying Colorado's water law favoring the most beneficial
use of the state's limited water supply." 5 However, to allow, an
applicant to "maintain its conditional appropriation indefinitely and
without progress would frustrate that fundamental policy. '6 Therefore,
public policy limits a conditional right against the speculative hoarding
of a water right.
"Accumulation of conditional water rights is subject to Colorado's
anti-speculation doctrine."' To avoid speculation, the water court may
not recognize an appropriation if the "purported appropriator of
record does not have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or
otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
specific beneficial uses.""
ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. 9 is
the seminal case defining Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine.0 The
Vidler court noted that Colorado law gives:
no one the right to preempt the development potential of water for
the anticipated future use of others not in privity of contract, or in
any agency relationship, with the developer regarding that use. To
recognize conditional decrees grounded on no interest beyond a
desire to obtain water for sale would as a practical matter discourage
those who have need and use for the water from developing it.

2. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(6) (1999).
3. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27,35 (Colo. 1997).
4. Id.

5. Trans-County Water Inc. v. Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 727 P.2d
60, 65 (Colo. 1986).
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II) (1999); Act ofJuly 6, 1979, § 5, ch. 346,

1979 Colo.Sess. Laws 1366, 1368.
9. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566 (Colo. 1979).
10. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
11. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 568.
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The Colorado legislature codified the anti-speculative holding of
Vidler in the statutory definition of an "appropriation."
An
appropriation does not "occur when the proposed appropriation is
based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights
to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation."' Speculative
sale or transfer may be shown when the:
purported appropriator.., does not have either a legally vested
interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the
lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, unless such
appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact for the
persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation [or if the
appropriator] does not have a specific plan and intent to... [put] a
specific quantity of water [to] specific beneficial use[]. [
pu
Successful challenges grounded on the anti-speculation doctrine
have succeeded where the non-governmental applicant did not show
that it intended to put the water to beneficial use for its own
purposes. 4
Challenges have also succeeded where the private
appropriator did not require the water for use on its own lands that it
owned or leased and where they had no contractual commitment with
any governmental entity to use the water.'5
The anti-speculation doctrine does not on its face seem to deny
the right to hold a conditional water right for specific use in a specific
quantity by the appropriator so long as an intent exists to place the
water to use within an indeterminate time. Instead, conditional rights
are made "subject to continued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of
priorities 'to the detriment of those seeking to apply the state's water
beneficially.' "1
To fulfill and balance the twin goals of encouraging large water
projects while also preventing hoarding, Colorado law requires that in:
every sixth calendar year after the calendar year in which a water
right is conditionally decreed,. .. the owner or user thereof, if such
owner or user desires to maintain the same, shall file an application
for a finding of reasonable diligence, or said conditional water right
shall be considered abandoned.
"[A] reasonable diligence proceeding tests whether the decreed
conditional appropriation is being effectively pursued in a manner
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (1999).
13. Id § 37-92-103(3)(a)(I)-(II).
14. See Rocky Mtn. Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 646 P.2d
383, 388 (Colo. 1982).
15. Lionelle v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1169
(Colo. 1984).
16. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1997) (quoting TransCounty Water, Inc. v. Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 727 P.2d 60, 65 (Colo.
1986)).
17. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (a) (I) (1999).
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calculated to complete that appropriation.""8 Colorado courts have
further justified and heightened the required scrutiny of a conditional
water right by finding that " '[t] he doctrine of relation back is a legal
fiction in derogation of the Constitution for the benefit of claimants
under larger and more difficult projects and should be strictly
construed.' "9
The burden of proof of diligence rests with the holder of the
conditional right, and thus, " It]he applicant has the burden of proving
reasonable diligence by a preponderance of the evidence." 0 The
water court's findings as to meeting the burden of proving diligence is
"binding on apeal where ... there is competent evidence to support
those findings.
The statutory standard by which the water court must measure
reasonable diligence is:
the steady application of effort to complete the appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner under all the facts and
circumstances. When a project or integrated system is comprised of
several features, work on one feature of the project or system shall be
considered in finding that reasonable diligence has been shown in
the development of water rights for all features of the entire project
or system.... [C]urrent economic conditions beyond the control of
the applicant which adversely affect the feasibility of perfecting a
conditional water right.., shall [not] be considered sufficient to
deny a diligence application, so long as other facts and circumstances
which show diligence are present.2
The Colorado legislature amended this standard in 1990. Prior to
1990, the statute required an applicant to show "continuous project
specific effort... in the most expedient and efficient manner.",13 The
amended section has arguably relaxed the standard for a finding of
reasonable diligence.
The Colorado Supreme Court has approved and applied various
narrative standards to aid in the determination of reasonable
diligence. "[T] he applicant must prove that it has the intent to use the
water and has performed concrete actions demonstrating diligent
efforts to finalize its appropriation. 24 To show diligent efforts the
applicant must "prove continuous, project-specific effort directed
toward the development of the conditional right commensurate with

18. Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.
19. Id. at 35 (quoting City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (Colo. 1954)).
20. Talco, Ltd. v. Danielson, 769 P.2d 468, 472 (Colo. 1989).
21. Vail Valley Consolidated Water Dist. v. City of Aurora, 731 P.2d 665, 670 (Colo.
1987).
22. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b), (c) (1999) (emphasis added).
23. Act of Apr. 13, 1990, § 1, ch. 269, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1625, 1625-26
(emphasis added). See also Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 841 P.2d 1061, 1064 n.7 (Colo. 1992).
24. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
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his capabilities. 2 5 The water court should consider the "totality of the
circumstances, 26 in making its determination.
Thus, the
"determination of diligence can only be made on a case-by-case basis
after considering all of the facts and circumstances
relating to the
27
development of each particular project.,
The considerations may include, but are not limited to:
(1) economic feasibility; (2) the status of rejuisite permit
applications and other required approvals; (3) expenditures made to
develop the appropriation; (4) the ongoing conduct of engineering
and environmental studies; (5) the design and construction of
facilities; and (6) the nature and extent of land holdings and
contracts demonstrating the water demand and2beneficial
uses which
the conditional right is to serve when perfected. 8
Other factors which the Colorado Supreme Court has found
persuasive include: "the size and complexity of [the] project; the
extent of the construction season; the availability of materials, labor,
and equipment; the economic ability of the claimant; and the
intervention of outside delaying factors such as wars, strikes, and
litigation."29 If "a project is comprised of several features, work on one
feature can be considered in determining whether reasonable
diligence has been shown in the development of water rights for all
features."
"Actual good faith work on the overall facilities necessary
to consummate the ultimate goal is a part of the diligence required to
continue the conditional decree."'"

M. CURRENT CASE
In Municipal Subdistrict, the Subdistrict claimed that the water court
erred on three issues in its finding that Chevron demonstrated
reasonable diligence. First, the court erred by not imposing a more
stringent
standard of reasonable diligence as a conditional water right
152
ages. Second, the Subdistrict argued that Chevron's past efforts had
not resulted in any actual progress towards the perfection of its
conditional water rights."3
Third, the Subdistrict claimed that
Chevron's participation in ajoint venture with two other oil companies
retarded Chevron's progress towards the perfection of its own
25.
26.
27.
1139,
28.

Id.
Id.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. City & County of Denver, 640 P.2d
1141 (Colo. 1982).
Dallas Creek, 933 P.2d at 36.

29. City & County of Denver, 640 P.2d at 1142 (citing Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 468 P.2d 853, 856 (Colo.
1970)).
30. Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 36 (Colo. 1997).
31. City of Lafayette v. New Anderson Ditch Co., 962 P.2d 955, 961 (Colo. 1998).
32. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1999).
33. Id. at 922.
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34
conditional water rights.

The Colorado Supreme Court held that, contrary to the
Subdistrict's claims, competent evidence supported the water court's
findings of reasonable diligence.35
The water court found that Chevron had pursued activities in
seven categories satisfying the reasonable diligence requirement.
These included: (1) planning a diversion facility; (2) planning a dam;
(3) planning pipeline facilities; (4) preparing environmental baseline
studies; (5) preparing a detailed master plan; (6) participating in
activities related to the conditional rights such as litigation, research,
and studies; and (7) continuing basic research into oil shale
production technology.36 The Subdistrict challenged only the accuracy
of the seventh category.
The Subdistrict based its primary challenge of the diligence
finding on the grounds that Chevron had not demonstrated the
"steady application of effort to complete the appropriation in a
reasonably expedient and efficient manner. 3 7 The Subdistrict claimed
that Chevron's efforts had not been continuous, and alleged that
Chevron had decided to defer its oil shale project until 2085.
The supreme court agreed with the water court that although "the
production of oil shale is currently not feasible, Chevron's efforts,
although minimal, were sufficient to demonstrate a steady application
of effort to complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and
efficient manner.""
By so finding, the court held that it was not
improper for the water court to consider the current economic
conditions of the shale industry in a determination of reasonable
diligence.
Because the issues were not properly raised before the water court,
the supreme court declined to address the question of whether the
anti-speculation doctrine applies in a diligence proceeding or whether
postponement of perfecting the rights until 2085 violated antispeculation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
The economic feasibility of the oil shale industry always seems to
lie just around the corner of the next oil shortage. Even with oil prices
near $40/bbl. during the early 1980s, the industry only made
economic sense based on a continued increase in oil prices. Since the
current economic unfeasibility of the oil shale industry is not sufficient
to deny a diligence application, it would seem this must be coupled
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 921.
Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(4) (b) (1999)).

38. Municipal Subdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Chevron Shale Oil
Co., 986 P.2d 918, 923 (Colo. 1999).

39. Id. at 923-24.
40. Id. at 923.
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with a requirement of stricter proof that as the conditional right ages
the appropriator will place the water to beneficial use within a
reasonable time. To not require this eliminates one of the primary
purposes of sextennial reasonable diligence findings: prevention of
hoarding of junior priority dates to the detriment of those who can
and will place waters of the state to more immediate beneficial use. In
essence, the people of Colorado are allowing senior priority rights to
the waters of the state to be held and invested by the oil shale industry
without the promise of any future return.
Municipal Subdistrict also raises questions as to whether the
codification of Vidler went far enough in preventing long term
hoarding of conditional water rights. Vidler was limited by its facts to
speculation based on the sale of water rights to other parties. It did
not address the issue of whether hoarding of a right by an entity for its
own use far in the future falls within the anti-speculation doctrine. By
codifying the holding of Vidler, the state legislature essentially
exempted such hoarding from the doctrine. To allow a nongovernmental entity to hold such a right would seem to frustrate the
fundamental policy of Colorado water law, which favors the
development of the current beneficial use of the state's scarce water
resources.
Under the Municipal Subdistrict holding, a junior absolute right
may, if the senior conditional right is eventually perfected, find itself
unable to divert more than a century after it has placed water to
beneficial use. As Vidler stated, this will, as a practical matter,
discourage those who have current uses of water from developing
rights junior to the senior conditional right.
Because of the arguably loosened standards applied in today's
diligence proceedings, the water courts seem much less likely to find a
lack of diligence in the development of a conditional right. Today's
diligence proceedings will not serve their proper function of balancing
between the potential hoarding of water priorities and reasonable
development. This seems contrary to the finding that the doctrine of
relation back is a legal fiction in derogation of the state Constitution
that should be strictly construed.
The supreme court reasonably interpreted the statutory provisions
Had the Subdistrict properly
relating to reasonable diligence.
presented the speculation issues before the court, the supreme court
probably also would have found that Chevron had not violated the
anti-speculation doctrine as codified. Instead, the legislature must
address these issues. For the legislature to fail to clarify the proper
balance between the anti-speculation doctrine and reasonable
diligence proceedings will lead to the inefficient allocation of the
waters of the state.

PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
To provide a personal perspective of the drafting of the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 while
recognizing one of Colorado's preeminent water lawyers, the Water
Law Review is honored to dedicate this issue to an integral part of the
Act's drafting, Mr. Felix Larry Sparks. The following is an excerpt
from an interview with Mr. Sparks about his experience as a water
lawyer in Colorado.
For more information about Mr. Sparks'
remarkable life, including his nearly forty years of involvement with
the United States Army, please see the Tribute at the beginning of this
issue.

Interviewer: How did you like law school?
Mr. Sparks: Well, I liked it. Law school was always easy for me.
Interviewer: What initiated your interest in water law?
Mr. Sparks: Well, one of the strange things that happened right
after I got back after the war was over and I was in Boulder was that the
army disintegrated and everyone wanted to get out. There were still a
lot of problems in the world and the Army was getting frantic because
it didn't have any soldiers. All the National Guard units had been
dissolved; the Army was anxious to get National Guard and Reserve
units going again. So, I got a letter one day from the governor of
Colorado. It said, "I've discovered you were one of the senior officers
in your Regiment and have returned to Colorado. I would like to talk
to you about getting the Regiment reorganized." So I went to Denver
and met with him. He told me that they wanted to put me back on
active duty for two months. I would tour the state and organize thirty
units. I told him I would have to think about it. I didn't want to miss
too much of law school. I talked to the dean of the law school. He
said, "You're a good student, you can just take the final exam. If you
pass, you pass. We'll excuse you for two months." So that's what
happened. I went back on active duty and sent my wife and two kids
back down to Arizona to stay with her folks. They furnished me with a
military vehicle and expenses and I drove around the state trying to get
things organized-Sterling, Cortez, Durango, Trinidad, you name it.
Most vets I knew weren't interested in getting back into the service but
I had two months to organize it. I did it and I joined as a commander.
When I started my law practice, I had a little pay coming in from the
Army, which helps. Starting your own law practice is not easy.
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Interviewer: So, you started your own law practice? Where?
Mr. Sparks: As I toured the state, I kept my eye open thinking, "I've
got to find a place to stay, a place where I can start a practice." I always
had a phobia of being in a big law firm. Lots of guys I'd graduated
with had gone to Holland & Hart and some of the other big firms here
in Denver. That wasn't for me. But in my travels, one of the little
towns I came across was Delta, Colorado. Well, I love that area
because I'm an avid fisherman and hunter, and boy do they have
fishing and hunting over there. And it's beautiful. Uncompahgre
National Forest on one side, Grand Mesa National Forest on the other.
An ideal place except that it was very small-population about three
thousand. But it's the county seat and the whole county's about 15,000
people. A lot of the old lawyers over there had been veterans of World
War I. And one of them said, "All of us old lawyers here are getting
pretty old. We don't have a young lawyer. Why don't you start here."
And there was a doctor there who was a doctor in World War I. He
had the been in the Army and he owned a two story building. He
encouraged me. He said, "I'll give you rent on this building. I'll just
charge you ten dollars a month rent." Can you beat that? When I got
out of law school I decided that was exactly where I was going. So we
packed up and went over to Delta in our little '35 Chevy and I bought
some second-hand furniture and an old typewriter. My wife's major in
college was in business administration. She could type and she could
take shorthand. So, she would come and help me at the office when I
had letters and things to type. Otherwise, she took care of our two
little kids.
Interviewer: Was most of the law you practiced water law?
Mr. Sparks: After I had only been there a few months in 1948,
there was the election and the District Attorney wasn't going to run
anymore. That district had seven counties in it at that time-Mesa,
Delta, Montrose, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Ouray, and San Miguel; it's
smaller now, been cut into two districts. I hadn't planned on running
for anything because I didn't know anyone. But there was an Army
school on nuclear warfare. The atomic bomb was new at that time.
They wanted all senior officers to go to a special course at Fort
Benning, Georgia, on nuclear warfare. The course was two weeks.
And, I would get military pay if I went. I wasn't making anything
practicing law. I enrolled in the course and when I came back, the
election was heating up. The guy running on the democratic ticket
got cold feet; he didn't think he could make it so he resigned. So, in
desperation, the vacancy committee put my name in without
consulting me while I was in Fort Benning, Georgia. When I got back
into town, an attorney from town met me at the airport. He said, "We
don't know about this but we had to do something. We had to get the
vacancy filled and we didn't have any time left so we just put your
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name in." Well damned if I didn't win. So I was the District Attorney.
And then I went into practice with this older lawyer who had
encouraged me to come there in the first place. See, in those days, in
a district of that size the District Attorney could practice law. In the
bigger districts, you couldn't. So I went in with this older attorney, and
with the District Attorney's salary and private practice, I was doing
alright. It didn't take very long. My partner was very much interested
in water law. He had been a referee in one of the adjudication
proceedings they used to have. So he got me interested. He said,
"We've got a lot of fights here in this county over water rights." So I
got interested in it and studied it.
Interviewer: What year was it at this point?
Mr. Sparks: I guess I was elected in '48 and took office in '49. So it
must have been '49 or '50, right in there when I got started with water
law.
Interviewer: What was your biggest case, a case that had a big
influence on the shaping of Colorado water law?
Mr. Sparks: I won a big case at the Colorado Supreme Court. We
had a client who had some money. He was a big rancher. He had a
local attorney for many years, but he got mad at him. He was having
trouble getting his water through his decree and his attorney was also
representing the ditch company so he came in to see me. He gave me
his outline of the case and I thought, boy, that's a tough one. As the
years went by, I discovered that most decrees entered in the state were
fraudulent. Probably at least ninety percent of them were fraudulent
decrees. So I got to go into records and study the whole system.
Interviewer: How did you discover the degrees were fraudulent?
What do you mean by that?
Mr. Sparks: By that I mean they used to have adjudication
procedures, that anyone could open up, that would last for a year or
so, and the court would appoint a referee to take testimonies. And the
referee would take testimony for however long the proceedings would
be open, usually around a year, and then the referee would hand down
a decision granting a certain priority and a certain amount of water.
And then they had the chance to contest it. The judge would enter a
decree based on the referee's recommendation. The way they were
fraudulent is you would get a decree for a reservoir for 1,000 acre-feet
per year and the reservoir didn't hold but 300. Or have a decree for
twenty cubic feet per second and the ditch didn't hold but five.
Nobody checked. Unless somebody contested it. Well, I knew that
practically all decrees were fraudulent but the problem was there was a
two year statute of limitations. After the decree was entered by the
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court, you had two years to contest it. If you didn't, it became a final
decree no matter what, fraudulent or otherwise, it didn't matter.
Well, as time went on, more and more decrees were entered and
water got more and more scarce and precious. This rancher owned a
pretty good hunk of land and ran cattle. He was having a hard time
getting his decree; in short years, his decree would run out. He got to
checking.
He did some investigation of his own and quickly
discovered what the problem was. Here was a reservoir above him with
a senior decree for about 12,000 acre-feet, a pretty good sized
reservoir. Well, they were refilling it and the water commissioner
would keep turning water to them. So I hired an engineer from
Denver to come over and do a detailed survey of the reservoir to give
me a capacity table. He reported to me that after the survey, let's say
their decree was 12,000 acre-feet, actually the thing only held about
4,000. They weren't running reservoir water any more, they were just
taking my client's and other people's water to make their 12,000 feet
but they didn't have it stored. They were using a direct flow from the
creek to make up their decree. Well, that's final. I'm thinking you
can't attack it presumably.
But I came up with a theory of
abandonment.
It was the first case of it's kind in the state and there wasn't any law
on it because no one would attack the two year statute of limitations. I
told my client, "We're going to have a tough time at the trial court and
we'll probably lose it. You'll have to be ready to appeal it to the
supreme court." So, I filed a procedure against the State Engineer and
Granby Ditch and Reservoir Company to stop them from delivering
any more than the actual capacity of the reservoir.
Well, I got bopped at the trial level. The trial judge at the district
court said, "That's a final decree and you can't attack it." I took it on
to the supreme court and what I argued was their decree was final
when it was entered but in a subsequent period of time they could
never have stored the 12,000 acre-feet, only 4,000, so 8,000 acre-feet
of their decree was abandoned. I said, "They didn't construct any
additional facilities and, therefore, they abandoned 8,000 feet." I
wanted to come in with the abandonment issue to make some real
teeth in it because all the cases before the supreme court on
abandonment previously had all held that abandonment was an issue
of intent; there's no abandonment without the intent to abandon. So
I argued that their intent was demonstrated by the fact that they didn't
do anything to enlarge their reservoir and the court bought it, much
to my surprise. It changed the abandonment law considerably at that
point. So that set me up as a big water lawyer in nothing flat. I was
winning cases left and right. Everybody had water problems.
Interviewer: What's the name of this case?
Mr. Sparks: Granby Ditch & Reservoir Company v. Hallenbeck.
Hallenbeck was my client.
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Interviewer: How did you become involved in the drafting of the
1969 Act?
Mr. Sparks: I knew all the holes in our water law and the problems
we'd had with it over the years and the whole adjudication procedure
was a mess of fraud. And what we had was decrees all over the state for
water that did not exist. There were many pitfalls in the old
procedure. Anybody could be a referee-you could just appoint some
guy who could be anybody. There was also no real review of the
various decrees. And the decree system in effect was a joke. For
example, we had a major creek called Surface Creek and there were a
lot of tributaries. There were different referees over the years and
what we ended up with was a Number One Decree on Smith Creek, a
Number One Decree on Surface Creek, a Number One Decree on
Cottonwood Creek, all tributary to the Gunnison River. Now you can't
have in one water district all those Number One decrees. Which one
do you shut off first? You have to look at the whole system. But there
was no system at all. And we had to satisfy compacts. So the whole
thing had to be redone and we had to go back and find out which
decree was the Number One decree instead of having four or five
hundred. We had to start renumbering the whole decree system.
Interviewer: How much input did you have in the drafting of the
'69 Act?
Mr. Sparks: I had a lot of input. I monitored that all the time,
constantly. There were some things I wanted to go further than what
they finally did but we got it set up finally where there was one system.
It was a lot of work for the State Engineer's office. Years and years of
work of revising the whole system so today he knows where the
Number One decree on the Colorado River is, or the South Platte.
And we got into the abandonment thing. What we found out was
we had a big hole with conditional decrees. We had some conditional
decrees that were fifty or seventy-five years old and nothing had been
done with them but they were still on the decree book, still valid
conditional decrees. We had to figure out a method of not allowing
people to have conditional decrees forever.
Interviewer: Enter diligence proceedings.
Mr. Sparks: Exactly. You have to go into court periodically to show
due diligence which was not required under the old law, causing a lot
of problems. We'd have power decrees on some of the tributaries of
the Colorado to run their generators but they were speculative decrees
tying up the whole system. When you put all the decrees together
you'd find out the whole system was over-appropriated by several
hundred percent. That was a big hole in the old proceedings.
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Then I worked on some other innovations.
We had no
groundwater law. The next thing I tackled was groundwater law. It
was after World War II and everybody started putting in wells because
the farmers were getting electricity. You could run pumps on gas or
electricity so, suddenly, we had a proliferation of wells everywhere.
Texas and New Mexico brought suit against us in the Supreme Court
because we weren't delivering our compact commitment. Well, when I
got into it and put my engineers on it, I was Director of the Water
Board at that time...
Interviewer: The Colorado Water Conservation Board?
Mr. Sparks: Yes. Well, as the years went by McNichols was elected
governor of the state, it was maybe 1950, and the Water Board, for all
practical purposes had ceased to exist. It was because the Eastern
Slope wanted more water from the Western Slope and the Western
Slope didn't want to turn it loose. The major project of contention at
that time was the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project where they wanted to
export water from the Colorado River to Colorado Springs and
Pueblo, and other cities and the farmers down there, with the help of
the Bureau of Reclamation. They came up with a plan to import water
from the Colorado River. Denver was busy with its Blue River project;
Denver was the number one importer. Every one of those projects
caused a great deal of agony in Western Colorado. They didn't want
to give up any water, a rather stupid decision, I might add, but that's
the way it was. So the state was badly divided. The Water Board had
four members from Western Colorado and the rest were from Eastern
Colorado.
Interviewer: How many were there from Eastern Colorado on the
Board at that time?
Mr. Sparks: At that time there were fourteen members-four from
the Western Slope and ten from the Eastern Slope. So the Eastern
Slope interests could outvote the Western Slope interests; but, there
was another factor that was very important at that time. The Western
Slope had its own congressman at that time, Wayne Aspinall. At that
time we had four congressmen. One was from Western Colorado and
the other three were from over here: Denver had its own, as did
Northern and Southern Colorado. So they had three congressmen
over here. To get anything done in a big way for the farmers, you had
to have federal help-the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of
Engineers, and other federal agencies. Well, they couldn't get
anything done because the Water Board was fighting all the time. It
just came to a very, very bitter halt.
The Water Board dictates state policy. Under the federal law, even
a project in California that involved the Colorado River or any river
that originates in Colorado (we've got four major rivers that start here)
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the Water Board had to approve any federal participation. Under state
law, the Water Board is an interstate agency as well as an intrastate
agency and everything that's going to happen on the Arkansas no
matter if it's in Kansas or somewhere down the line, has to be
submitted to all the states for comments and objections. The
endorsement of the state Water Board is critical for anybody that wants
federal or state money. Because of the bitter battle between Western
and Eastern Colorado, they couldn't get anything done.
The ace in the hole for the Western Slope was Wayne Aspinall. He
turned out to be the most powerful man in the House because he
quickly, after he got in Congress, became Chairman of the Interior
Affairs Committee of the House. Throughout the history of Colorado
we've only had two chairmen in either house of Congress. Chairmen
run the Congress, anybody that thinks otherwise doesn't know what's
going on back there. If you want to get anything done through a
particular committee you have to have a chairman watching. Well,
Wayne Aspinall gets that powerful position which means he can block
anything that they want in Eastern Colorado that involves federal
money. And so that's where we were in the state-in a complete
deadlock.
This is a condition that Steve McNichols inherits when he's elected
governor. Steve was an active guy with a lot of plans, one of the best
governors we've ever had. He was determined to break the deadlock.
First, the Board had its own attorney, with the consent of the Attorney
General. It was in the statute that the Board could appoint its own
attorney, which is different than most state agencies. I'm not sure how
that came about originally. These water cases as they go through to
the United States Supreme Court, they last sometimes fifteen years.
They decided the state Water Board should have its own independent
attorney for continuity. It used to be that the Attorney General's office
turned over every two years. The Attorney General was only elected
for two years. Those people came and went. We never really had
much of an Attorney General's office over the years until recently.
Anyway, the Board had its own attorney. The first, when the Board
was first born back in the 1930s, was Gene Breitenstein. Gene was
appointed as the Board's first attorney. And he was quite a wellknown attorney who finally was appointed to federal court. Then his
place was taken by a man named Hatfield Chilson, also a well-known
water lawyer in the state. He became Assistant Secretary of the
Interior. Chilson resigned from the Board to take that position and
that left a vacancy for the state Water Board which was always regarded
as a top spot for a water attorney. The man who seemed to be in line
for it was Ray Moses, a prominent water attorney from Alamosa. But
Ray was a member of the Board; he had been appointed as a member
from the San Luis Valley. Ray looked to be the most likely Board
attorney. But he had always voted with the Eastern Slope interests; he
wasn't too popular in Western Colorado. One day out of the blue
McNichols called me at my office and said, "I want you to come in and
talk to me." I got on the plane and came over and he said, "I want you
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to be the attorney for the state Water Board." You're from Western
Colorado and we've got to pull this Board together and I think you're
the one man who can do it. We have millions of dollars in projects
that are ready to go but we can't get them done because of our
political problem in Washington with Wayne Aspinall and the other
congressmen." I said, "I already heard Ray Moses was going to be
appointed and never thought much about it." But he put it up to me
and put me on the spot.
There were fourteen members on the Board at that time, the
governor being one of them. The governor, by statute, was chairman
of the Board. So I said, "I don't know if you can swing it or not,
Governor." He said, "By god I can swing it. I appoint those people."
He appoints nine. The other five were ex offico members, including the
State Engineer, the State Planning Director, and the Attorney General.
I said, "Well, I'm ready." He said, "I'll hold a Board meeting and
recommend that you become the attorney for the Board."
So the meeting was held and the governor nominated me but
somebody else on the Board nominated Ray Moses. The governor
said, "Well I want Felix Sparks to be the attorney for the Board." Ray
Moses made a motion for a secret ballot, which the governor had not
expected, and the vote came out seven to seven. The Governor was
very angry; McNichols could get very angry. He said, "I'm chairman of
this Board and responsible to appoint people. My wishes should be
followed." The meeting was adjourned. There was another meeting
in two weeks. He told me, "I'm shocked I couldn't carry this but give
me a couple weeks and I'll carry it." A couple of weeks later, at the
next meeting, he placed my name in nomination and that was itthere were no other nominees. So I was unanimously elected attorney
for the Board. And then I got busy with all the Western Slope projects,
and with meetings with the Colorado River Board and the
Southeastern Board and I got rough with them. I said, "If you people
want anything done in this state, you have to pull together. There has
to be common effort." I cursed at some of them that were giving me
problems. I can get pretty nasty too.
Interviewer: How do you feel about the '69 Act now and the court
interpretations over past thirty years?
Mr. Sparks: I think it has worked quite well. I think it has
improved a lot of the problems and filled in the gaps we talked about
before. It's an entirely different system than it was. Especially since
there's the water court. It used to be that any judge heard water cases.
I think it's working pretty well.
Interviewer: Is there anything about it you would change?
Mr. Sparks: No, I don't think so. Well, there were a few things I
wanted to change at the time but couldn't get done. I think it has
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worked reasonably well and the major errors have since been
corrected. But the one thing I did not like about it was the thing
about replacement water, augmentation plans.
Interviewer: In closing, how do you think Colorado's system
compares to other states?
Mr. Sparks: Ours is as good as any, probably much better than
most. We have a tight knit watershed approach to our system. Most
states don't have that.

BOOK NOTES
ALICE OUTWATER, WATER: A NATURAL HISTORY, Basic Books, New
York, NY (1996); 212pp; $23.00, ISBN 0-465-03779-8.
Alice Outwater's environmental engineering work on the Boston
Harbor clean up project resulted in her writing Water: A Natural
History. She monitored chemical content from industrial pollution in
Boston Harbor and found the water and sludge in the harbor mainly
uncontaminated by industry. In an effort to understand why so many
bodies of water around the country remain contaminated despite the
Clean Water Act's enactment, Outwater wrote this book which
examines how the earth cleans its own water. She calls water "the
blood of land" whose natural cycle, particularly in North America, has
been altered so drastically that "water is no longer able to clean itself
naturally." Citing dredging and damming as "tampering" with and
oversimplifying the natural process, Outwater articulates a natural
history of water while suggesting how changes in the management of
public lands could restore the natural process.
The first section of the book, entitled "Dismantling the Natural
System," contains six chapters that highlight historical practices that
contributed to the break down of the natural cleansing process for
waterways. For example, Chapters One and Two outline the history of
the fur trade and its elimination of the North American beavers and
their dams. According to Outwater, beavers, "nature's hydrologists,"
play an important role in aiding water's natural cleansing by building
dams. She notes "[a] land with hundreds of millions of beavers is a
truly rich land, and the wetlands associated with beaver dams made the
New World's water plentiful and clear as the dew." Outwater also
asserts an association between rainfall and forests. She explains how
the effect of deforestation of old growth forests deprives waterways of
nutrients, received through rainfall "catching" those nutrients from
lichen and fungi.
After Outwater establishes what she believes to represent the
beginning of the break down of the natural water purification process,
she covers the additional degradation of water in second section,
entitled "Engineering the Waterways." Chapter Seven discusses the
ways in which dams both arrest natural processes by "exert[ing] total
control over the downstream river" and eliminate "natural extremes of
flow, water temperature, and sediment transport." Since water travels
more slowly through a dammed river, organic matter and sediment,
critical to the aquatic ecosystem, get trapped in reservoirs. In the final
chapters, Outwater examines the effects of modern sewer systems,
industrial pollution, and the Clean Water Act on the earth's natural
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cleansing process. She also discusses the Boston Harbor Clean-up
project, her education in that process, and her subsequent compulsion
to write this book.
This book provides a "natural history" of water that is interesting to
read and invaluable to anyone-a city planner, lawyer, or concerned
citizen-who works with water or is interested in the state of our water
supply. Outwater suggests that "[a]fter a hundred years of taking away
from our waterways" we need to give back. In the book's final pages,
Outwater suggests methods to give back and also notes improvements.
Although she writes summarily here, the solutions are not her book's
focus. Instead, Outwater shows the reader the many avenues North
American water took to arrive at this troubled state.
JenniferLee

KENNETH R. WRIGHT, ED., WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES, American Water Works Association, Denver, Colorado

(1998); 15 6 pp; $47.00; ISBN 0-89867-960-5, softcover.
Water Rights of the Eastern United States focuses on the thirty-one
Eastern states which base surface water allocation on the riparian
doctrine. Chapters One and Two explain the necessity of water rights;
the basic function of water law; and the government's role in water
rights as creator, enforcer, and regulator.
Under the riparian doctrine, water rights stem from land
ownership adjacent to a water body. The owner has reasonable use of
the water flowing past his land subject to other riparian owners' rights.
Chapter Three discusses the land continuity requirements and natural
flow and reasonable use principles which govern how much water a
landowner may use. This chapter examines various issues surrounding
the riparian doctrine and how states differ in its application and
definition. It also addresses riparian rights transferability and the
doctrines applicable to groundwater.
Based on assumptions of water surplus and increasing water
demand, many Eastern states have modified the common law riparian
system with a system of regulated riparian rights. Chapter Four
examines the structure and application of regulated riparian rights.
Under a system of regulated riparian rights, a user may not withdraw
water without a permit from the state. The chapter also examines
issues arising under the conflict of a regulated riparian system
application in the face of common law riparian rights.
States often try to address cooperatively transboundary water
problems through interstate compacts that do not completely
surrender control to the federal government. Chapter Five addresses
the general law governing interstate compacts and compares the
different patterns of Eastern and Western state compacts.
This

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

chapter then explains the first interstate compact, the Delaware River
Basin Compact. It concludes with a discussion of the legal system of
the Great Lakes, including the Great Lakes River Basin Compact, a
model for most Eastern compacts.
Even in the East, where water is more plentiful than in the West,
conflicts arise from the allocation of water rights where water supply is
limited. Many methods exist to increase water supply availability in
Eastern states.
Chapter Six discusses several of these methods
including water storage, water rights, and water conservation. Chapter
Seven then addresses water rights engineering which plays a large role
in resolving water rights disputes.
Since the 1970s, the United States has seen a surge in federal
environmental law. Chapter Eight briefly examines the major laws
affecting water management including the Clean Water Act, the
National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act.
These federal laws are important since they overlay any state water law
scheme and may affect many water projects. Chapter Nine concludes
with an alphabetical table providing a general summary of the water
rights in the thirty-one Eastern states.
Water Rights of the Eastern United States provides an excellent
overview of the major concepts related to water law principles as
applied in the Eastern United States and provides a general
understanding of these major principles, including how they apply in
specific situations.
Shana Smilovits

DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL, West Publishing Co.,

St. Paul, Minnesota (1997); 4 5 6pp; $23.75; ISBN 0-314-21157-8,
paperback.
Water Law in a Nutshell addresses the fundamentals of water law in a
manner useful to both students and lawyers. In its third edition, Water
Law in a Nutshell captures the latest developments in the rapidly
growing field of water law. It not only focuses on water issues in the
Western United States, but also explores the conflicts and shortages in
the East. This book examines the pressures on state laws to
accommodate diverse and expanding water uses; the weighing of
public interest issues; and environmental considerations in water
decisions by courts, agencies, and legislatures.
Chapter One provides an overview and introduction to water law.
The chapter focuses on the study of water law and discusses water's
unique diversity and importance, priming its reader for discussions of
water allocation legal systems.
Chapter Two explains the riparian rights system, beginning with
the doctrine's historical roots in England and France. The chapter
continues the historical overview with discussions of early development
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in the Eastern United States, repudiation and recognition in the
American West, and modern riparian law. This chapter identifies
riparian lands, exploring source contiguity, types of watercourses, and
the extent of riparian right attachment. It also examines rights of
riparian proprietors in the surface of waterways, highlighting the
essentials of those rights. Chapter Two also explores limits on riparian
rights, permit systems, transfers of riparian rights, and concludes with
loss of riparian rights.
Chapter Three surveys the prior appropriation doctrine. It begins
with a brief description of the doctrine, outlines its traditional
elements, and explains its developments. Next, the chapter discusses
appropriative water rights as property, examining the general rule of
no individual ownership of flowing water, state constitutional and
statutory provisions, and statutes limiting riparian rights. The chapter
discusses priority, the essential feature of the doctrine, and details the
elements of appropriation: intent, diversion, and beneficial use. The
chapter explores waters subject to appropriation including
watercourses, waters made available by human effort, and withdrawals
from appropriation. The chapter concludes with discussions of loss of
water rights, access to water sources, and storage rights.
Some states employ a hybrid of the riparian and appropriation
doctrine in their water laws while others employ their own special
water allocation scheme. Chapter Four explores hybrid systems and
other variations in water law. This chapter begins its discussion by
exploring the development of the hybrid system through California's
early recognition of both appropriative and riparian rights, federal
recognition of appropriative rights, and limitations on riparian rights.
Modifications of riparian rights in hybrid systems are illustrated
through discussions of reasonable use limitations, extinguishment of
unused riparian rights, and constitutional challenges. The chapter
then addresses the administration of hybrid systems. The chapter
concludes by detailing two of the more anomalous state water
allocation systems, Hawai'i and Louisiana, and also examines pueblo
water rights.
Chapter Five explores rights to use the surface of waterways. The
chapter describes public rights in navigable waters and defines
navigability, including both state and federal definitions. This chapter
also defines the public trust doctrine and various state recognitions of
public rights to surface use of non-navigable waters. The discussion
then turns to accessing waterways for lawful surface use, focusing on
condemnation and implied rights of access. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of reciprocal rights of riparian owners.
Chapter Six reviews groundwater law, exploring basic hydrology,
groundwater occurrence, and water wells. The chapter discusses the
allocation of rights in groundwater, focusing on the nature of rights,
rules of liability, economic effects of rules, permits, and statutory
limitations on pumping. The chapter also explores conjunctive use,
using California as an example, and groundwater storage. It concludes
with an exploration of groundwater contamination controls.
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Different rules apply to diffused surface waters, the focus of
Chapter Seven. This chapter distinguishes watercourses from diffused
surface waters and then addresses protection from damage of surface
flows. The chapter concludes with an exploration of diffused surface
waters, detailing the right to capture diffused surface waters and state
control of the use of diffused surface waters.
Chapter Eight examines federal and Indian reserved rights
beginning with the reserved rights doctrine. This chapter focuses on
the origin of the doctrine articulated in Winters v. United States and
discusses its application to federal, non-Indian lands; federal power;
and state water law. The chapter identifies priority of reserved rights,
including date of reservation and early priorities based on Aboriginal
Indian Rights as well as the quantity of water subject to federal or
Indian reserved rights and its availability. Next, the chapter focuses on
transfers of reserved rights, examining users of public and Indian
lands, individual Indian allotments, and uses outside Indian
reservations.
Chapter Eight also discusses various quantification
methods concluding with a brief discussion of "non-reserved" federal
water rights.
The final three chapters, Nine, Ten, and Eleven, explore federal
control of water development, interstate allocation (focusing on the
increased demands for water within an interstate basin), and water
service and supply organizations (examining both private and public
organizations).
Water Law in a Nutshell will prove to be a valuable tool for anyone
involved in water law related issues. It provides a succinct, basic
understanding of water law illustrated through case law and statutory
references. Furthermore, this book will serve as a reliable guide for
students and lawyers with its convenient outline, table of cases, and
index.
Anna Litaker

MICHAEL COLLIER, WATER, EARTH, AND SKY: THE COLORADO RIVER

BASIN, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City (1999);
$29.95; ISBN 0-87480-598-8, hardcover.

1 2 8 pp;

Water, Earth, and Sky: The Colorado River Basin ("Water, Earth, and
Sky") offers a unique examination of one of this country's most
complex and overused rivers, the Colorado River. Seven essays,
complemented by aerial photographs of the Colorado, comprise the
book. Each essay focuses on a different aspect of the river's basin.
From the varied native fish that survived and evolved with the
Colorado system to the landscape that surrounds the river to a writer's
personal impressions of the river, Water, Earth, and Sky provides the
reader with an insightful look into this majestic system. As Glen
Canyon Institute President David Wegner states in the forward, the
photographs and essays "explore the history of this watershed, both
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natural and human."
Michael Collier's essay describes the river's aerial perspective. Not
only has Mr. Collier spent significant time circling over every stretch in
his Cessna, but also he is the book's photographer. Mr. Collier offers
insights and descriptions of events that he feels impacted the river.
For those unfamiliar with the configuration of the Colorado, this essay
illustrates its intricacies and relations with other tributaries and rivers.
The essay portrays how the landscape, human involvement, and
habitat changes have all shaped the river's current state.
John C. Schmidt, a geomorphologist, writes about the landscape
that surrounds the Colorado. The essay describes the "interaction
between rivers and regional geology." He analyzes the concept of
"uplift," how the character of rocks can alter a river's course, and a
case history of the Green River.
Ned Andrews, a United States Geological Survey research
hydrologist, describes the nature of the basin (water and sediment
origin, ancestral flows, and aridity) and how human impact,
particularly diversions, affect the river. Focusing primarily on Glen
Canyon, Mr. Andrews describes the conflicting interests of providing
water for beneficial uses, generating hydroelectric power, and
elimination of natural spring flooding. The essay also provides a brief
history of reservoirs and dam building on the river.
Rich Valdez's essay examines the native fish of the Colorado. A
large portion of the fish (some 74%) are indigenous to the Colorado
and cannot be found anywhere else on earth. They survive within a
unique ecosystem, one that depends on unpredictable conditions and
a "harmonious occurrence of many environmental factors."
Archaeological records indicate that many of the species date from
A.D. 1100 to 1700 and some as early as 300 B.C. and A.D. 400. Within
the last 100 years however, dramatic changes greatly affected these
native fish. Dam construction essentially blocked the passage of
migrating squawfish and razorback suckers. State and federal agencies
introduced recreational sport fish to the river, resulting in disease, and
space and food competition. Clear, cold water, a result of the dams,
excluded native fish from certain regions and provided an ideal
habitat for tailgate trout fisheries, a valued resource to fly anglers. The
author points out the necessity of managing the river to accommodate
all needs, including the survival of native fish.
Lawrence Stevens, a research biologist, focuses on the riparian
ecosystem of the Colorado. According to Mr. Stevens, the term
riparian means the ecosystem's surviving in the "margins of ephemeral
and perennial stream channels as well as in wet meadows, and in areas
of springs, seeps, hanging gardens, and marshes," encompassing such
areas as the high-elevations of the Rocky Mountains and Uinta
Mountains, alpine wet meadows along the upper Green River
drainage, the White River Plateau, and the river banks in the low
elevations (below 6 thousand feet). The essay also explores human
impacts on riparian ecosystems and concludes by questioning the
balance between economic and environmental sustainability.
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Ellen Molloy, an author, paints a vivid image of the Colorado.
Depicting human's insatiable hunger and the fragile ecosystem of the
river, Ms. Molloy points out that "each year the Colorado Plateau
menu diminishes, the diners grow more numerous and their appetite,
ravenous." A solo-rafting journey down the river conjures many
intimate thoughts for the writer. After almost losing the raft and her
gear, Ms. Molloy reiterates what most forget, that the river is always in
charge. The river humbles and forces us to look within ourselves.
The photographs in Water, Earth, and Sky are truly spectacular.
They bring the essays to life and offer glimpses of the Colorado River
that most would never be able to see. For this reason alone, the book
is essential for any lover of not only the Colorado, but of all rivers.
The Colorado River is not what is once was. To understand the
changes and ways to lessen the damage, Water, Earth, and Sky offers a
valued first step.
KarinaSerkin

TERRY L. ANDERSON AND PETERJ. HILL, EDS., WATER MARKETINGTHE NEXT GENERATION, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc,

Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania (1997); 201pp; $22.95; ISBN 08476-8398-2, softcover.
A water market's ability to prevent water crises involves the
interrelation between property rights and politics. This compilation of
articles entitled Water Marketing-The Next Generation discusses law and
policy alternatives that legislators can use to achieve efficient water use
in future American water markets.
According to Barton H. Thompson, American water markets face
obstacles emanating from two non-market paradigms that influence
legal rules: ownership structures and societal expectations. The first
paradigm represents the view of water as a public resource for all to
share. The other represents water as a local resource for local
regulation. In the article Water Markets and the Problems of Shifting
Paradigms,Thompson discusses the two paradigms' negative effects on
shifting from private to public water rights. Thompson focuses on
institutional barriers, psychological barriers, and market advantages
shaping America's future water policy.
The article, Institutional Constraints on Transboundary Water
Marketing, examines problems presented by state, federal, and
international laws. To be effective, American water policy must bridge
both federal and international political boundaries to participate
effectively in transboundary water markets. The author, James L.
Huffman, also proposes solutions designed to overcome interstate
water marketing obstacles.
To exemplify the institutional obstacles, Interstate Marketing of
Central Arizona Project Water: Law, Economics, and Politics criticizes legal
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and political constraints contributing to the Central Arizona Project's
inefficiency. The author, Jeffrey R. Fuller, focuses on Arizona's water
revenue potential in interstate water markets, but shows how the state's
legislature continues to restrict access to markets to maintain the legal
status quo.
On the other hand, other states, with varying success, have sought
to change their legal status quo to create more efficient water
allocation. Texas, for example, has sought to change its legal status
quo, yet has not found a strategy that satisfies all competing political
factions. The article entitled Protectingthe Edwards Aquifer advocates for
institutional reform.
One possible institutional reform involves creating water districts
that span state boundaries and include entire river basins. In Must
Water Regulation Be Centralized? David D. Haddock explains that this
approach allows regulators to tailor hydrological regulation to remedy
externalities and to maximize benefits occurring within the basin.
Australia utilizes the basin approach.
The article Transborder Water Trading among the Australian States
discusses the successes of transcending political boundaries for
administering water rights.
The author, Gary L. Sturgess,
demonstrates that the advantages to basin-wide rules outweigh the
disadvantages to political autonomy loss.
The basin approach does not always require a loss of political
autonomy. The article Environmental Quality, Biological Envelopes, and
River Basin Markets compares mandatory and voluntary river basin
approaches by contrasting North Carolina's voluntary Tar-Pamlico
Association to Germany's and France's mandatory water associations.
The authors, David W. Riggs and Bruce Yandle, suggest that the
voluntary basin approach to environmental protection offers more
flexibility and efficiency for its members.
Another institutional reform involves tailoring the pollution
control regime to reflect the pollution's geographic scope. This allows
local governments to govern local pollution issues that the federal
government currently regulates. According to Henry N. Butler and
Jonathan R. Macey, authors of Water Rights Regulation, Political
Incentives, and Federalism, the centralized pollution control system fails
to adequately protect the environment because of its inflexibility and
its inertia. The authors argue that legislators cannot fix the current
centralized pollution control regime; thus, they must dismantle it.
However, because dismantling water regulatory regimes remains
cumbersome, other commentators suggest ways to reform existing
regimes. IncreasingEfficiency in Water Markets: Examples from the Western
United States focuses on environmentalists' increased opposition to
agriculture-to-urban
water transfers
due to the external
environmental impacts.
Madoline Wallace
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OLGA L. MOYA AND ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
THE USER'S GUIDE, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, MN (1997);
4 0 4 pp;

$26.75, ISBN 0-314-03721-7.

Olga Moya and Andrew Fono designed this book guide the reader
through several federal environmental laws. The book provides law
students, engineers, attorneys, and concerned citizens who have
limited experience in environmental law with a simplified yet
comprehensive guide to several prominent environmental statutes.
The User's Guide provides a wide variety of additional legal resources
including executive orders, agency regulations, and relevant statutory
and judicial citations. The authors use a simple and brief outline for
each covered statute, providing a complete overview, guiding the
reader directly to the relevant sections necessary in federal
environmental litigation.
The User's Guide begins with an introduction into administrative
law. Using the Environmental Protection Agency as its analytical focus,
this first chapter leads readers through administrative rulemaking
processes, adjudications, and agency enforcement actions.
The
chapter describes the steps a litigant must take to challenge an agency
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. Also detailed are
the different standards of review courts apply when reviewing different
levels of administrative action and different judicial remedies courts
apply when considering the validity of agency action.
The next chapter explores the policies supporting the National
Environmental Policy Act and its practical application. The outline
describes in detail each step agencies must perform to satisfy the
statute.
The authors explain the substantive contents of each
procedural step when an agency must perform a particular statutory
requirement, and provides judicial and regulatory citations
demonstrating the applicability of particular statutory sections.
Chapter Three explores and simplifies the structure of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). Blending both
the regulatory and statutory provisions into a clear, step-by-step
analysis allows practitioners to determine what constitutes solid and
hazardous waste, who is subject to RCRA regulation, and how to
comply with the statute. This chapter also describes the role of the
government and citizens in enforcing the statute, and different
remedies available to courts when reviewing regulations, permits, or
other final agency actions.
Next, the book covers a statute related to RCRA, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERLCA"). After a brief overview of CERCLA's history and
origin, Chapter Four explains how it provides for cleaning up
contaminated sites, and who is liable for paying the cleanup costs.
This chapter clearly sets out each of the statutory and regulatory
elements necessary to find liability, and provides a detailed breakdown,
complete with judicial and statutory citations, interpreting the
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requirements of each element. The outline describes the scope and
applicability of the statute's exemption and defenses to liability. The
chapter concludes by stating the serious consequences of failing to
comply with the statutory requirements.
Chapter Five covers the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). It describes the
federal and state roles in implementing and enforcing the Act. The
chapter discusses the statutory mandates for determining air quality
standards and the regulations guiding state permitting programs
designed to meet the standards. The chapter also provides a detailed
description of the CAA's permitting procedures and requirements,
and the enforcement mechanisms available to agencies and citizens
when individuals fail to satisfy permit requirements.
The book's final chapter covers the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Beginning with a concise statement of the elements necessary to
determine when a CWA violation exists, the chapter then describes the
federal and state roles in implementing, enforcing, and varying the
act's provisions.
The chapter analyzes the Act's permitting
requirements, and describes when particular permits are required and
the degree of technology different dischargers must use to comply
with the Act. The chapter briefly deals with the Act's wetlands
protection program, oil spill program, and nonpoint source pollution
program, as well as the permitting requirements necessary to comply
with each program. Finally, the chapter concludes with a description
of the Act's enforcement, penalty, and citizen suit provisions designed
to promote compliance with the Act, and ultimately, a cleaner
environment.
MichaelFischer

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SECOND CIRCUIT
Burnette v. Carothers, Nos. 98-7835(L), 98-9003(CON), 1999 WL
710624 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (holding homeowners' suit for
injunctive and monetary relief under the CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA
citizen suit provisions brought against state officers in their official
capacity was barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
The Burnettes filed suit against various state officers in their
official capacities claiming the Connecticut Correctional Institute
("CCI") had emanated toxic substances onto their property that
polluted and continued to pollute their wells in violation of the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The Burnettes sought
an injunction, monetary relief, and reimbursement for past and future
response costs.
At the trial court, the state officers successfully argued that the case
was barred for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the sovereign
immunity clause of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The court granted the state officers' motion for
summary judgment on the claims for response costs because recovery
would violate the state's sovereign immunity. The Burnettes appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed based on
congressional intent explicitly stated in each of the statutes under
which the Burnettes sued, acknowledging that citizen suits against
governmental entities were allowed only to the extent pennitted by the
Eleventh Amendment.
The court rejected the Burnettes' argument that the case
represented qui tam action, brought by the Burnettes on behalf of the
United States, and held that citizen suit provisions granted citizens the
right to sue on their own behalf, not on behalf of the United States.
Next, the Burnettes argued that the claims for prospective relief
were valid under Ex Parte Young. The court waived this claim because
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the Burnettes had not raised the claim in the original case, and no
miscarriage ofjustice resulted by not recognizing the exception.
Through summary judgment, the court denied both claims that
sought response costs. The court denied the CERCLA § 113(f) claim,
because the provision was only available to parties potentially
responsible for contribution costs which the Burnettes were not. The
court also denied the CERCLA § 107(a) claim, because although
Congress did express its intention that the Eleventh Amendment
would not bar a suit under the section, Congress did not have valid
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court ruled Congress acted within its authority when it
abrogated the Eleventh Amendment only once; the Court ruled
Congress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment only when
enacting legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CERCLA, enacted under the Commerce Clause, did not fall into this
category.
The court also ruled Connecticut did not constructively waive its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by engaging in an activity
regulated by Congress or by accepting federal funds.
Tiffany Turner

United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
brook where defendant discharged waste slurry from asbestos removal
project qualified as "waters of the United States" under the Clean
Water Act).
Employees of the defendant, TGR Corp. ("TGR"), performed
asbestos removal services for a Connecticut middle school. In the
process, the employees poured a waste slurry (comprised of mastic,
chemical mastic remover, water, and pieces of floor tile that contained
asbestos) into a drain in the school basement. From the drain, the
slurry traveled into a storm water discharge system, and then into a
waterway known as "Grasmere Brook."
The government charged TGR with knowingly discharging a
pollutant into the waters of the United States without a permit in
violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and
knowingly disposing and storing of a hazardous waste without a permit
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A) and 18 U.S.C. §2. The court
dismissed the latter two violations. The parties entered into a
stipulation agreement and the only issue remaining concerned
whether Grasmere Brook qualified as part of the "waters of United
States" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The district court held that Grasmere Brook was a tributary of Ash
Creek, a navigable water of the United States, and therefore fell under
the CWA. The court ordered TGR to pay a fine of $50,000 and remain
on probation for five years. TGR appealed.
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On appeal, TGR argued that Grasmere Brook was a "municipal
separate storm sewer" and a part of a "waste treatment system" and
was, therefore, excluded from the CWA under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)
and 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. In addition, TGR maintained that the brook
was "designed and constructed to carry storm and other waste water
runoff."
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. It
acknowledged the broad meaning of "waters of the United States"
under the CWA and noted that several circuits have held nonnavigable waterways as "waters of the United States." However, the
court largely based its reasoning on the definition of both "waters of
the United States" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 and "municipal separate
storm sewer" under 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8). Under the latter
category, the sewers must be owned or operated by a public body
(such as a state, city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or
association). Testimony at trial established that no public body owned
or operated the brook. Furthermore, the court noted that the
exclusion for waste treatment systems only applied to manmade bodies
of water. Testimony provided at trial demonstrated the brook was
considered a "natural waterway housing aquatic life and water fowl."
The court held that as a natural tributary of a navigable waterway,
Grasmere Brook was part of the "waters of the United States" under
the CWA; TGR's discharge into the tributary violated the CWA; and
thus confirmed the conviction.
Karina Serkin

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that two citizens' environmental groups
did not have standing to bring an action under the Clean Water Act).
Gaston Copper owned and operated a non-ferrous metals
smelting facility on the waters of Lake Watson in South Carolina. The
company received a renewed National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit from the state Department of Health and
Environmental Control in February 1991. In September 1991, two
non-profit environmental organizations ("FOE" and "CLEAN")
brought suit on behalf of their members against Gaston pursuant to
the Clear Water Act ("CWA"). The suit alleged that Gaston exceeded
effluent limitations for various pollutants and failed to comply with
reporting requirements. FOE and CLEAN argued these violations
affected their ability to protect and improve South Carolina's waters
and also "affected the health, economic, recreational, aesthetic and
environmental interests of their members," residing in the vicinity of
waters that receive runoff from Lake Watson. Gaston moved to dismiss
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the case on the ground that FOE and CLEAN lacked standing. FOE
and CLEAN argued that their members had suffered injury in fact and
supported this with testimony of three members who were allegedly
harmed by Gaston's activities.
One witness testified that he believed his lake contained mercury,
based upon a news article, which stated that lakes in his area contained
this element. He also had his lake tested for pollutants prior to 1991,
with the final results of the test indicating that there were effluents in
his lake. Due to this fact, he claimed he did not recreate in the lake
often and that his property value diminished. A second witness
testified to concerns of the Gaston facility polluting a nearby river
thereby affecting his enjoyment of canoeing and swimming in the
river. A third witness also expressed concern that nearby waters
contained contaminants and, therefore, he was less likely to dive in the
waters. FOE and CLEAN also argued that effluents which Gaston
discharged into Lake Watson flowed downstream and adversely
affected members' protected interests in the waters.
The district court determined that FOE and CLEAN failed to
establish standing. It found that the testimony of the three witnesses
did not, standing alone, establish that the interests of the citizens'
groups were adversely affected. FOE and CLEAN appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing their
CWA claim.
In order to establish standing, Article III requires a party to show
(1) that he personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the illegal conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
The court of appeals held that the evidence failed to show that the
waters which the witnesses used were actually or in imminent threat of
being adversely affected by pollution. It stated that the witness who
tested his lake failed to conduct toxicity tests on the lake during or
after 1991. The interested witness should have performed toxicity tests
for this period because the action arose out of Gaston's conduct since
1991. Additionally, none of the members testified that there was any
observable negative impact on the waters. The court found that their
concerns were "based upon mere speculation as to the presence of
pollution." Furthermore, there was no evidence showing that the
pollutants found in one of the members' lakes was traceable to
Gaston's facility. The court stated that even assuming arguendo that
FOE and CLEAN's members suffered injury in fact, they failed to
establish that the waterways contained effluent directly traceable to
Gaston. The court found it significant that the lake and the river
about which the witnesses testified were many miles away from Lake
Watson and that there were many intervening ponds and tributaries in
between, however, the court mentioned in a footnote that it was not
requiring a plaintiff to establish mileage limits in order to satisfy the
"fairly traceable" prong of standing. Based upon the evidence, the
court concluded the plaintiffs had not demonstrated standing.
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In a vigorous dissent, the chief judge argued the majority had
raised the threshold for establishing standing by "erecting standing
hurdles so high as to effectively excise the citizen suit provision from
the Clean Water Act." He also contended that the holding required
courts to litigate scientific facts as a matter of standing and that the
"fairly traceable" requirement was not equivalent to a requirement of
tort causation. The chiefjudge would have permitted the citizens' suit
upon a finding that the case satisfied the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.
StephaniePickens

United States v. Smithfield Foods, No. 97-2709, 1999 WL 713847 (4th
Cir. Sept. 14, 1999) (affirming the district court's finding of plaintiff's
liability, but reversing and remanding for recalculation of penalty).
Smithfield Foods ("Smithfield") owned and operated two swine
slaughtering and processing plants that discharged wastewater into the
Pagan River located in Virginia. The discharged wastewater contained
pollutants regulated under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") thus
requiring a permit under a process overseen by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and locally administered by the Virginia
State Water Control Board ("Board"). In 1986, the Board issued
Smithfield a permit ("1986 Permit") for discharge of a restricted
amount of pollutants into the Pagan River.
At the time of the issuance of the 1986 Permit, Virginia issued new
regulations stating all permits required modification to lower the
monthly average of phosphorus discharged into rivers. In 1990, the
Board modified the 1986 Permit, resulting in a new permit ("1990
Permit") that instructed Smithfield to comply with the more restrictive
state phosphorus limitation within three years.
Smithfield and Virginia began negotiations that resulted in an
agreement involving various accommodations ("1990 Order").
Smithfield agreed to investigate the feasibility of connecting its plants
to the local sanitation system in order to resolve its wastewater
treatment problem, while the Board agreed to postpone
commencement of the compliance schedule for roughly one year.
The Board amended the 1990 Order in May of 1991 ("1991 Order").
The 1991 Order stated that if Smithfield chose to connect its systems
to the local sanitation system, it must do so within three months of the
In
notification that the necessary equipment was operational.
addition, the 1991 Order mandated Smithfield comply with interim
regulations until the connection was complete. The 1991 Order
explicitly stated that it did not modify the 1990 Permit. Smithfield
notified the Board of its decision to connect its facilities to the existing
sanitation system on June 7, 1991.
Contemporaneous to the 1991 Order, the 1990 Permit expired.
The Board composed a new permit. The proposed permit contained
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the same compliance schedule as the 1990 Permit requiring
compliance with the phosphorus discharge limitations by January 4,
1993. A Board environmental engineer assured Smithfield that any
special order agreements approved by the Board would take
precedence over the permit. The Board issued Smithfield the new
permit ("1992 Permit"). Smithfield met neither the January 4, 1993
deadline for phosphorus discharge required by the 1992 Permit nor
the May 13, 1994 deadline for all other substances. Smithfield
eventually achieved complete connection to the local sanitation facility
in August 1997.
Virginia filed an enforcement action in the state circuit court in
1996. The government filed its own suit on December 16, 1996
alleging that Smithfield violated the CWA by discharging pollutants
into the Pagan River at levels exceeding those specified in the 1992
Permit. The government moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted summary judgment in July 1997 in favor of the United
States as to Smithfield's liability and calculated 6,982 days of violations
and assessed a penalty of $12.6 million.
On July 9, 1997 the state court, in hearing the action commenced
by Virginia, determined that the 1991 Order superseded the 1992
Permit and, as a result, Smithfield only had to comply with the
phosphorus limits within three months of connecting to the local
sanitation system. Thus, Smithfield filed a motion to dismiss the
government's action. The district court refused to reverse its finding
of liability or calculation of penalty. Smithfield appealed on three
grounds.
, Smithfield first contended that the 1991 Order superseded the
1992 Permit. The court, in agreement with the district court, held the
1991 Order did not take precedence over the 1992 Permit. The court
held that because Smithfield had not followed a formal permit
modification procedure, none of the letters or statements issued by the
Board after the issuance of the 1992 Permit were sufficient to
constitute modification.
The court addressed both aspects of Smithfield's second
contention in turn. First, Smithfield argued that the CWA provided
that if a state pursued an action under state law, any sufficiently
comparable federal civil enforcement action was precluded. The
court, relying on the analysis of the district court, concluded that state
action was not sufficiently comparable to the federal civil enforcement
to bar the federal action because Virginia did not have the authority to
assess penalties without the violator's consent. In addition, Virginia's
statutory structure did not provide adequate procedures for notice and
public participation. In the alternative, Smithfield argued that the
United States Supreme Court's previous holding that in some cases a
violator's corrective action would be sufficient to override the
assessment of penalties precluded the federal suit. The court of
appeals determined, in agreement with the previous findings of the
district court, that the corrective action taken by Smithfield did not
achieve compliance, thus was insufficient to overcome the penalty
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assessment. Rejecting Smithfield's first two contentions, the court
upheld the district court's ruling on Smithfield's affirmative liability.
The court then addressed Smithfield's final contention that the
trial court incorrectly assessed $12.6 million in penalties, reversing and
remanding the action to the district court for penalty recalculation.
The court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review and
considered factors established by the CWA for determining an
appropriate civil penalty. In addition, the court gave the district
court's award wide discretion.
In considering Smithfield's various claims of error in relation to
the penalty, the court only disagreed with the findings of the district
court on one count. The district court utilized the weighted average
cost of capital to calculate the present value of interest. In doing so,
the district court determined that the approximate four percent
calculation error was insignificant in relation to the $12.6 million
overall penalty. The court of appeals disagreed. The four percent
calculation error resulted in a miscalculation of between $100,000 and
$200,000. The court concluded no reason existed for an admitted
error to go uncorrected. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded
the penalty determination to the district court to recalculate the
penalty.
Sarah E. McCutcheon

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Michigan Peat v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 422
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the federal district court had subject
matterjurisdiction over the Environmental Protection Agency and the
State of Michigan had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Michigan Peat engaged in business activities that included the
extraction of peat within a wetland area. In 1991 and 1994, it applied
for a wetland permit application under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act ("CWA"). According to the combined Michigan and federal
permitting process, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
must review a permit application and comment on it. The EPA
reviewed the application of Michigan Peat and objected to the
expansion of the mining program. In response, it created a new draft
permit and submitted it to Michigan Peat. The draft permit did not
allow expansion into any unmined area but granted other requested
actions with various conditions. Michigan Peat did not sign and return
the draft permit. Instead, it accepted certain portions of the permit
and contested the unacceptable elements. The Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality issued Michigan Peat a state-only permit
and suggested that Michigan Peat contact the United States Army
Corp of Engineers ("Corps") for federal authorization. Michigan Peat
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never contacted the Corps.
Michigan Peat filed for declaratory relief in federal court against
the EPA and the State of Michigan. The district court dismissed the
action against the EPA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also
dismissed the action against the state defendants on the ground that
the Eleventh Amendment barred suit. The appellate court identified
two main issues in the case: (1) whether the EPA committed a final
agency action allowing suit against it; and (2) whether Michigan
waived immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by volunteering to
enter the section 404 permitting program of the CWA.
A court may only review final agency actions. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the draft permit was a final agency action because the
EPA withdrew objections and agreed to the proposed permit. It did
not matter that Michigan Peat did not sign the draft because statutorily
there was nothing left for the EPA to do. Therefore, the court of
appeals reversed, holding the district court erred in dismissing
Michigan Peat's action against the federal defendants.
The court also held that Congress did not abrogate state immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment by enacting the CWA act because the
only authority under which Congress can waive this immunity is under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress promulgated the
CWA under Article I powers. Therefore, Congress did not intend to
eliminate state immunity under the CWA. As a result, the court
reasoned that Michigan did not waive its immunity to federal suit by
volunteering in the section 404 program.
Kristen L. Cassisa

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Armstrong v. Asarco, Inc., 138 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff of citizen suit was prevailing party and entitled to limited
attorney's fees for actions reasonably related to results obtained after
polluter settled with government authorities following commencement
of citizen suit under Clean Water Act).
ASARCO began operating a lead refinery on the Missouri River in
the 1870s and discharged wastewater containing lead and other
pollutants directly into the river. As required by the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality
("NDEQ"), ASARCO filed an application for National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit in 1982. Ten years later, NDEQ
had still not decided ASARCO's application, so it held a public hearing
regarding the pending application in 1993. In January 1994, after
receiving information regarding the facility under the Freedom of
Information Act, two citizens sent ASARCO a sixty day notice of intent
to sue required under the CWA and then filed suit on March 15, 1994.
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The EPA filed a similar suit on March 30, 1994. The two lawsuits were
consolidated.
After a consent decree failed in district court, ASARCO responded
to the plaintiff citizens' discovery requests by releasing a monitoring
report that showed a significant increase of wastewater and lead
discharged into the river. The citizens sought to preliminarily enjoin
ASARCO'S refinery operation. On June 28, 1995, one day before the
scheduled hearing, the EPA lodged another consent decree with the
district court. After public comment, the EPA and ASARCO moved
for the district court to enter the consent decree as a final judgment
on October 3, 1995. The citizens opposed the motion on the ground
that the decree failed to adequately address ASARCO's violations. The
district court granted the EPA's motion and entered a final judgment.
The court never entered judgment on the preliminary injunction
motion.
The district court awarded the citizens attorney's fees and expenses
pursuant to the CWA. On appeal, ASARCO argued that they should
not receive fees because they did not succeed on the merits,
emphasizing that the district court never ruled on the preliminary
injunction motion. ASARCO also argued that the citizens subverted
the goals of the CWA when they disagreed with and pursued goals
contrary to the EPA's position.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the legal question of
whether the citizens were prevailing parties. The court held that when
a polluter settles with government authorities following the
commencement of a citizen suit, a court may infer that the citizen suit
motivated the settlement, thereby making the citizens the prevailing
In this case, the citizens were catalysts to ASARCO's
party.
remediation efforts and eventual settlement with the EPA. The court
concluded the citizens were entitled to litigation costs related to the
motion for preliminary injunction because the costs reasonably related
to the results obtained. Even though the district court never ruled on
the citizens' motion, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the motion
promoted the success of the consent decree between the EPA and
ASARCO.
The court affirmed the district court's award of litigation costs
pursuant to the CWA, but reversed and remanded the award of any
litigation costs after June 30, 1995 related to the motion for a
preliminary injunction. The court also reversed and remanded any
award of litigation costs after June 28, 1995 in connection with the
consent decree because such work was not reasonably related to the
results obtained. Thus, the court only awarded costs as they related to
the motion for the preliminary injunction through completion of the
hearing.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
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NINTH CIRCUIT
American Rivers v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 187 F.3d 1007
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that: (1) use of existing environmental
conditions as a baseline was proper under FPA and NEPA; (2) under
the no action alternative, license denial and project decommissioning
does not have to be an alternative; and (3) while § 100) of FPA
allowed discretion regarding recommendations by other agencies,
FERC cannot reject the Secretary of Interior's properly prescribed
fishways under FPA § 18).
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") granted a
new license to Eugene Water and Electric Board, the incumbent
licensee of two hydroelectric power plants. Petitioners consisted of a
variety of environmental and conservation groups, the United States
Department of the Interior and the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife ("Petitioners"). After the Director of FERC rejected a request
for rehearing, the Petitioners consolidated their petitions and
challenged the license's renewal.
They contended that FERC
performed inadequate environmental analysis under the Federal
Power Act ("FPA") and National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").
Petitioners also alleged FERC violated §§ 10(j) and 18 of the FPA by
improperly making threshold determinations as to the sufficiency of a
recommendation.
Pursuant to NEPA, FERC prepared a final environmental impact
statement, which considered the incumbent's re-licensing proposal as
well as five alternatives. Of the five alternatives, FERC defined its no
action alternative as renewing the existing license without additional
environmental protection or enhancement measures.
The Petitioners recommended FERC adopt several measures to
protect the environment. FERC recommended complete adoption of
the Department of Fish and Wildlife and the Department of Interior's
recommendation of fish ladders and screens, but determined the
remaining conditions were outside the scope of the fishway
prescriptions as required in section 18 of the FPA. FERC instead
created a plan requiring the incumbent licensee to consult with the
state and federal agencies to develop plans for FERC's approval.
Petitioners challenged FERC's construction of the FPA and the
baseline assessment. The court of appeals applied the first part of the
Chevron test, and found an absence of any language directed to the
issue. Applying the second part of the Chevron test, the court stated
that when legislation is silent, an assumption applies that Congress left
statutory construction to the discretion of the agency administering
the program. The court determined that when assessing a baseline to
contrast the NEPA-required alternatives, FERC's use of present
environmental conditions was acceptable. The court concluded that
Petitioners' suggested baseline, which consisted of conditions
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occurring before the hydroelectric power plants existed, was not
pragmatic. The power plants' operation in the area for over fifty years
resulted in tremendous amounts of environmental change, making it
virtually impossible to recreate the conditions. The court found that
adopting existing conditions as a baseline did not itself preclude
inclusion of conditions that would mitigate or reduce any negative
environmental impacts.
When considering the NEPA-required alternatives, the court
applied the rule of reason to determine if FERC thoroughly
considered all possible environmental consequences.
Petitioners
contended FERC's definition of no action violated NEPA by not
considering the full range of alternatives available.
The court
determined that while NEPA required the inclusion of a no action
alternative, FERC did not violate NEPA when defining the no action
alternative as maintaining status quo by reissuing the same license with
no new environmental provisions. The rule of reason required that
FERC consider only the alternatives that were reasonable and feasible.
The court pointed to a directive by the Council of Environmental
Quality that stated that no action alternatives may be thought of in
terms of continuing with the present course of action until that action
was changed. Thus, the court found that FERC need not consider an
infinite number of alternatives.
In applying the traditional Chevron test, the court focused on
whether FERC violated FPA by rejecting recommendations from other
Fish and Wildlife agencies. The court pointed to section 10(j) (1) of
FPA, which required FERC to impose conditions that protect the
environment. The court found that section 10(j)(1) was subject to
section 10(j) (2). Applying step one of the Chevron test, the court
pointed out that the language of section 10(j) (2) granted FERC, after
thoroughly reviewing the Agencies' recommendations, the discretion
to reject those recommendations. The statute further required a
finding that the recommendations were inconsistent with purpose and
law for a rejection. Any subsequent conditions had to in fact protect
and mitigate damage to fish and wildlife. The court noted that while
FERC normally must afford significant deference to the Agencies'
recommendations, Congress itself has ordained that such deference
yielded to FERC'sjudgment when conflict occurred.
In contrast, the court noted that the language present in section
10(j)(2), allowing for discretion of FERC to reject certain
recommendations, was absent in section 18 of the FPA. The court
concluded that the language of section 18 clearly required FERC to
adopt recommendations made by the Secretary of the Interior
regarding fishways. Since section 18 did not have a qualifying
provision like section 10(j) (1), the court found FERC had to consider
input from the Department of Interior. FERC did not have the
authority to decide when section 18 fishways were beyond the section's
scope, and thus could not reject a properly prescribed section 18
fishway outright.
Kim Shropshire
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B.J. Carney Indus. Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, No.
98-70315, 1999 WL 739575 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1999) (holding that the
plaintiff s appeal of a class II civil penalty under the Clean Water Act
filed more than thirty days after Administrative LawJudge issued civil
penalty order was untimely).
From 1982 to 1990, B. J. Carney Industries ("Carney") operated a
wood pole treating facility. Water from the facility flowed into
Sandpoint, Idaho's publicly owned treatment works ("POTW").
Sandpoint issued industrial waste acceptance ("IWA") forms to the
industry users, like Carney, pursuant to its National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System permit.
Sandpoint received
pretreatment authority.
In 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") notified
Carney, in writing, that its discharge to Sandpoint's POTW violated the
pretreatment
standards
because
the
discharges
contained
pentachlorophenol ("PCP") and diesel grade oil. The EPA indicated,
however, that it would defer to Sandpoint's enforcement of
pretreatment standards. Subsequently, in January 1987, Sandpoint
issued Carney an IWA permitting Carney to discharge small amounts
of PCP.
Carney challenged the EPA's determination that its discharge
violated the applicable pretreatment standards. In response, the EPA
reasserted that Carney's discharge to the Sandpoint POTW violated
the pretreatment standard allowing no discharges even though
Sandpoint had issued Carney an IWA allowing the discharge. In its
response, the EPA, again, deferred to Sandpoint's enforcement
authority, but indicated it would contact the city regarding its
concerns.
Carney's IWA, permitting PCP discharges, remained in effect until
May 29, 1990. Subsequently, Sandpoint issued Carney a new IWA
allowing no PCP discharges. In July 1990, Carney closed its plant and
voluntarily cleaned up the site. The EPA, apparently unaware that
Carney had closed its plant, filed an administrative complaint against
Carney. Upon learning of the plant closure, the EPA amended the
complaint seeking a civil penalty for the previous years of
noncompliance.
After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found
Carney violated pretreatment standards and assessed a $9,000 penalty.
The ALJ, however, refused to allow EPA to recover Carney's economic
benefit. Both parties appealed to the Environmental Appeals Board
("Board"). The Board affirmed the findings of liability and the penalty
assessment, but rejected Carney's equitable estoppel defense regarding
EPA's ability to recover Carney's economic benefit from the violations.
Thus, the Board remanded the case. On remand, a different ALJ, who
factored in both an economic benefit penalty and a gravity-based
penalty, assessed the maximum allowable civil penalty of $125,000
against Carney.
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The ALJ entered the civil penalty order on January 5, 1998.
Carney filed its appeal in federal court seventy days later on March 16,
1998. The issue on appeal was whether Carney had filed a timely
appeal to the ALJ's civil penalty order.
The court looked to the statutory language of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The CWA provided that a party may challenge a civil
penalty assessment in a federal court of appeals by filing a notice of
appeal within thirty days from the date the court issued the civil
penalty order. The CWA also provided that an order became final
thirty days after the date of issuance unless a party filed a petition for
judicial review. Once an order became final, the Attorney General
could bring a civil action to collect the penalty.
By statute, the Board had forty-five days within which it could elect
to review sua sponte a presiding officer's initial decision before it
became final. Thus, Carney argued that the ALJ's order was merely an
initial decision which became an appealable order issued by the Board
only after forty-five days elapsed following issuance by the ALJ.
Carney also argued that only the EPA Administrator had the power to
assess penalties and that the Administrator had delegated that power
to the Board, not ALJs.
The court rejected both of Carney's arguments. First, the court
found that the Administrator could delegate to ALJs the authority to
issue all necessary orders, and that the ALJs were expressly empowered
by statute to issue initial decisions with recommended civil penalty
assessments.
The court stated that a penalty assessment was
presumably an initial decision because a party could seek review with
the Board or the Board could choose to review the decision sua sponte.
The court further explained that parties could bypass the agency
process, however, and seek immediate review by a federal court of
appeals. Second, the court found that the plain language of the CWA
failed to indicate that an ALJ's order assessing a civil penalty did not
constitute a civil penalty order from which appeal had to be taken
within thirty days. Thus, the court concluded that the ALJ's order
constituted a civil penalty order and had to be appealed within thirty
days.
The court held that Carney's appeal of the civil penalty order filed
more than thirty days after issuance by the ALJ was untimely. Thus,
the court dismissed the case.
Kris A. Zumalt

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, No. 98-71080, 1999 WL 717721 (9th
Cir. Sept. 15, 1999) (holding that municipal storm-sewer discharges
are not subject to a Clean Water Act provision requiring that certain
discharges must comply with state water quality standards).
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued storm-sewer
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permits to five large municipalities in Arizona. During the notice and
comment period, Defenders of Wildlife objected to the draft permits
because they did not include numeric limitations to ensure
compliance with the state water quality standards. The EPA revised
the drafts but still did not include numeric limitations. Defenders of
Wildlife were unable to obtain administrative relief within the EPA and
therefore sought review in Federal Court.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether the EPA's decision to issue
the permits without requiring numerical compliance with state
standards was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The
court first looked to see if the language of the Clean Water Act
governing the issuance of EPA permits was clear. Since the language
was clear, the court did not need to determine if the EPA's decision
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The court focused
on the express language of the statute.
The statutory provision in question specifically distinguished
between industrial and municipal storm-sewer discharges. The statute
then stated that municipal storm-sewer discharges must be reduced to
the maximum extent practicable. The court found that the provision
requiring industrial storm-sewer discharges to comply with state law
was intentionally left out of the provision for municipal storm-sewer
discharges. This interpretation gave the EPA discretion to determine
what pollution controls were necessary. The EPA determined that the
best management practices were appropriate for municipal stormsewer discharges, and actual numeric limitations were unnecessary.
Thus the court denied the petition for review.
Rebekah King

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the federal court has continuing and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the Nevada State
Engineer involving federally adjudicated water rights and that the
federal court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the Nevada state
court proceeding).
A dispute occurred concerning the jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada ("Federal Court") to
hear appeals concerning water rights owned by the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") adjudicated under the Alpine and Orr
Ditch Decrees ("Decrees").
The Federal Court adjudicated the
original water rights of the Newlands Reclamation Project in the
Decrees in the early 1900's.
On April 4, 1996, FWS filed two applications to change the place
and manner of use of their water rights with the State Engineer.
Churchill County ("County") filed a protest to each application. The
State Engineer granted one of the applications and FWS withdrew the
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other. In November, the County filed an appeal in the Third Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada ("State Court") which denied a
motion by the State Engineer requesting dismissal of the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. The State Court held that it properly had
jurisdiction by narrowly construing federal precedent which held that
the Federal Court maintained appellate jurisdiction over State
Engineer decisions involving federally decreed water rights.
On August 11, 1997, the State Engineer filed a motion in Federal
Court asking it to enjoin further State Court proceedings. Meanwhile,
the County filed a motion in the State Court to enjoin the federal
proceedings, which the State Court granted. However, on September
17, 1997, the Federal Court issued an injunction holding that the State
Court injunction enjoining the federal proceeding was void. In
addition, the Federal Court held that it maintained exclusive
jurisdiction over water rights issues in FWS applications.
The County appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that the Federal
Court's jurisdiction was limited to decisions made by the State
Engineer, which implicate federal interests in the operation of the
Newlands Reclamation Project. In addition, the County argued that
the Federal Court improperly enjoined the State Court proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jurisdiction of
the Federal Court over the dispute was both continuing and exclusive.
In addition, it held that the Federal Court did not abuse its discretion
in enjoining the State Court proceeding. The court held that the
Federal Court had continuing jurisdiction based on previous
consistent interpretation of the Decrees to provide for Federal Court
review of decisions of the State Engineer regarding the type of
application filed by FWS. In addition, the Court of Appeals previously
had interpreted Nevada law to provide for Federal Court review of
State Engineer decisions specifically on Federal Court decreed water
rights.
In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that an arrangement
permitting State Court appellate jurisdiction of a federal judgment
would frustrate the purposes of the Federal Court. Additionally, the
court reasoned that exclusive jurisdiction was appropriate because the
jurisdiction was properly characterized as in rem jurisdiction. The
court stated that because the Federal Court was the first to gain
jurisdiction over a res, the Federal Court should maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over that res. Finally, the court held that the AntiInjunction Act ("Act") did not bar the Federal Court from enjoining
the state proceeding because the Act provided an exception
permitting federal courts to enjoin state proceedings "where necessary
in aid of jurisdiction." The court held that the actions of the federal
court fell into this exception permitting it to enjoin the State Court
action.
Julie E. Hultgren
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TENTH CIRCUIT
Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that the government's allowing private parties to use
public lands is an implied license, revocable at-will by the government,
and vests no private property interests in individual licensees).
Kit and Sherry Laney, owners and operators of Diamond Bar Cattle
Company and Laney Cattle Company, initiated this action on April 1,
1996, seeking adjudication and validation of interests in certain public
lands. The Laneys claimed they owned a vested water right and an
inseparable but distinct right to graze the federal lands compromising
their allotments. The Forest Service denied this interest and advised
the Laneys that unpermitted grazing on Forest Service land would
result in fees, penalties and civil trespass action. The district court
granted summary judgment for the Forest Service and enjoined
appellants from grazing livestock on national forest lands without a
permit.
The Laneys claimed their water right arose from their
predecessor's prior appropriation. The Laney's predecessors obtained
title prior to 1899 when the United States withdrew the land from the
public domain. This land later became the Gila and Apache National
Forests. The Laneys asserted this pre-1899 appropriation vested in
their predecessor a "possessory" property interest entitling the holder
to use of the water and range for grazing purposes. The Laneys
claimed that this long-standing property right, acquired under New
Mexico law, obviated the need for them to obtain grazing permits
from the Forest Service.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment, finding that grazing cattle on public lands was permitted by
an implied license, revocable at the will of the Forest Service. Before
the federal government reserved these lands as national forests, New
Mexico law permitted cattle grazing within the public domain. The
law required, as a prerequisite, that individuals possess adequate water
rights to meet the needs of their cattle grazing there.
This
appropriation gave the holder the privilege to use the public lands.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the nature of this privilege was an
implied license, revocable by will of the licensor.
Article IV of the United States Constitution provides Congress with
plenary power when disposing of or regulating the territories and
properties of the United States. Pursuant to this authority, Congress
passed the Organic Administration Act of 1897, authorizing the
government to reserve lands as national forests. The Act placed these
lands under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture and
permitted this office to make all necessary rules and regulations
concerning the management of reserved lands. Under this grant of
authority, the Secretary of Agriculture, as early as 1906, began
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promulgating regulations requiring permits to graze stock on national
forest lands. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that historical
acquiescence on the part of the federal government allowing private
use of public lands was never intended to confer any vested right. This
"tacit consent" by the government does not deprive it of the power
to
recall any implied license.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Laneys did not hold and
never held a vested private property right to graze cattle on federal
public lands. The Laneys' predecessor in title held simply an implied
license to use the lands for grazing. This privilege conferred no vested
rights and was revocable at the government's will. Thus, without
regard to the validity of predecessor's claimed water right, the Laneys
were not entitled to graze cattle on national forest lands without a
permit. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's assessment
of penalties and injunction for unpermitted grazing.
John B. Ridgley

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
stormwater discharged during timber harvesting and land
development activities fell within the Clean Water Act's ("CWA")
definition of "pollutant" from a "point source" into "navigable water"
and landowner's failure to make every good faith effort to comply with
pollution control standards and failure to reduce discharges to a
minimum precluded application of the exception to liability under
CWA for discharge without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit even though no permit was available to be
issued by the state).
Adams owned 76 acres of land in the mountains of North Georgia.
The Driscoll and Galbreath families owned land adjacent to Adams'
property. Driscoll owned five acres directly abutting Adams' property,
and Galbreath owned approximately two acres adjacent to Driscoll's.
The Spiva Branch stream flowed downhill from Adams' property
through a pond on Driscoll's property and then through another
pond on Galbreath's property before merging into another river.
Adams began harvesting timber in March of 1995 in order to
develop his property for vacation homes. He cut and graded roads,
installed storm pipes, and removed timber. This activity caused
erosion which Adams did little to prevent. This erosion caused
considerable damage to Driscoll's and Galbreath's properties. Adams
did not seek proper approval from any federal, state, or local
government agency before starting work on his property.
In
September 1996, Adams filed for the required state permit after
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completing most of the timber harvest. Adams never obtained a
NPDES permit, which is required for lawful pollutant discharge under
the CWA. General stormwater permits were not available in Georgia.
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in December 1996 against Adams for
violating the CWA. They included in their complaint state law claims
for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. They filed a motion for
summary judgment, and Adams filed a motion to dismiss, which the
court treated as a cross motion for summaryjudgment. The trial court
denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted Adams' motion. The court
stated that because the NPDES permit was an impossible condition in
Georgia, and since there were no approved federal standards, the
complaint should be dismissed. The trial court declined to retain
jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without
reaching the merits. The Driscolls and Galbreaths appealed.
In his defense, Adams raised two issues on appeal. First, he
claimed that the CWA's prohibition on pollutant discharge does not
apply where the NPDES permit, normally required to make the
discharge lawful, is not available in the state. Second, he claimed that
his discharges did not fall within the CWA's definition of a release of a
"pollutant" from a "point source" into "navigable water".
The CWA provides that the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful except as in compliance with other sections of
the Act. The CWA grants the EPA authority to issue permits that allow
individuals to discharge limited quantities of pollutants under certain
conditions. The EPA delegates this authority to the state. Georgia
Environmental Protection Department ("EPD") was approved to
administer the state NPDES program.
The EPD has tried
unsuccessfully to implement a "general" NPDES stormwater discharge
permit that would cover an entire class of dischargers. However, due
to court challenges, this permit is unavailable in Georgia.
In Hughey v. JMS Development Corp., the Eleventh Circuit created a
narrow exception to the general rule of liability for discharges without
an NPDES permit. The court in Hughey held that (1) where
compliance was factually impossible because there would always be
some stormwater runoff from an area of development; (2) there was
no NDPES permit available; (3) the discharger was in good faith
compliance with local pollution control requirements; and (4) the
discharges were minimal, a party could discharge without violating the
CWA.
The court found that Adams did not meet the four
requirements established in Hughey. Although Adams met the first two
elements, the court held that he did not discharge in good faith as he
made no attempt to obtain the required permits and his discharges
were not minimal. Thus, the exception did not apply.
The court held that Adams' discharges fell within the scope of
prohibited pollutant discharges under the CWA.
The CWA's
definition of "pollutant" includes sand and silt, two of the primary
sediments deposited in plaintiffs ponds by Adams' development
activities. The CWA's definition of "point source" includes "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
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limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit. . ." Here, Adams
constructed pipes and other means by which stormwater was
transported into the streams which the court held to be a point source.
Finally, the CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States, including territorial seas." The court held that the Act makes it
clear that Congress intended to include ditches, canals, as well as
streams and creeks, under the term "waters of the United States."
Thus, the court found that the Spiva Branch stream fell within the
definition.
The appellate court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in Adams' favor on the CWA claim and vacated the district
court's dismissal of the state law claims. The case was remanded for
further proceedings.
Kimberley Crawford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Iberville Parish Waterworks Dist. No. 3 v. Novartis Crop Protection,
Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 934 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that water systems
lacked standing to bring claims against herbicide manufacturer absent
current or imminent injury).
Two waters systems, one in Iberville Parish, Louisiana and the
other in Bowling Green, Ohio, ("Water Systems") sued Novartis, the
manufacturer of Atrazine. Deemed an environmental hazard by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Atrazine is a herbicide that
corn, sorghum and sugar cane farmers use to control pre-emergence
broad leaf weeds. The EPA had set limits on the levels of this
contaminant for drinking water and also certified that the best way to
remove it from water was to use a granular activated carbon ("GAC")
filtration system. The plaintiffs, like many other water systems, did not
have permanent GAC systems and the cost to install them was
significant.
Unfortunately, conventional water treatment systems
could not remove Atrazine without great difficulty. Therefore, the
Water Systems wanted Novartis to pay for both the costs of testing raw
water for Atrazine and the resulting removal.
Because it found the Water Systems lacked standing, the district
court did not reach the merits of their claims of strict products
liability, negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities,
trespass, nuisance, or unjust enrichment. In order to having standing
to sue, the plaintiffs needed to show an injury in fact, a causal
connection between the injury and the manufacturing of Atrazine, and
finally, a likelihood that the injury was redressable by a favorable
decision. Because the Water Systems invoked federal jurisdiction, they
assumed the burden of establishing these elements.
The court found that neither Water System had suffered injury
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because the levels of Atrazine in each system never violated the
mandates of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The court reasoned that
there was no harm because the EPA only required water systems to
meet an annualized average for Atrazine levels. Thus, the fact that the
Iberville Parish system experienced peaks each spring that exceeded
regulation levels did not amount to an injury. In addition, the Water
Systems could not show that there was any imminent danger of
Atrazine exceeding these yearly limits.
The court also found no harm with respect to testing raw water.
EPA regulations did not require raw water testing for Atrazine, only
pre-distribution testing. Iberville Parish did not pay for the Atrazine
testing on its raw water, and Bowling Green voluntarily tested its water
to determine which source to draw from, not just to determine
Atrazine levels. Therefore, because there was no EPA mandate to test,
the Water Systems suffered no injury.
Finally, the Water Systems argued their claims should stand by
virtue of the jurisprudential tradition allowing pre-enforcement suits
to enjoin statutory enforcement. The court held that such actions
could be entertained only when three conditions were met: (1) where
the constitutionality of the statute was put in issue; (2) where plaintiffs
were under a concrete threat of prosecution under the statute; and (3)
where there was strong public interest in resolving the constitutionality
of the statute before enforcement. The Water Systems met none of
these conditions. The Water Systems could not show their claims were
ripe for adjudication. As an alternative holding, the court stated that
even if the Water Systems had standing to sue, their claims were not
ripe because they were based upon contingent and speculative future
events.
Susan P. Klopman

United States v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 48 F.Supp.2d
65 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that the utility violated the Safe Drinking
Water Act and the EPA's Surface Water Treatment Rule).
In 1974, Congress passed the Safe Water Drinking Act ("SWDA").
The SWDA charged the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") with the overall responsibility for protecting the
nation's public water supply. A 1986 amendment to the SDWA
reflected Congress' judgment that filtration was the best technology
for removing bacterial and viral contaminants from water. The EPA
later promulgated drinking water regulations, referred to as the
Surface Water Treatment Rule ("SWTR"). The "self-implementing"
SWTR required non-compliant water systems to install treatment
facilities by June 29, 1993. The issue in this case was whether or not
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") violated the
SWDA and the SWTR by not implementing filtration technology and
continuing to operate its facilities using another method.
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While the lead role in ensuring the safety of public drinking water
belongs to the EPA, Congress also intended that the states participate
in the enforcement process. The Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection ("MDEP") provides that either a state
filtration determination or a failure of the water system to meet one or
more of the filtration avoidance criteria triggers the filtration
requirement.
The MDEP and the MWRA negotiated an administrative consent
order to achieve compliance with the SWTR. The final agreement
required that the MWRA prepare a watershed protection plan, and
implement other measures intended to bring the MWRA's system
within the filtration avoidance criteria. The MWRA sought to use an
ozonation method of water treatment, but agreed to comply with the
filtration requirement after a period of time. The SWTR specifies the
appropriate treatment technique by its terms. Therefore, treatment
facilities must use filtration.
The MWRA sought to use only the ozonation technique and thus
delayed the installation of a filtration method. After many years of
waiting for the MWRA to convert its systems to filtration, and because
the testing done on the MWRA's water showed that it exceeded fecal
coliform concentrations, the EPA brought this action to order the
MWRA to begin filtering its water and to impose statutory damages.
The court found that the SDWA does not deprive a court of
discretion in fashioning remedies for a violation of the SWTR.
However, it held that the MWRA is presently in violation of the
filtration avoidance criteria of the SWTR as the agency suggested, and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the appropriate form of relief to
be awarded to the United States.
Melody Divine

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 38
F.Supp.2d 802 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that in Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") initial contribution action, the applicable limitation
period is the limitation period set out in the provision foe cost recovery
action, the question of whether action can be characterized as removal
or remedial is one of law appropriate for resolution on summary
judgment, causes of action for contribution for clean up costs brought
under state law claims accrue at the same time as CERC[A
contribution claims, actions for negligence for property damage due
to hazardous waste contamination accrue when plaintiff discovers the
injury and its cause, and award of attorney fees under the California
private attorney general action provision is improper where the
primary effect of the lawsuit is to advance or vindicate plaintiffs
personal economic interest).
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In 1982, Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD") initiated subsurface
investigations at its manufacturing facility as a result of suspicions of
leakage from underground chemical solvent storage tanks. The tests
indicated contamination principally in the ground water of the A and
B aquifers under the site. After the California Regional Water Quality
Control Board completed its investigation, AMD began studies for
installing and operating ground water extraction and treatment
systems. In 1984, AMD removed two subsurface waste solvent tanks.
In 1986, it began interim remedial measures in the A aquifer
consisting of the installation of ground water extraction wells. In
August 1987, AMD installed additional extraction wells for the B
aquifer, even though AMD was not responsible for the contamination
in that aquifer. In April 1989, an Administrative Order, No. 89-061,
adopted the cleanup site requirements for AMD, and AMD prepared
its Final Draft Remedial Investigation ("RI").
This document
determined the remedial action alternatives necessary and appropriate
for the site. In September 1991, the EPA issued its Record of Decision
("ROD") which presented the selected remedial action for the site.
AMD filed a contribution action on September 19, 1997.
CERCLA authorizes actions against responsible parties to recover
costs incurred in cleaning up hazard waste disposal sites. Section
113 (g)(2) provides the statute of limitations for cost recovery in
removal actions as three years after the completion of the removal
action. It also provides limits on cost recovery for remedial actions as
six years after initiation of physical on site construction of remedial
action. Section 113 (g)(3) provides the statute of limitations for
section 113(f) (1) contribution actions as not more than three years
after the date of judgment or the date of an administrative order.
Neither was present in this case. Thus, the question presented was
what statute of limitations to apply to initial contribution claims, to
removal action cost claims, and to remedial action cost claims.
The court held section 113(g)(2) applied to initial contribution
actions under CERCLA. Since this statute expressly provides the
statute of limitations for recovery actions, the original source of the
right to contribution under CERCLA, it follows that section 113 (g) (2)
limitations would apply.
The court then examined the limitation period for "removal
action" cost claims. Section l13(g) (2) (A) provides that an action for
recovery of costs of a removal action must be filed within three years
after completion. The parties could not agree which of AMD's actions
constituted "completion of removal action." The court also looked at
the limitation period for "remedial action" cost claims.
Section
l13(g) (2) (B) provides a six-year statute of limitations on an action to
recover costs after initiation of on-site construction of the remedial
action. The defendants contended that the ground water extraction
and treatment system installed in August of 1984 constituted
"removal." The plaintiff agreed that those actions were "removal," but
the activities were not time barred because "remedial action" began
within three years of completion of the "removal action."
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The court identified several factors that assist in the
characterization of an action as "removal" or "remedial:" (1) proximity
to disclosure of the final remedial design, which may occur prior to
approval of the final remedial plan; (2) whether Remedial
Investigation/Field Study ("RI/FS") monitoring and testing are
ongoing at the time of the action; (3) whether the action falls within
the statutory definition of "removal" (or "remedial"); and (4) the
action's role in the implementation of the permanent remedy.
Applying those factors to the AMD claim, the court first found that
final remedial designs were not disclosed until the issuance of the
September 1991 ROD. Second, site testing began in 1982, but the
testing was still being conducted in November 1987. Third, the court
found that the installation of water extraction system could constitute
"clean up of released hazardous substances" under the definition of
"remedial action." The evidence included numerous references to this
system prior to the ROD as a "remedial measure." Finally, the court
found that the installation of the well extraction system was not critical
to the implementation of the permanent remedy. That remedy was
not determined for another four years. Thus the court concluded that
AMD completed removal activity and commenced remedial action in
September 1991. Since the actions were therefore within three years
of each other, the action for contribution for costs were timely under
section 113(g) (2) (B).
The court did not grant AMD's claim for contribution under
California State Law. The court held that claims under California
Health & Safety Code accrue at the same time as a CERCLA
contribution claim. Thus the action accrued in September 1991. The
California Civil Code applies a three-year statute of limitations to
claims under the California Health & Safety Code. Therefore, the
claim, filed in September 1997, was untimely. Similarly, the court
found that the statute of limitations barred AMD's claim for
negligence and negligence per se. The court stated that a cause of
action arising from alleged property damage due to hazardous waste
contamination accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury and its
cause, or should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The court held that AMD should have discovered this injury by at least
September 1991. Thus a negligence claim, filed six years later, is time
barred. The court also denied attorney fees, which a court may award
to a successful party in a "private attorney general" action to enforce
an important right affecting the public interest. The court held that
the primary effect of the lawsuit was to advance or vindicate the
plaintiffs personal economic interests, not to affect a public interest.
Thus the award of attorney fees is improper under this statute. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of AMD in regard to the
contribution claims and denied summary judgment on the remaining
claims.
Kimberley Crawford
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American Canoe Ass'n v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 54
F.Supp.2d 621 (E.D. Va. 1999) (overruling intervenor defendant's
objection to a settlement between plaintiffs and United States
Environmental Protection Agency concerning establishment of total
maximum daily loads of pollutants for Virginia waters).
Plaintiffs, the American Canoe Association and the American
Littoral Society, alleged that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") had failed to perform duties imposed by a
variety of federal legislation, including the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Plaintiffs' allegations specifically involved the EPA's failure to establish
total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") of pollutants for Virginia
waters. Plaintiffs argued that CWA required Virginia to submit TMDLs
for its waters to the EPA byJune 26, 1979. However, Virginia made no
such submissions to the EPA and the EPA did not established any
TMDLs for any Virginia waters. In support of their allegations,
plaintiffs relied on a previous decision where the court determined
that Virginia's lack of submissions to the EPA was tantamount to
constructive submissions that no TMDLs were necessary. However, the
court in that case stated that the EPA was still required to approve or
disapprove Virginia's constructive submissions.
The district court permitted Virginia Association of Municipal
Wastewater Agencies ("VAMWA") to intervene as defendant. The
parties began a settlement process, mediated by a magistrate judge of
the same division. Plaintiffs and EPA agreed upon a settlement of all
the issues involved and submitted the proposed consent decree to the
court.
The settlement specified an eleven-year schedule for
establishing TMDLs for Virginia waters; VAMWA, as intervenor
defendant, objected to the settlement claiming that the EPA had no
authority to enter into an established schedule without the
consultation of Virginia due to the lack of a judicial finding of
constructive submission. In addition, VAMWA argued that should
Virginia fail to meet the establishment schedule agreed to in the
settlement, EPA lacked authority to establish TMDLs in Virginia's
place. The court overruled intervenor defendant's objection and
affirmed the settlement.
The court first stated the standard of review for settlements. First,
the settlement must not be illegal, collusive, or otherwise against
public policy.
Second, the settlement must be adequate, and
reasonable. The court acknowledged a presumption in favor of
encouraging settlements. The court buttressed the presumption with
the conclusion that the parties' expertise put them in the best position
to craft remedies involving complex problems. Therefore, the court
gave considerable weight to the judgment of the EPA.
In affirming the settlement, the court found that VAMWA's
concern that no finding of constructive submission existed was valid.
Despite the absence of such a finding, the court held that EPA had the
authority to create a schedule for the establishment of TMDLs. The
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court interpreted the CWA as creating a cooperative process between
the EPA and states for the establishment of TMDLs. The court
declared that Virginia had in fact participated in establishing the
TMDL schedule as it had previously issued a Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU"). The Virginia MOU detailed goal dates for
the development of TMDLs for state waters. In comparing the MOU
with the settlement, the court determined that the two schedules were
consistent; the settlement merely refined a schedule implied by the
MOU. As a result, Virginia had clearly participated in establishment of
TMDL deadlines.
In addition, a liberal interpretation of the CWA by the court
indicated that it is within EPA's authority to establish a TMDL when
the state has refused to act for an extended period of time. The court
regarded a state's failure to comply with the schedule as a constructive
submission that no TMDLs are necessary, consequently allowing the
EPA to establish the appropriate TMDL. If this were not the case, the
court concluded that a state's mere refusal to submit a TMDL could
render the CWA dead. This would clearly produce an absurd result.
Therefore, the court held that EPA did possess the authority to enter
into an agreement concerning the establishment of TMDLs and the
settlement between plaintiffs and EPA was not illegal.
The court also determined that the settlement was reasonable and
adequate. First, the settlement gave Virginia primary authority to
establish TMDLs. However, the default to the EPA in absence of state
actions ensured the establishment of TMDLs consistent with the
purpose and requirements of the CWA. In addition, the process
outlined by the settlement required public notice and opportunity for
public comment. The court concluded that the settlement agreement
provided a reasonable approach to fulfilling the requirements of the
CWA with due authority given to both Virginia and the EPA.
Therefore, the court granted the motion to enter the consent decree.
SarahE. McCutcheon

Waste Action Project v. Clark County, 45 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (holding that county's failure to timely obtain NPDES storm
water permit violated Clean Water Act).
Clark County owns and operates a municipal storm sewer system
that discharges stormwater runoff. The discharges contained copper,
lead, and zinc exceeding legal limits. Clark County submitted part I of
an application for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit to the Department of Ecology ("Department") in
June 1997. The Department then extended the deadline for filing the
application's part II until October 1998.
Waste Action Project ("WAP") and Clark County Natural
Resources Council ("CCNRC") are two non-profit citizen groups
dedicated to the preservation, protection, and enhancement of the
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natural environment. They served Clark County with notice of intent
to sue, as required by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), more than 60
days before they filed suit, claiming that Clark County violated the
CWA by failing to obtain a NPDES permit.
In its defense, Clark County asserted that notice was insufficient.
The CWA requires that the notice contain sufficient information to
allow the alleged polluter to determine what standards they have
violated, the persons responsible for the alleged violation, and
locations where the violations occurred.
According to state law, the head of Clark County is the Board of
County Commissioners ("Board"). WAP and CCNRC sent complete
notice to the county's managing agent as well as the Environmental
Services Director, but the Board's notice did not contain an
attachment identifying the locations of the specific alleged violations.
The court held notice sufficient. Since WAP and CCNRC sent
complete notice to the individuals who were primarily responsible for
the alleged violations, they satisfied the CWA's notice requirements,
and adequately informed the Board of the alleged violations, even
without the detailed attachments. Therefore, the court granted
plaintiff s motion for summary judgment on this issue.
Clark County next argued that the environmental groups did not
have standing to sue. To satisfy associational standing requirements, a
group must establish that: (1) its members would have individual
standing; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
group's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor the relief sought
requires participation of individual members. Here, the court found
that the only disputed element was whether WAP's and CCNRC's
members had individual standing to sue.
To establish this element, a plaintiff must show they have suffered
an "injury in fact" caused by the alleged misconduct, and that the
injury will likely be "redressed by a favorable decision." Since the
contaminated discharges affected members' recreational use of nearby
waters, the court found they suffered an injury. Additionally, the court
recognized that plaintiffs established causal connection between Clark
County's discharges and their injuries, although additional possible
sources of pollution to those waterways existed. The court concluded
that even though Clark County submitted part II of its NPDES permit
application, the lawsuit was not moot. Remedy for the injuries was
possible because submitting an application did not guarantee that
Clark County would receive a permit. Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiffs had standing.
Clark County next argued that they fit a statutory exception from
CWA's permit requirements due to their stormwater system. Realizing,
however, that both the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of Ecology required Clark County to apply for an NPDES
permit, the court refused to second-guess the agencies'
determinations. Therefore, the court held that Clark County was
required to obtain a NPDES permit.
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Finally, the court concluded that Clark County violated the CWA.
Liability under the CWA requires that a party must: (1) discharge; (2)
pollutants; (3) to navigable waters; (4) from point sources; (5) without
an NPDES permit. Since all elements were present in this case, the
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and found
Clark County liable for violating the CWA.
Michael Fischer

STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 702 So. 2d 472
(Civ. App. Ala. 1997) (holding that the trial court erred in applying
the two-year residual statute of limitations to allegations derived from
a claim of riparian rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue
of ownership of property directly facing Terry Cove).
Cove Properties, Inc. ("Cove") appealed from a judgment
dismissing its claims against Walter Trent Marina ("Marina") on the
basis that Cove's claims were barred by the two-year residual statute of
limitations. Cove and the Marina were adjoining landowners of
property fronting Terry Cove in Orange Beach, Alabama. The Marina
had erected a pier that crossed a line extending into the water of Terry
Cove from the parties' land boundary.
Cove sued under various theories all based upon its riparian water
rights of access to the waters of Terry Cove by virtue of its ownership of
property directly facing Terry Cove. The lower court dismissed the
action as barred by the two-year residual injury statute of limitations.
On appeal, Cove argued that its claims should not be subject to the
statute of limitations. Cove analogized its riparian rights to access the
water fronting its lot to the rights of a fee simple landowner to
possession of his or her land, arguing that its claims should be subject
to the statute of limitations governing recovery of interests in land, or,
alternatively, trespass to real or personal property.
In reviewing Cove's claims, the court held that the rights Cove
sought to vindicate were appurtenant to its riparian tract and were
corporeal hereditaments inuring to its tract. Thus, the ten-year
statute of limitations for actions for the recovery of lands, tenements,
or hereditaments, or the possession thereof, properly applied.
CarolinePayne
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CALIFORNIA
Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Coastal Act:
(1) did not permit development of environmentally sensitive habitat
areas ("ESHA") despite relocation of affected species; (2) did not
permit residential development of wetlands despite restoration of
other wetlands; and (3) did not permit destruction of an ESHA and
wetland for widening of a road without a demonstration that no
alternatives existed to maintain current traffic capacity).
A dispute occurred concerning the Local Coastal Program
("LCP"), a plan for the development of a large area of land in
southern Orange County ("County") known as Bolsa Chica. The Bolsa
Chica area included 1,558 acres of undeveloped wetlands and coastal
mesas surrounded on three sides by an urban development and the
fourth side by beach, coastal dunes, and bluffs separating the Pacific
Ocean. Approximately 1,300 acres of Bolsa Chica included lowlands
of both saltwater and freshwater wetlands with dry areas used by
wildlife. Flanking the lowlands were two mesas, the Bolsa Chica and
Huntington. Both the County and the California Coastal Commission
("Commission") approved an initial land use plan for Bolsa Chica in
1985 which permitted development of 5,700 residential units, a
seventy-five acre marina, and a 600-foot-wide navigable ocean
channel and breakwater. Concerned about the environmental impacts
of the development, the Bolsa Chica Planning Coalition ("Coalition")
protested the development.
The Commission made modifications to the LCP and then
approved it. The final LCP eliminated the planned marina and
navigable ocean channel, eliminated three roads, reduced residential
home development to 3,400 homes, 900 of the homes in the lowlands,
and increased the planned open space and wetlands restoration area.
The plaintiffs, Bolsa Chica Land Trust ("Trust"), objected to three
features of the modified LCP requesting a writ of mandate from the
trial court challenging the following provisions of the LCP: (1) the
replacement of a degraded eucalyptus grove on Bolsa Chica mesa with
a new raptor habitat on Huntington mesa; (2) the residential
development the lowland area which the LCP permitted as a means of
financing restoration of substantially degraded wetlands; and (3) the
elimination of Warner Pond on Bolsa Chica mesa to accommodate for
the widening of Warner Avenue.
The trial court held that elimination of the Bolsa Chica mesa and
recreation of the habitat on Huntington mesa was consistent with the
Coastal Act ("Act"). The trial court stated, however, that the Act did
not permit residential development of wetlands even if it would fund
restoration of other wetlands and the Act did not permit elimination
of Warner Pond to accommodate for a road absent a showing that the
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road outweighed the value of preserving the Pond. Both parties
appealed.
On appeal, the Trust argued that the trial court erred finding a
planned relocation of bird habitat permissible under the Act. The
Commission argued that the trial court erred in preventing residential
development of a wetlands area and in requiring preservation of the
pond.
The court reversed the trial court decision permitting the
relocation of the bird habitat. It rejected an argument of the
Commission that the goals of the Act under section 30240 to "carefully
safeguard [the] preservation" of ESHA's were upheld given the
deteriorated state of Bolsa Chica. The Commission argued that the
relocation of the raptor habitat best promoted the "habitat values" of
the Bolsa Chica mesa. The court rejected this argument holding that
the strict terms of section 30240 specifically limit all development of
ESHA's and did not permit the relocation of specific values of a
particular ESHA. Thus, the court held that section 30240 did not
provide a balancing mechanism to weigh conflicting interests
concerning ESHA's. In addition, the court rejected an argument that
a conflict between long-term and short-term goals existed to permit
development of the Bolsa Chica mesa.
The court upheld the trial court's decision on the issue of
residential development of wetlands. It held that section 30233 of the
Act, while permitting development of wetlands for very specific
purposes, did not mention residential development and therefore was
excluded from the list of permissible development of wetlands. In
addition, the court held that section 30411, permitting the
Department of Fish and Game to evaluate degraded wetlands to
determine the potential for restoration through development of a
boating facility, did not permit the Commission to construct
residential homes on wetlands as an alternative with equal potential to
restore. More fundamentally, the court pointed out the fact that the
power to evaluate degraded wetlands for boating facilities rested
exclusively with the Department of Fish and Game.
The court also upheld the trial court on the issue of elimination of
Warner Pond to widen the road. The court held that as both an ESHA
and wetland, the Warner Pond was protected from development under
sections 30240 and 30233 of the Act, absent a showing that no other
alternative for the road expansion existed and was necessary to
maintain existing traffic capacity.
Julie E. Hultgren
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County of Del Norte v. Crescent City, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that an unincorporated area outside the city
limits, which had received water from the city pursuant to city's water
appropriation permit, did not have the right to new water service
hookups, and the city's water service limitation was not arbitrary).
The County of Del Norte ("County") petitioned for writ of
mandamus to compel the City of Crescent City ("City") to continue
providing new water service connections outside of the city limits. The
Superior Court of Del Norte County granted the petition. The
California Court of Appeals reversed.
In the 1950's, the City bought and operated a water system for the
benefit of its residents as well as for service to private customers and
several water districts n the unincorporated area of the County. In July
1997, the City enacted a policy that it would "no longer allow new
utility connections outside itm incorporated territory.. .

."

This policy

was based on the assumption that by providing outside hookups, the
City encouraged development of new business and residential units
there, while discouraging growth within the City. In June 1994, the
City entered into a revenue sharing agreement with the County in
which the City would share in County sales tax revenue. The County
withdrew from this agreement in June 1997. On July 10, 1997, the city
council had a special meeting to consider alternatives for operation
and expansion of its water system and wastewater facilities. The city
manager recommended that the City should stop providing water or
sewer connections outside City limits.
The first issue was whether the City had a duty to provide new
water hookups to the County. The County argued that the City had a
duty to provide new water hookups on a nondiscriminatory basis
without regard to territorial boundaries under the permit. The court
held that the permit was a permit to appropriate unappropriated
water. The "place of use" authorized by the permit was not the
equivalent of the "service area" associated with the privately owned
public utility. The State Water Resources Control Board that issued the
permit did not require the City to serve the entire "place of use,"
therefore, the court held that the City did not violate the terms of the
permit. The "service area" is an area served by such utility "in which
the facilities have been dedicated to public use and in which territory
the utility is required to render service to the public." Therefore, the
court held that those persons coming into unincorporated lands
within the "place of use" do not have a vested right to new service
under the terms of the permit.
The second issue was whether the City's policy confining new water
hookups to properties within its borders was arbitrary or palpably
unreasonable. The County argued that the City's policy was "arbitrary"
because it denied water to potential users in the unincorporated area
"solely for the reason that they were outside rather than inside the
City's corporate boundaries." The water ordinances enacted by the
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two parties compelled the City to supply water to properties within
corporate limits, but vested discretion in the city council to designate
any areas it would serve beyond its borders. The court held that the
City not only had authority to designate the areas outside its borders,
but also had a financial incentive to deny new hookups after the
County withdrew from the revenue sharing agreement. The court
held that the City could use the utilities as a tool to manage growth
because its first obligation was to its own residents, who funded the
system. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

Paterno v. California, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that: (1) the then-announced Locklin factors needed to be
retroactively applied on remand; (2) negligent maintenance in aid of a
public flood control project was insufficient to establish takings
liability; (3) evidence that the levee failure was caused by rapid failure
from hydrofracture and that such hydrofracture was not predictable
corroborated a finding that the defendants did not create a dangerous
condition of public property; and (4) the plaintiff did not establish
prejudice stemming from the dismissal of the nuisance claim as being
duplicative of the negligence claim).
Flooding in the Sacramento Valley is common. In February 1986,
a turbulent storm hit areas of California and remained for more than a
week. The Linda levee, located in Yuba County, was at issue in this
case. The state was ultimately responsible for the Linda levee;
however, the local district had control over the daily maintenance and
operation of the levee, subject to federal and state standards. The
state was required to inspect the levee twice a year. On February 20,
1986, Eddie Bolton rode his bike on the levee and noticed boils on the
landside. A boil occurs when water is piped from the riverside to the
landside of the levee. Some boils carry a soil and water mixture that
removes support from the levee. The boils at issue were of such a
character. He reported the boils that evening. Approximately forty
minutes after he reported the boils, the levee buckled. The present
case arose from this collapse, which resulted in extensive flooding and
property damage.
Paterno alleged that all of the following contributed to the
Linda levee's failure: rodent burrows, boils, a forgotten concrete pipe,
and a nearby gravel pit that perforated the subsurface layers and
permitted water to flow underneath the levee. Paterno brought suit
alleging that the state inadequately maintained, inspected, and
operated the levee.
An owner may sue for inverse condemnation, when the
government takes or damages property without first paying for the
right to do so. Generally, strict liability applies when the government
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takes or damages property. However, strict liability is not applicable
when the project fails and causes damage to properties historically
subject to flooding. A reasonableness standard then must be used. To
establish strict liability, Paterno had to establish: (1) the identification
of maintenance plan(s); (2) the state in fact adopted such plans; and
(3) the plans contributorily caused the floods.
When a public flood control system fails to safeguard land from
historic periodic flooding, it must be determined whether the system
design posed an unreasonable risk of harm. The Locklin factors are
used to reach such a conclusion and are: (1) the overall purpose
served by the project; (2) to what extent losses are offset by reciprocal
benefits provided by the project; (3) the availability of alternatives to
the plan adopted; (4) the severity of the plaintiffs damage in relation
to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the extent to which the damage is a
normal risk of land ownership; and (6) the degree to which the
damage is distributed at large over the project or is peculiar to the
plaintiff. The Locklin factors apply retroactively.
If the Locklin factors demonstrate that the system plan posed an
unreasonable risk of harm, then a takings liability is feasible if a
negligent plan of maintenance exists. The plan of maintenance must
be found to be unreasonable. The court had already held that takings
liability only transpires from a public entity's failure to appreciate
potential property harm, not from an employee's failure.
Here,
the
court addressed Paterno's
seven
different
unreasonableness arguments. First, the court asserted that it was not
unreasonable for the local reclamation districts to act as the
''permanent committee" responsible for maintaining the project in
accordance with federal law. Second, the court determined that the
State's failure to verify that the levee patrols were being done on a
regular basis was a negligence claim, so the court did not decide the
issue. Third, the court considered the allegation pertaining to the
unreasonable failure to have federally mandated continuous levee
patrols immaterial and irrelevant because of its negligence nature.
Fourth, the vegetation and rodent plans were shown as unreasonably
superficial in order to support takings liability. Fifth, the failure to
excavate encroachments could be perceived as unreasonable, if it
could be shown that the defendants knew or should have known about
the encroachments and did not inspect or remove any of them. Sixth,
the government did not act unreasonably in failing to upgrade the
levee. Lastly, the state's unreasonableness regarding its authorization
of the gravel pit could be established if Paterno could show that the pit
pierced an impermeable subsurface layer that channeled water,
resulting in the levee collapse.
Paterno asserted that the state maintained a dangerous condition
of public property. The court sustained the trial court's decree that
the defendants, in fact, did not preserve a dangerous condition of
public property. The court reasoned that if evidence existed alluding
to the rapid failure of the levee due to the existence of an
unpredictable hydrofracture, then a dangerous condition of public
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property was not present.
A nuisance claim emanates from the notion that anything that is
injurious to one's health or an obstruction to the free use and
comfortable enjoyment of life or property constitutes a nuisance. A
nuisance cause of action cannot substitute for a dangerous condition
of property cause of action in a situation when the cause of the
nuisance itself is a dangerous condition of property.
Paterno
effectively showed the trial court's error in granting defendant's
directed verdict, but nonetheless made minimal effort to show
prejudice derived from the directed verdict. Therefore, the court
found harmless error. The court reasoned that Paterno had the duty
of asserting a prejudice claim and arguing how the error equated to a
miscarriage ofjustice. The court ordered a new trial.
SaraFranklin

COLORADO
Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Lost Creek Ground Water Management
Dist., No. 98CA1518, 1999 WL 771014 (Colo. App. Sept. 30, 1999)
(holding that accomplishing personal service within thirty days is a
procedural requirement, the violation of which does not mandate
dismissal of an appeal).
Eagle Peak Farms ("Eagle Peak") filed an application for a change
of water rights with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and the
Lost Creek Ground Water Management District ("District"). After a
hearing, the District denied the application. Eagle Peak then filed a
notice of appeal in the district court. Eagle Peak failed, however, to
timely serve three of the twenty defendants and interested-party
defendants. Due to this failure, the district court dismissed the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal and lack of
personal jurisdiction over the three defendants.
On appeal, Eagle Peak argued that although the filing of the
notice of appeal with the court was jurisdictional, once timely filed, the
appeal has been perfected even though all interested parties may not
have been served personally with such notice within thirty days. The
District, to the contrary, argued that notice of the appeal must be
served personally upon all parties within the thirty day time period or
the appeal must be dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.
In reviewing the appeal and the arguments set forth by both sides,
the court held that violation of a procedural requirement did not
mandate dismissal of the appeal. The court held that filing a timely
notice of appeal in the district court invoked subject matter
jurisdiction for the appeal; subject matter jurisdiction could not be
waived. On the other hand, procedural requirements were intended
to facilitate proceedings before the court. Once a court's subject
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matter jurisdiction was properly invoked, a party's failure to comply
with a procedural requirement could justify the court's dismissal of
that action. A procedural requirement, service must be accomplished
upon all proper and necessary parties. The court held that actual
service, however, rather than its timing, perfected the appeal.
Accordingly, because the thirty day service of notice requirement was
procedural, plaintiffs failure to timely serve the three parties did not
require dismissal of the action.
CarolinePayne

CONNECTICUT
Albahary v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482781, 1999 WL 185131
(Conn. Supp. Mar. 16, 1999) (holding that a statute authorizing the
City of Bristol's condemnation of an easement on plaintiffs' property
was constitutional because it was enacted for the legitimate and public
purpose of complying with a Consent Order).
In 1995, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
("CDEP") entered into a Consent Order with the City of Bristol
("City"). The City agreed to investigate and study the damage to a
city-owned landfill that was leaking contaminants. The Consent
Order did not require the City to clean up the contaminants. Instead,
the Consent Order required the City to take control of all affected
land within the contamination's zone of influence. The Consent
Order defined the zone as the area where leachate and ground water
mixed, or could potentially mix.
The Albahary's land bordered the landfill and was deemed within
the contaminated zone. In 1996, the Connecticut General Assembly
enacted Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act"). The Special Act allowed for
condemnation in those cases involving city-owned landfills when the
condemned land was outside a municipality's corporate limits. In
August of 1997, pursuant to the Special Act, the City began
condemnation proceedings to acquire an easement onto Albahary's
land. Albahary challenged the constitutionality of the Special Act,
seeking to have the Special Act declared invalid, unconstitutional, and
against public policy.
The court first noted that the constitutional issue was dispositive.
If the court found the Special Act unconstitutional, the need to
address Albahary's additional arguments was obviated. The court
found the Special Act to be constitutional and valid.
The court pointed out that any legislation for the economic or
social welfare of its constituents would be constitutional if there were a
rational and legitimate state purpose. If the Special Act met this twopart test, then it satisfied the due process requirement. Here, the
Special Act met the two-part test. Albahary did not contest the validity
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of the Consent Order mandating acquisition of all water rights
affected by contamination. The Consent Order itself served a public
purpose in trying to assure clean water. Therefore, the City's attempt
to comply with the Consent Order was for the benefit of the public.
The Special Act facilitated the fulfillment of the Consent Order, and
was therefore enacted for a legitimate purpose.
Albahary next argued that the Special Act only permitted the City
to take ground water rights, not easement rights. Because the Special
Act did not mention the word easement, Albahary argued that by
taking easement rights, the City exceeded the express authority of the
Special Act, thus rendering the condemnation ultra vires. Conceding
there was no express language regarding easements in the statute, the
court relied on the traditional view that ambiguous statutes must be
construed to satisfy the legislature's purpose. The court determined
that it was plain from the legislative history that the City was not
limited to the water rights of the property. The court thus held the
City had statutory authority to acquire an easement necessary to
comply with the Special Act's purpose. Therefore, the court allowed
the City to condemn an easement across Albahary's property.
Finally, Albahary argued that the taking was statutorily prohibited
by General Statutes which provide that a municipality may take only a
fee simple interest in private property. The court first stated that
nothing prohibited the legislature from authorizing less than a fee
interest in property. The court next pointed out that the Special Act,
authorizing taking of ground water or rights or interests therein, could
reasonably be interpreted as allowing a condemnation of less than fee
interest. Accordingly, the City's condemnation of the Albahary's
property under the Special Act did not violate the General Statutes.
Kim Shropshire

Middlefield Citizens Action, Inc. v. Middlefield Inland Wetland, Nos.
82372, 85259, 82830, 83209, 1999 WL 195882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(holding an agency did not receive ex parte information when it
received technical information from its engineer explaining a perched
water table).
White Water Mountain Resorts of Connecticut ("White Water")
runs Powder Ridge Ski Area in the winter. To expand its business to
include summer sports, White Water intended to build a summer
water park adjacent to the ski area.
White Water applied to the Town of Middletown Planning and
Zoning Commission ("Commission") for a special permit to create the
park and the road. During the mandatory public hearings, the
Commission created the special permit's conditions, which primarily
addressed traffic problems. The Commission subsequently approved
the permit.
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White Water also applied to the town of Middlefield Inland
Wetlands and Watercourse Agency ("Agency") for approval of road
construction activities that would affect wetlands. The Agency held
public hearings concerning the application.
After the hearings and during the deliberation, the Agency
members discussed the drainage calculations for the new road's runoff. The Agency's expert presented the members with a technical
memorandum to explain the dynamics of a perched water table to
help the Agency determine alternative drainage points. The Agency
later granted White Water's application by finding that the road
building activities would not likely impair the water or the natural
resources.
Citizens sued the Agency for accepting ex parte information from
the Agency's engineer after the public hearing period depriving
Citizens of their right to a fair hearing. The court held that receiving
information of a technical nature from an Agency engineer did not
constitute ex parte information.
Madoline Wallace

Reynolds v. City of Bristol, No. CV 970482675, 1999 WL 240064
(Conn. Super. Ct. March 29, 1999) (holding that city's condemnation
proceedings were within city's authority as authorized by special
legislative act).
The City of Bristol ("Bristol") owned and operated a landfill that
began to leak contaminants into surrounding waterways. In 1995, the
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection entered a
Consent Order with Bristol. The Consent Order required that Bristol
test and monitor the contamination and propose plans to remediate
the pollution. The Consent Order also required Bristol to acquire
control over all water rights or interests that were either contaminated
or potentially contaminated.
To assist Bristol in complying with the Consent Order, the
Connecticut General Assembly passed Special Act 96-12 ("Special Act")
allowing municipalities to condemn property rights outside their
corporate limits. In 1997, Bristol's City Council passed a resolution to
comply with the Consent Order.
This resolution authorized Bristol to acquire certain property
rights necessary to comply with the Consent Order. Bristol then
initiated condemnation proceedings against Thomas Reynolds.
Reynolds challenged Bristol's actions, claiming that the condemnation
proceedings exceeded the scope of the Special Act, and were therefore
ultra vires. Both parties stipulated to the relevant facts, and both
moved for summary judgment. The issue was whether Bristol, by
condemning Reynolds' property, acted within the authority granted by
the Special Act.
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To resolve this issue, the court applied basic rules of statutory
construction. After finding that the Special Act's plain language was
vague, the court analyzed the legislative history. Noting that the
Special Act was not intended as a 'blanket law,' the court found the
Special Act was "specially tailored to meet the needs of Bristol, as
opposed to any other municipality in the state." Thus, the court found
that it was plain "from the legislative history that the legislature
contemplated that Bristol would have such statutory authority" to
condemn property easements necessary to satisfy the Consent Order's
Bristol's
requirements. Disallowing
testing and monitoring
condemnation proceedings against Reynolds would be directly
contrary to the Special Act's legislative purpose.
The court concluded Bristol acted within the scope of the Special
The court also found that Bristol followed the proper
Act.
proceedings necessary to condemn Reynolds' property. Therefore,
the court refused to enjoin Bristol's condemnation proceedings
against Reynolds.
Michael Fischer

FLORIDA
City of West Palm Beach v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund, Nos. 93,821, 1999 WL 731654 (Fla. Sept. 9,
1999) (holding that dredging of submerged lands did not constitute a
"permanent improvement" under the Butler Act and divestiture of title
in State submerged lands did not occur).
In 1947, the City of West Palm Beach ("City") obtained a building
permit under the Butler Act ("Act") and its predecessor the Riparian
Rights Act. The Act divested the state's title to submerged lands if
upland owners constructed improvements. The Act's purpose was to
encourage the state's waterfront development. The City constructed a
municipal marina on the submerged land of Florida's sovereign land.
The City also dredged a boat basin in the area surrounding the piers.
Ten years later the legislature repealed the Act, however, it confirmed
title for all upland riparian owners who bulk-headed or filled in or
permanently improved the submerged land before the Act's repeal.
In 1994, the City sued to quiet title to the twenty-six acres of
submerged lands around the marina including the dredged
bottomlands. The Board of Trustees conceded that the City was
entitled to title for the land under the docks, but contested the action
regarding title for the dredged bottomlands. The trial court entered
summary judgment for the Board of Trustees and concluded that the
dredging of the bottomlands did not constitute a permanent
improvement under the Act. The appellate court reversed and
granted a rehearing on which they affirmed the trial court order for
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summary judgment.
The issue the Supreme Court of Florida faced on appeal was
whether the City's dredging of submerged bottomlands in the vicinity
of the marina's piers had permanently improved the land under the
language of the repealed Act thus vesting tite to the dredged
submerged lands in the City. The court held that the legislature in
enacting the Act did not intend for dredging of submerged
bottomlands to constitute a permanent improvement subject to
divestiture of tide in state submerged lands.
The court construed the Act in favor of the sovereign state and
examined the Act's plain language. The court noted specific language
in the statute regarding an owner's exclusive right only over parcels of
submerged land on which wharves were built or the land filled in by
construction of warehouses, dwellings or other buildings. It found this
specific language to limit later language in the statute dealing with
land actually bulk-headed, filled in, or permanently improved. Thus,
permanent improvement occurred by building significant structures
like wharves, warehouses, dwelling, buildings, and other permanent
structures.
In reaching its conclusion, the court disapproved of the suggestion
made in the two cases the City presented arguing that dredging of
bottomlands constituted a permanent improvement.
The court
applied the strictly construed language of the Act to the City's facts
and found that dredging did not permanently improve the land. The
court affirmed the decision of the appellate court and held that title to
the submerged lands remained with the Board.
Karen McTavish

Tewksbury v. City of Deerfield Beach, No. 98-2673, 1999 WL 741109
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. Sept. 17, 1999) (holding that an outdoor dining
dock stretching over privately owned submerged lands is not a proper
exercise of dock owner's littoral rights).
Seeking compensation for the use of private land, the owners of
submerged lands ("Kesters") sued the Cove Restaurant and Marina
("Restaurant") which had built an outdoor dining area on a dock. The
dock supporting the Restaurant was located above the Kesters'
submerged land. Because the sovereign usually owns submerged
lands, this case was unique. In this case, the sovereign's only interest
in the submerged lands was an easement the Kesters previously
granted to the United States government to widen the Intracoastal
Waterway. The Restaurant sought a declaration that the use of this
dock was within their littoral rights. The district court of appeal held
that the Kesters owned a fee simple interest in the submerged lands,
and that the only issue on remand should be the scope of the
Restaurant's littoral rights.
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In a riparian jurisdiction, the term littoral rights refers to the right
to use land abutting navigable ocean, sea, or lake waters. These rights
included uses for ingress, egress, boating, bathing, fishing, and other
uses as defined by law. Here, the Restaurant's dining dock was
supported by the Kesters' submerged lands. The district court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that such use fell outside of
the Restaurant's littoral rights.
The court narrowly defined Florida's riparian and littoral rights,
holding that these rights include: (1) the general use of the water
adjacent to the property; (2) wharfing out to navigability; (3) accessing
navigable waters; and (4) the right to accretions. As a result, the court
found the Restaurant's operation of an outdoor dining area on a dock
simply does not fall within the permissible use of submerged lands
adjacent to its property.
Susan P. Klopman

HAWAI'I
Young v. Planning Comm'n of Kaua'i, 974 P.2d 40 (Haw. 1999)
(holding that commercial boat tour operator's increase in activity and
use of more and bigger boats constituted a "development" within the
meaning of Hawai'i's Coastal Zone Management Act thus requiring
operator to obtain a permit).
Ralph Young, the plaintiff-appellant, ran both an independent
tour boat operation and boat services for Club Med, operating much
of the time in the Hanalei River, an area designated a Special
Management Area ("SMA"). From 1974 to 1988, Young increased the
number and size of boats in his fleet and operated his business without
obtaining a permit. In 1988, the Planning Department of the County
of Kaua'i informed Young and other tour boat operators that tour boat
operations for hire would be considered a "development" under the
terms and conditions of the Hawai'i Coastal Zone Management Act
("CZMA") requiring operators to obtain a permit for boat operation in
SMA. Young suspended operation from 1988 until 1992 when he
petitioned the Kaua'i Planning Commission for a declaratory order
maintaining that his business operations did not fall under the purview
of the CZMA. The commission dismissed Young's petition and he
appealed, but the parties dismissed the appeal. Subsequently, Young
applied for a permit which the Commission approved and then
extended until March 31, 2000. Still unsatisfied, Young initiated this
suit in order to determine whether his commercial tour boat activities
constituted a "development" under the CZMA and thus required a
permit. The trial court held that Young's tour boat operation
constituted a "development" because it satisfied three of five criteria
used to determine whether an activity constituted a "development"
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under the CZMA. The Hawai'i Supreme Court affirmed.
The CZMA defined "development" as any uses, activities, or
operations on land or in or under water within an SMA that: (1)
placed or erected solid, gaseous, liquid, or thermal waste; (2) graded,
removed, dredged, mined, or extracted materials; (3) changed the
density or intensity of use of land; (4) changed the intensity of use of
water; and (5) constructed, destroyed, or altered the size of any
structure. The trial court determined that Young's boat operations
qualified as a "development" based on (1), (3), and (4). The supreme
court determined that the activities needed to meet only one of the
requirements in order for an activity to constitute a "development"
thus the court limited its analysis to whether Young's activities changed
the "intensity of use" of water, development definition (4).
Young argued that his tour boat operation was already in existence
when the statute became effective, thus his activities did not constitute
a "development" but constituted, instead, the base-line from which
changes to the use of the river should be measured. The court
dismissed this argument by examining the growth of his business and
the increase in the size and number of boats he used. In 1974, Young
operated a sport fishing sole proprietorship and a shuttle service for
Club Med. He used two boats, one a seventeen foot Boston Whaler
with an eighty-five horsepower outboard motor and the other a
fourteen foot McKee Craft with a sixty-five horsepower outboard
motor. The Hawai'i legislature passed the CMZA in 1977. By that
time, Young's business used the McKee Craft, a forty-two foot sailboat,
a twenty-two foot Wellcraft with two fifty horsepower outboards, and a
twenty-seven foot catamaran with a fifteen horsepower outboard. He
also shared the use of a forty-two foot Post craft with twin 310
horsepower diesel inboard engines.
In 1979, when the Kaua'i
Planning Commission adopted the SMA rules, Young had added two
more boats to his fleet. According to the court, this increase
constituted a change in the intensity of use.
Young also argued that his use of the water constituted a nonconforming use for zoning purposes which, if conducted prior to the
enactment of zoning regulations, should be allowed to continue. The
court rejected this argument as well stating that without a proprietary
interest in land beneath the Hanalei River or a vested right in use of
the river, the tour boat operation could not be considered a nonconforming use. The court held that Young's operation constituted a
"development" and that his operations required him to obtain a
permit.
Amy W Beatie
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IDAHO
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, Nos. 24546, 24547, 24548, 24557,
24559 (1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999) (holding that the United
States has federal reserved water rights to: (1) all unappropriated
water flows in the Selway-Bitterroot, Gospel-Hump, and Frank
Church River of No Return Wilderness Areas; and (2) all the
unappropriated water flows in the tributaries of the Snake River within
Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area).
The Wilderness Act of 1964 ("Act") designated nearly four million
acres of land in Idaho as Wilderness Areas. These preserves were
known as the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness Area, the Gospel-Hump
Wilderness Area, and the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness
Area ("Wilderness Areas"). In addition, Congress created the Hell's
Canyon National Recreation Area ("Hell's Canyon") within Idaho's
boundaries in 1975. In 1996, the United States filed to reserve water
rights within the Wilderness Areas based on the Act. Simultaneously,
the United States claimed all unappropriated water flows within Hell's
Canyon based on its organic statute.
Later that year, the United States and the State of Idaho filed
cross-motions for summary judgment seeking a determination of
whether the Act implied a federal reserved water right for the
Wilderness Areas. In 1997, both the United States and State of Idaho
filed motions for summary judgment to determine whether the United
States Forest Service was entitled to a federal reserved water right in
Hell's Canyon. The Snake River Basin Adjudication District Court
("SRBA") consolidated both cases.
The SRBA concluded that the Act implicitly entitled the United
States to a federally reserved water right within the Wilderness Areas.
In addition, the SRBA found that the United States was expressly
entitled to all unappropriated flows of water originating in tributaries
to the Snake River within Hell's Canyon. The State of Idaho, the
Potlatch Corporation, and a number of other objectors filed this
appeal in the Idaho Supreme Court.
On appeal, the first issue was whether the United States held
federally reserved water rights within the Wilderness Areas. The court
analyzed whether the Act's designation of the wilderness areas
constituted a land reservation by the federal government for the
purposes of the federal reserved water rights doctrine. To establish
federal reserved water rights, the United States had to show the land
was withdrawn from the public domain by statute, executive order, or
treaty, and that the withdrawn land was dedicated to a specific federal
purpose. The court determined that the clear language of the Act
stated that the specific purpose of the reservation was to preserve the
wilderness character of the area. The court also stated that it was
irrelevant that the lands in question were previously withdrawn as
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national forests, since Congress had the authority to re-reserve land
for changed purposes.
Next, because the Act did not expressly reserve water rights, the
court looked to see if reserved rights were implicit in the Act. A court
will infer an intent to reserve water if the water were necessary to satisfy
the primary purposes of the reservation. The Act's purpose was
maintaining the designated area in its pristine natural condition.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the SRBA's
determination that strictly applying Idaho's prior appropriation
regime was inconsistent with this purpose. The court also agreed that
removing any water within the Wilderness Areas would defeat the
purposes of the Act. Subsequently, the court affirmed the SRBA's
determination that Congress intended to reserve all unappropriated
waters within the Wilderness Areas.
The second issue was whether the United States held federal
reserved water rights to all unappropriated flows of tributaries to the
Snake River originating within Hell's Canyon. The court determined
the federal reserved water rights doctrine was satisfied because Hell's
Canyon was withdrawn by federal statute. The withdrawal's purpose
was to preserve the natural beauty and historical values of the Hell's
Canyon area for future generations. The court rejected the argument
that the Hell's Canyon Act was merely a land management statute.
Therefore, the court affirmed the SRBA's finding that Hell's Canyon
withdrawal was a governmental land reservation, and thus satisfied the
reserved rights doctrine.
The SRBA and the Idaho Supreme Court both concluded that the
Hell's Canyon Act expressly reserved the tributaries of the Snake River
within Hell's Canyon. The plain language of the Hell's Canyon Act
clearly stated that Hell's Canyon would comprise all land and water
within the area. Therefore, the United States was entitled to reserve
all unappropriated water flows in the tributaries of the Snake River
originating within Hell's Canyon.
Kirk Waible
INDIANA
Carnahan v. Moriah Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 437 (Ind.
1999) (holding that a party wishing to establish a recreational
prescriptive easement must show by clear and convincing evidence
that their use was adverse to the owner).
In 1972, the Carnahan family purchased property that included
two and one half percent of Lake Julia, a private lake. Until the
Carnahans filed suit in 1993, the family engaged in recreational activity
on the lake such as boating, water skiing, and jet skiing. Moriah
Property Owners Association, Inc. ("Moriah") owned approximately
sixty-four percent of Lake Julia. Before Moriah took title to the
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property, the Drewy family owned the property for several years. The
Carnahan's engaged in their recreational activities while the Drewy's
owned the property and continued when Moriah took ownership.
Moriah then established a covenant restricting the use of watercraft on
the lake, in order to prevent harm to children and adults swimming in
the lake.
After the issuance of the restrictive covenant, the Carnahans filed
suit to establish a prescriptive easement for the use of watercraft on the
lake and to quiet title to such easement. Moriah counter-claimed for
an injunction to stop the use of watercraft on the lake. The trial court
determined the Carnahans had established a prescriptive easement for
recreational use of watercraft on the lake. The appeals court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Indiana analyzed the standard a claimant must
meet in order to establish a recreational prescriptive easement and
whether the Carnahans recreational use of the lake entitled them to a
prescriptive easement. The court disagreed with the lower courts and
found that entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement
required clear and convincing evidence of an adverse use, something
the Carnahans failed to establish.
The court first distinguished a recreational use from the normal
ingress and egress over land. The court noted the presumption that
normal ingress and egress use of a road over another's property is
adverse to the owner. Recreational use is more permissive and if an
owner witnesses the claimant making use of the body of water and
does not intervene that does not mean the owner is acknowledging a
right by the claimant. The owner is merely permitting the claimant to
use the body of water. Thus, the court established that in order to
show entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement, the claimant
must show use adverse to the owner. To prove "adverse" the claimant
needed to show use of the land as an owner without any regard to the
claims of others or permission from anyone for at least twenty years.
The court stated a claimant needed clear and convincing evidence to
prove adverse use.
Next, the court proceeded to review the evidence presented by the
Carnahans to establish adverse use. The court looked mainly to the
use while the Drewys owned the property because the majority of the
use occurred during that time. The court found that the Carnahans
engaged in leisurely use of the lake that did not affect the quality of
the lake. The recreational use of the lake was not inconsistent with the
Drewy's prior use. Therefore, the court held the Carnahans did not
establish entitlement to a recreational prescriptive easement, reversing
the findings of the lower court.
Karen McTavish
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In re Clinton Water Works Rate Schedule Adopted Sept. 9, 1997, 707
N.E.2d 807 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) (holding that after the city's removal
from the jurisdiction of the IURC, it could raise rates to generate
revenue for repairs and that the rate increase was just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory).
On September 9, 1997, the Common Council of the City of
Clinton ("City") adopted an ordinance setting forth an increase in the
City's water rates. These increases resulted in the Clinton Township
Water Co., Inc. ("Township") paying the same rates as the residential
customers. The Township filed a petition objecting to the rate
increase, claiming it violated IC 8-1.5-3-8. The trial court held a
hearing on the Township's petition and confirmed the City's rate
increase. The Township appealed the trial court's decision.
The first issue was whether the City was required to justify the rate
increase by using the same rate-making methods and procedures
followed by utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission ("IURC"), for approval of rates and charges.
The Township also argued that the City was not permitted to raise
rates to cover future expenses. The City previously removed itself from
jurisdiction of the IURC. Therefore, the court held that a municipal
utility that removed itself from that jurisdiction is not limited to the
methodologies used by the IURC and could raise rates to generate
revenue for repairs. The court held, however, that IC 8-1.5-3-8 still
required the municipal utility to make rates that are
nondiscriminatory, reasonable, and just.
The second issue, therefore, was whether the municipal utility's
rate increase was nondiscriminatory, reasonable, and just. The court
held that the evidence demonstrated that the rate increase met each of
those characteristics. In addition, IC 8-1.5-3-8(a) requires the City to
provide its customers with reasonably adequate services and facilities.
The court held that the City presented evidence to the trial court
establishing that the rate increases were necessary to provide adequate
services. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's findings and
approved the rate increases.
Lori Asher
IOWA
Iowa v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1999) (holding an owner of
an Iowa hog confinement facility strictly liable for violating statutes
and regulations governing spray irrigation and for violating freeboard
standards).
Austin J. DeCoster owned more than thirty hog confinement
facilities. The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") issued
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permits for the construction of two earthen waste storage basins in
units two and three, and unit nine's anaerobic lagoon. On April 27,
1995, DeCoster began spray irrigating manure from the waste storage
basin at unit three. During the second spray irrigating application, an
employee discovered that water and manure started to pool in the low
spots. Irrigation continued until the next day. A local noticed a dirty
darkish color with a strong odor of manure running from both tile
outlets. The outfalls created foam in the water in the ditch and
continued until someone removed the tile. The two tile outlets
discharged into a stream that eventually joined the Iowa River. A DNR
field agent investigated and concluded that DeCoster's spray irrigation
penetrated three feet of soil, reaching the tile line creating the
polluted discharge.
The trial court held that the overwhelming evidence showed that
the spray irrigation caused the polluted discharge from the tile outlets.
It imposed a civil fine of $59,000 against DeCoster, which he appealed.
This court then affirmed in four parts.
First, the court agreed with the lower court that sufficient evidence
existed to show that the polluted discharge and putrid odor of hog
manure came from DeCoster's spray irrigation.
Second, the court pointed out Iowa Code § 455B.186(1), which
states that an operator is in violation of this section if it places
pollutants into the state's water. The pollutants found in the water
came from the tile outlets at DeCoster's facility. DeCoster, through his
employees, knowingly placed pollutants in state water by
contaminating the soil around the water. Therefore, he was strictly
liable for violation of the statute.
Third, the court held that DeCoster violated Iowa Administrative
Code rule 567-65.2(7) which states that manure removal shall be done
in a manner that will not cause surface or groundwater contamination.
The evidence showed that the pooling and foam that emerged onto
the surface directly resulted from the spray irrigation. DeCoster's
process for manure removal led to surface and groundwater pollution;
therefore, he was liable for violating the regulation. The court also
pointed out that a permit from DNR did not a defense as it did not
confer the right to violate state statutes and regulations.
Finally, the court affirmed the lower court's finding of a violation
of the freeboard standards. The DNR permit issued to DeCoster
limited the space between the top of the berm of the basin and the
level of waste to two feet. DeCoster exceeded that limit and violated
the regulation. DeCoster argued that the violation did not cause the
pollution, but the removal of tile line caused it. The court held that
DeCoster did not remove the waste properly; therefore, the tile outlets
clogged and caused the discharge.
The court also reviewed the imposition of the civil fine. It found
that the lower court had not abused its power to impose fines and that
the appropriate fine for DeCoster was $59,000.
Lastly, the court addressed DeCoster's claim that the penalties
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imposed by the lower court violated his equal protection rights
because his fines were greater than those imposed on previous
violators. The court rejected that claim because the evidence failed to
show DeCoster received unequal treatment. The court found that
DeCoster violated the Iowa statutes and regulations. The trial court
correctly found him strictly liable and imposed an appropriate fine.
Sheela S. Parameswar

KANSAS
Moon v. City of Lawrence, 982 P.2d 388 (Kan. 1999) (holding that the
homeowners' claims for personal and real property damage recovery
against the City, resulting from the storm water drainage system flood,
were barred by the statute of limitations).
Homeowners resided in a part of Lawrence, Kansas, which had a
history of water drainage problems. In 1958, the City of Lawrence
("City") constructed a complex drainage system. HQwever, within a
few years, the City became aware of the inadequacy of the drainage
system. Heavy rains rendered a portion of the drainage system
inadequate because the inlet pipe could not accommodate the large
amounts of water runoff. In the late 1960's, the City hired Black &
Veatch Consulting Engineers ("B & V") to examine different drainage
systems and identify solutions to those systems' problems. B & V
recognized the systems, including the Second and Michigan Street
Drainage System at issue here, as inadequate and suggested three
modes of action.
The City executed only two of B & V's
recommendations.
The recommendation that the City did not
perform constituted most of the financial burden.
Since the
implementation of B & V's two recommendations, the City had on
occasion inspected, maintained, and repaired the Second and
Michigan Street Drainage System.
Since 1969, an abundance of development occurred upstream
from the homeowners' properties.
Development included the
erection of the Holidome, the Sallie Mae Office Building with two
accompanying parking lots, and the Highpointe Apartments. The City
allowed each of these three sites to be completed with the knowledge
that each project did not require a storm water detention system
because of their nearness to the Second and Michigan Street Drainage
System.
The homeowners suffered substantial damage due to the flooding.
The homeowners alleged damages included: (1) severe yard flooding,
sometimes resulting in damage to outdoor property; (2) numerous
incidences of basement flooding, sometimes including property
damage; and (3) garage flooding. Each of the homeowners had
knowledge of the propensity of flooding between 1978 and 1993.
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The statute of limitations for an action alleging injury to another's
rights, not arising from a contractual agreement, is two years.
Additionally, a Kansas statute delineates that accrual of the cause of
action does not begin until the act giving rise to the cause of action
first causes substantial injury. The court had previously held that
"substantial injury" meant the victim must suffer a sufficient
ascertainable injury, regardless of the extent of that injury.
The court compared this situation with the 1996 decision in
Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Commissioners, which differed factually.
The Johnson court held that the statute of limitations did not
commence until after the 1991 flood; therefore, the cause of action
was not barred. In that case, a flood occurred in 1988, and the
plaintiffs promptly complained to the County. The County then took
action to prevent any future problems. Flooding again occurred in
1991, at which point the plaintiffs realized that the County had not
rectified the problem. Consequently, they filed suit.
The court also compared this situation with the decision of Isnard
v. City of Coffeyville. There the court held that the plaintiffs' injuries
due to flooding were reasonably ascertainable before the suit was filed
in October of 1991. Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations
barred their cause of action. The court reasoned that past experiences
gave the plaintiffs satisfactory knowledge before October 1991 to
estimate the amount of rain needed to cause an overflow in the storm
sewer. Furthermore, the court held that the underground storm sewer
was a permanent structure, and the entire system needed replacement
in order to fix the flooding problem.
The court held that Isnardwas the applicable and controlling case.
The court stated that even if portions of the drainage system were
classified temporary, the classification did not preclude the entire
Second and Michigan Street Drainage System from being
characterized as a permanent structure. The homeowners had prior
knowledge of the flooding, and the City had not promised or tried to
abate the flooding. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to
run in 1993, thus barring the homeowners' cause of action.
Sara Franklin

LOUISIANA
Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737 So.2d 720 (La. 1999) (holding that
the continued presence of a canal and the consequent diversion of
water from a bayou did not constitute a continuing tort since those
were continuous ill effects, not unlawful acts).
Sarah Crump sold eighteen of her sixty acres to Sabine River
Authority ("Authority") in 1965. The Authority used this land to
construct the Toledo Bend Reservoir. The McDonald Bayou traversed
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Crump's land and acted as an approximate boundary between
Crump's land to the north and Authority's land to the south.
Authority leased back an area of the land to Crump so that she could
retain access to either the Toledo Bend Reservoir or the Sabine River
by way of McDonald Bayou. In 1969, Crump's attorney requested that
the Authority notify Crump if any neighboring landowners sought
permission to dredge a canal and use the bayou crossing Crump's
land. The Authority responded that there was no record of any such
application. In 1971, without a permit, neighboring landowners dug a
canal intersecting McDonald Bayou and the reservoir. This canal
altered the flow of water in the bayou and ultimately caused the
portion on Crump's land to dry up. Consequently, Crump lost her
ability to access Toledo Bend Lake via her property.
After several unsuccessful attempts to rectify the problem with the
Authority's cooperation and recourse to the Board of Commissioners,
Crump filed a negligence action in 1992 against the Authority seeking
damages and a mandatory injunction.
Crump alleged that the
Authority was obligated to prevent the digging of the channel by the
neighboring owners and had a subsequent duty to restore McDonald
Bayou to its original condition. Thus, Crump argued that the
continued existence of the canal and Authority's continued refusal to
fix the situation resulted in the continuing damage of limited
accessibility and constituted continuing tortious conduct. Crump also
alleged that she suffered emotional and financial damages as a direct
result of the Authority's refusals to correct the problem.
The trial court found in favor of Crump, and she received
$100,800 in damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed and determined
that Crump's claim under the theory of continuing tort had not
prescribed because she continuously sought rectification from the'
Authority. The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted certiorari.
The court stated that an action in continuing tort required the
operating cause of the injury to be a continuous one resulting in
continuous damages. If the operating cause was not continuous, then
prescription ran from the date that the injured party became aware of
or should have become aware of such harm. Relying on precedent
from the turn of the century, the supreme court found the operating
cause of injury occurred when the neighboring land owners actually
dug the canal. The canal's continued presence and the consequent
continuous diversion of water from McDonald Bayou were continuous
ill effects and not continuous unlawful acts. It followed that the oneyear prescriptive period applicable to negligence actions involving
damage to immovable property began to run when damage to Crump
became apparent. The supreme court determined that Crump
discovered her damages no later than 1972. Since this suit was filed
twenty years later, Crump's negligence action had prescribed.
Crump's alternative arguments also failed. Crump argued that the
running of prescription was interrupted when Authority acknowledged
that the canal was illegally constructed and represented that it would
help repair the damage.
The supreme court held that mere
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recognition of a disputable claim and humanitarian or charitable
gestures do not constitute acknowledgments, halting the progress of
prescription.
Crump alternatively argued that her inaction was
justified because the employees of the Authority assured her they were
going to fix the problem, ultimately lulling her into a course of
inaction. The supreme court determined that Crump's allegations did
not prevent the running of prescription. Therefore, because Crump's
negligence action had prescribed, the supreme court dismissed her
suit.
Vanessa L. Condra

MAINE
Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999) (holding that Maine
continues to follow the absolute dominion rule).
Giles owned and operated a gravel pit adjacent to the Maddockses'
property.
Although the Maddockses' did not live there, an
underground spring historically produced large quantities of water
beneath this property. The Maddockses filed a complaint in 1994
alleging that Giles' gravel excavation depleted the spring's water.
Prior to trial, the court recognized the general rule that although a
landowner had the right to use his land for lawful purposes, he may
not disrupt a watercourse causing injury to neighboring landowners.
At trial, the jury preliminarily determined whether the spring
constituted a watercourse. A watercourse must have a substantial and
well defined existence. Water in a watercourse must flow in a specific
direction in a regular channel, with a bed and banks and sides. Also, it
generally flows into another body of water. The jury found that the
spring under the Maddockses property was not a watercourse and the
court granted judgment to Giles.
On appeal, the Maddockses asked the court to abandon the
dominion rule in favor of groundwater rules set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The dominion rule held that the
landowner had absolute ownership of the groundwater beneath his
land, similar to the soils and rocks surrounding it. Under this rule, a
landowner has no liability for digging a well on his property while
causing percolating water of his neighbor's property to dry up. The
Maddockses argued that the dominion rule was based on faulty
science, other jurisdictions have used modern science as the basis for
abandoning this rule, and only a few jurisdictions continue to follow it.
This court declined to reject the dominion rule. First, they found
the rule still suitable for use in Maine; even if modern science changed
views on groundwater, the rule could still operate adequately in Maine.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that landowners have relied on
this rule for over a century. Absent proof of its counterproductivity,
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the court will not change it.
Second, the court felt that the legislature should make the decision
whether to abandon the old dominion rule. The legislature had
created a board to study Maine water law. In 1991, this board
suggested that Maine adopt reasonable use principles. The legislature
declined to adopt those reasonable use principles and left the
common law as it currently stands.
The court also noted that the legislature previously created an
exception to the old dominion rule. This exception created liability
where a landowner withdraws groundwater in excess of single-family
household purposes interfering with his neighbor's preexisting
household groundwater use. However, this exception did not apply
here since the Maddockses have no preexisting household
groundwater use.
Since the court declined to abandon the old dominion rule, they
found the trial court had correctly applied Maine law.
Shana Smilovits

Trask v. Public Util. Conm'n, 731 A.2d 430 (Me. 1999) (holding that
several cities located near a water utility's dam had right of first refusal
to purchase the dam).
In 1982, the Gardiner Water District ("District") constructed a
hydroelectric facility at the New Mills Dam ("Dam") site to generate
power. The Dam operated under a power purchase contract with the
Central Maine Power Company ("CMPC"), until the CMPC bought out
the contract. Subsequently, the District surrendered the Dam's
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission license, and the District no
longer utilized the Dam. By September 1997, the District began steps
to abandon the Dam pursuant to the Maine Dam Abandonment Act.
The statute required the District to consult with municipalities, local
landowners and state agencies to discover whether any of them desired
to purchase the dam. The District did not locate a buyer until George
Trask offered to purchase the Dam in March 1998. Several concerned
citizens filed objections with the Public Utilities Commission
("Commission") subsequent to this offer. The Commission decided
that, pursuant to its own rules and a separate state statute ("section
6109") governing sales of water utility property, the District's
acceptance of Trask's offer was subject to a right of first refusal held by
the City of Gardiner and several local towns. The Commission decided
that the municipalities had this right since the property for sale was
greater than five acres, as required by section 6109. The Commission
included the Dam, the land on which it sits, and the water rights in
terms of flowage in order to find the total acreage of the property.
The Commission included flowage, since it determined that the
District proposed to transfer not only the Dam, but any water rights it
possessed.
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Trask appealed the judgment of the Commission to the Supreme
Court of Maine, arguing that: (1) the Commission committed an error
of law by measuring flowage in terms of acreage; and (2) that a conflict
existed between the Dam Abandonment Act and the Maine statute
relating to the sale of water utility property requiring the Commission
to give precedence to the Abandonment Act.
The court addressed the first issue by stating that the purpose of
section 6109 was to "govern the sale or transfer by a consumer-owned
water utility of land or property owned by that water utility .... "
Under this statute, a municipality has the right of first refusal to
purchase any land that lies within its boundaries and is offered for sale
under the statute. The property that is subject to the statute is defined
as "any land or property owned by a water utility... [which] contains
greater than five contiguous acres."
The court defined flowage rights as "in the nature of an easement
appurtenant," which is an easement that is incapable of existing
separate from the land to which it is connected. Since easements were
included in statutory definitions of "sale" and "land," and since section
6109 required a minimum threshold in acres, the court found that the
Commission was correct to measure flowage in terms of acreage. The
court stated that the legislative history supported the Commission's
interpretation and that other jurisdictions also referred to flowage
rights in terms of acreage. It concluded that it was inconsistent to
ensure that a city had an opportunity to preserve interests in
shorefront property without a corresponding right in the dam
property. The public value of the shorefront property is eliminated
without the dam.
As to Trask's second argument, the court found that the Dam
Abandonment Act and section 6109 could be read in harmony with
each other and that the two statutes were not conflicting. The Dam
Abandonment Act stated that a dam owner should follow the
procedures set out in the Dam Act until locating a prospective buyer,
thus implementing section 6109.
Stephanie Pickens
MARYLAND
Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 723 A.2d 440 (Md. 1999) (holding
that the County Council did not support its decision to deny a
developer a growth allocation with substantial evidence).
Bucktail, LLC, a company formed to acquire and to develop land,
intended to build homes on ninety-three acres of land located near
the town of St. Michaels, Maryland. Of the ninety-three acres, twenty
were zoned as rural residential. However, the remaining seventy-three
were located within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection
Program's resource conservation area, restricting construction to one
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home per twenty acres in areas that contained naturally dominated
environments. The zoning allowed Bucktail to construct only three
homes.
To increase the number of homes it could build, Bucktail applied
for a growth allocation with the Talbot County Planning Commission.
If approved, the growth allocation would have changed the overlay
zoning from a resource conservation area to a limited development
area and would have changed the underlying zoning from rural
conservation to rural residential.
The new zoning would allow
Bucktail to build fourteen homes.
The Planning Commission compared Bucktail's application to
statutory critical area criteria, which minimizes damage to water quality
and to natural habitats. The Planning Commission approved and
recommended that the County Council approve Bucktail's application.
In conformance with statutory mandates, the County Council
introduced a bill and opened the application for public hearings.
After the public hearing, the Council voted four to one against the bill.
The Council found that Bucktail's growth allocation did not comply
with all the critical area criteria. The Council denied Bucktail's
application for the growth allocation.
Bucktail sued the Council for denying application. Neighboring
property owners intervened as defendants. The circuit court found
that substantial evidence supported the Council's decision. Bucktail
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals where it argued that
substantial evidence did not support the Council's denial of the
rezoning, suggesting that the Council acted as a quasi-judicial entity.
The Council summarized its act as legislative and immune from
challenge.
The court determined that the Council's ultimate decision denying
the rezoning remained legislative. However, it ruled that the process of
applying the standards to particular facts remained judicial.
The court held that the Council's judicial actions were not
supported by substantial evidence on the record, stating that the
agency needed to have stated reasons for its decision. Thus, the court
held that the Council did not advise Bucktail of the deficient facts and
circumstances within the application.
Madoline Wallace
MINNESOTA
Pelican Group of Lakes Improvement Dist. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Natural Resources, 589 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
the Department of Natural Resources had no duty to hold a contested
permit hearing for activities occurring above the high water level of
Cormorant Lakes).
Pelican Group of Lakes Improvement District ("Pelican Group") is
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a lake improvement district and a property owners' association.
Pelican Group questioned the authority of Cormorant Lakes
Watershed District ("Cormorant Lakes") to discharge water from
Cormorant Lakes into Pelican Lakes without a permit. Therefore,
Pelican Group sought a temporary restraining order, temporary
injunction, and writ of mandamus compelling the Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") to conduct permit
proceedings on a project involving water above the ordinary high
water level of Cormorant Lakes.
Cormorant Lakes do not have sufficient natural drainage outlets.
In the past, drainage was accomplished through a thirty-six inch
culvert that led from the Cormorant Lakes into Pelican Lakes. In
1997, the culvert was expanded to forty-eight inches. In May 1998,
Cormorant Lakes filed an application with DNR seeking approval of a
new outflow structure replacing the forty-eight inch culvert so that its
bottom level was at the ordinary high level of the Cormorant Lakes.
This new structure would increase the outflow from Cormorant Lakes
from 5.14 c.f.s. to 22 c.f.s. DNR determined no permits were required
for this project. Pelican Group challenged DNR's decision claiming
DNR had a duty to hold a contested permit hearing under Minnesota
law.
The question before the court was whether the Commissioner of
Natural Resources had a clear duty to hold permit proceedings.
Traditionally, DNR declined to make permit decisions regarding
deposits of surplus water such as flood waters or deposits of surplus
lake waters. As a matter of policy, DNR "focuses its protection efforts
on activities occurring below the ordinary high water levels of public
waters that meet the statutory definition of public water under
Minnesota law."
Under the premise that a reviewing court should give great weight
to an agency's interpretation, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held
that DNR was not under a duty to require a permit in this situation
and Pelican Group was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. The court
found Pelican Group lacked an entitlement to mandamus and,
therefore, declined to review whether the appellants were beneficially
interested parties or had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
form of an action for damages. The court also declined to explore
respondent's challenge that Pelican Group lacked standing.
Anna Litaker
Town of Fayal v. City of Eveleth, 587 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. App. 1999)
(holding that Fayal did not have express statutory authority to
condemn Eveleth's public property as private property, and Fayal did
not have implied authority to take Eveleth's public property under
consistent use doctrine).
The Town of Fayal ("Fayal") and the City of Eveleth ("Eveleth")
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entered into a contract providing Fayal residents with water. Under
the terms of the contract, Eveleth received water lines from Fayal in
exchange for Eveleth's promise to maintain the lines and provide fire
hydrants and water to Fayal residents. Since 1991, Fayal disputed
Eveleth's water rates, hydrant rental fees, and water service
maintenance.
In 1996, Fayal terminated all of Eveleth's water
contracts, stopped paying hydrant rental fees, and received water from
another city. In 1997, Fayal completed constructing water lines from
the City of Gilbert. Fayal constructed new lines and offered to buy
Eveleth's to prevent duplicating lines to Fayal's new lines linking it to
Gilbert. In November 1997, Fayal disconnected Eveleth's water supply
to Fayal customers and provided service using Gilbert water.
To acquire complete ownership of the water system in Fayal, Fayal
Township petitioned to condemn Eveleth's water lines, hydrants, and
appurtenant easements lying within Fayal's borders. Eveleth moved to
dismiss the petition but the district court concluded that Fayal had the
authority to condemn Eveleth's property under its power of eminent
domain. The court also concluded that Fayal had an implied right to
condemn Eveleth's property because Fayal's proposed use was not
substantially inconsistent with Eveleth's use of the property.
Additionally, the court held the taking was necessary for the public
purpose of providing a cost-efficient water supply system to Fayal
residents. Eveleth appealed.
The issues on appeal were: (1) whether Fayal had the statutory
authority to condemn Eveleth's water lines under either its express
grant to take private property, or under its general grant of eminent
domain authority; and (2) whether Fayal had the implied right to
condemn public property based on the consistent use doctrine.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a government entity
may not, as a general rule, condemn public property unless such
authority is expressly or implicitly granted by statute. The court
reasoned that since supplying electricity was a public use, supplying
water was also a public use, especially since the legislature had
empowered municipalities to provide waterworks systems. The court
stated that as a general rule, public property, unlike private property,
could not be condemned, unless expressly or impliedly granted by
statute. Under Minnesota statute, Fayal's grant of eminent domain
contained no express authority to take public property. The court also
held that Fayal had no implied power to condemn. Therefore,
Eveleth's water lines and related property were not subject to
condemnation under either Fayal's express grant to take private
property, or under its general grant of eminent domain authority.
The court next addressed whether Fayal could condemn under the
consistent use doctrine. The court applied the general rule that
property already devoted to a public use cannot be condemned for an
identical use in another party's hands, unless the power to make such
a second appropriation is expressly granted, or arises from necessary
implication. The court found that Fayal did not have an implied right
based on consistent use. Fayal's proposed use was necessarily
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inconsistent with Eveleth's use. Fayal's proposed use was identical to
Eveleth's existing use, and condemnation would destroy Eveleth's
existing use.
The court held that the exception allowing
municipalities to take property if a greater public use and benefit
would result from purely public ownership or operation did not apply
in this case. The exception was not applicable because the only
difference is change in ownership, not increased benefit. Therefore,
the court held that Fayal had neither express nor implied authority to
condemn Eveleth's water lines.
Sommer Poole

MISSISSIPPI
Winters v. City of Columbus, 735 So. 2d 1104 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)
(upholding City's condemnation of private property under the state
"quick take" statute for the purpose of a drainage project).
This case is an appeal from the decision of the Lowndes County
Special Court of Eminent Domain upholding the exercise of the City
of Columbus' ("City") power of eminent domain over private land
under the Mississippi "quick take" statute. The City, after being unable
to obtain the property rights necessary to construct a drainage project
designed to alleviate flooding and encourage development, initiated
condemnation proceedings against private landowners, the Winters.
After the trial court found that the City could legally take immediate
possession of the land for the purpose of the drainage project, the
Winters appealed on the grounds that: (1) the City did not establish
the project constituted a public necessity or public use; and (2) the
City did not prove that irreparable harm would result if it did not
receive immediate possession of the property.
Under the "quick take" statute, a city, in exercising its power of
condemnation, may take immediate possession of private property if it
can establish two factors. First, that the intended use of the property is
a public necessity or public use. Second, that following the normal
eminent domain procedures will result in irreparable harm and delay.
Absent clear abuse of discretion or fraud, a city's determination that a
project is necessary for the public welfare is a valid exercise of its
legislative power. Thus, the party challenging a city's condemnation
action bears the burden of showing that a proposed project is not a
public necessity.
On appeal, the Winters challenged the legal sufficiency of the
City's description of the affected property in its resolution. The
Winters also alleged that the City Council abused its discretion in
pursuing the project by succumbing to threats of legal action by
property owners if the City did not address flooding on their land.
However, the City's resolution clearly identified and described the
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land necessary for the project and clearly stated that the project would
"enable future development and growth." Absent the presentation at
trial of supporting evidence to the contrary, the trial judge
appropriately decided these issues in favor of the City.
The Winters also argued that because the drainage project would
clearly benefit many private landowners, the project could not be
considered a public use, therefore, the project was not an appropriate
cause of a condemnation action. The Winters argued that as a result
of the classification of this project by the City as a mere "drainage"
project and not a "flood" control project, the primary purpose was not
a public use. However, the court did not accept this distinction and
instead noted that the incidental private benefit that may result from
the taking of property for a primarily public use will not defeat the
taking. Evidence established that the drainage project may also
constitute a flood control project. Thus, whether the project corrected
disastrous flooding conditions or less significant drainage problems,
the project was appropriately deemed a public use.
The final issue appealed was the City's entitlement to immediate
possession of the property under the state "quick-take" statute. The
"quick-take" statute allows a city to take immediate possession of
property when it proves that it would suffer "irreparable harm and
delay" if regular eminent domain proceedings were followed. At trial,
all parties agreed that a loss of government funding, as a result of
delay, could meet this statutory requirement. However, contradictory
evidence presented at trial as to whether the City would lose its
funding if the project did not begin within a certain time frame,
necessitated a finding by the trial judge as to what evidence she
believed more reliable. This court upheld the trial judge's conclusion
that the City could possibly lose its funding unless work began within
as short a time period as reasonable.
Thus, the court held that the City had proven the requisite public
necessity and public use of the drainage project and the possibility of
irreparable harm resulting if the project proceeded through the
course of a lengthy normal eminent domain proceeding. Therefore,
the court deemed the City entitled to immediate possession of the
property under the state "quick take" statute.
Lucinda K Henriksen
MONTANA
Barnes v. Thompson Falls, 979 P.2d 1275 (Mont. 1999) (finding that a
statutorily authorized activity or facility cannot be a nuisance unless
the plaintiff shows that the defendant exceeded it statutory authority
or that the defendant was negligent in carrying out its statutory
authority, resulting in a qualified nuisance).
In 1978, Sally Barnes purchased a duplex in Thompson Falls,
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Montana. The basement door was level with the alley behind the
house. Barnes began to experience flooding problems. In the early
1980's, the city established a municipal sewer system and installed a
storm drain in the alley behind Barnes' home. While this solved the
flooding problem for a time, a regraveling project, which heightened
the alley's surface, and the expansion of a highway through the city
caused further flooding. By 1993, the problem caused Barnes to file a
complaint with the city. Thompson Falls responded by replacing the
existing storm drain line and chip-sealing the alley. Finally, in 1996, a
heavy rainstorm caused the storm drain line to backup. Run-off
pooled in the alley and flooded the basement with three inches of
caustic sludge. Barnes filed suit alleging that the city negligently
designed and maintained the sewer and storm drain system, and that
the system constituted a private nuisance.
The district court denied Barnes' request to instruct the jury on
nuisance.
Therefore, the jury decided the case based only on
Thompson Falls' negligence. The jury found the defendant not liable.
Barnes appealed this decision on the grounds that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on nuisance.
Thompson Falls argued that the statute specifically authorized the
nuisance alleged by Barnes and that she could only prevail on her
theory of nuisance by proving negligence.
The primary issue facing this court concerned whether a plaintiff
could bring a nuisance action against a defendant engaged in a
statutorily authorized activity when Montana statutes indicated that
such activity should not "be deemed a nuisance." The court first
examined Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls. Wilhelm held that where a
statutorily authorized activity existed, the plaintiffs, in order to prevail,
must prove that the acts complained of were either wholly outside of
statutory authorization or so negligently performed as to constitute a
nuisance.
The court determined that Wilhelm recognized the
difference between an absolute nuisance (where negligence is
immaterial) and a qualified nuisance (which is predicated on
negligence).
The court then looked at California law, the basis of the Montana
statute. California courts have recognized that where an activity was
authorized by statute and could not be a nuisance, the manner in
which the activity is performed may constitute a nuisance. The court
also noted that a lawful action might become a nuisance by reason of
its negligent performance. The court then held that, under Montana
law, statutorily authorized activities were not a nuisance unless the
plaintiff: (1) could show that the defendant acted wholly outside of its
statutory authority or: (2) could prove a qualified nuisance by averring
negligent design, construction, operation or maintenance.
Applying the facts to the law, the court ruled that Barnes had not
shown that Thompson Falls' activities were outside of its statutory
authority. Barnes' only remedy relied on her ability to prove the city
was negligent in its design, construction, operation, or maintenance of
the storm drain line. Based on the jury's finding of no negligence, the
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court concluded that Thompson Falls was not negligent in its
operation or maintenance of the storm drain line behind Barnes'
duplex. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision.
Karina Serkin

NEWJERSEY
Bubis v. Kassin, 733 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(holding that an express easement was not automatically extinguished
when the easement area was below the mean high water line and that
when the easement was below the mean high water line the public
trust doctrine applied).
In 1883, developers prepared and subsequently recorded a
subdivision map for the seaside community of Loch Arbour (know
known as the Village of Loch Arbour). The 183 lots on the map
contained a number of east-west streets that terminated at the beach.
The most easterly north-south street on the map was an unnamed
street running along an area described as "Bluff," which immediately
adjoined an area described as "Beach." As the developers sold the lots,
the deeds conveyed not only the designated lots to the property owner,
but also an easement which was described as "on, over and across a
certain strip of land, being a part of Beach and Bluff, as shown on the
aforesaid Map of Loch Arbour ......
The Plaintiffs owned homes on inland lots on Edgemont Avenue,
which was one of the east-west streets shown on the map. Plaintiff
Bubis' home was directly across the street from defendant Kassin's
eight oceanfront lots, which were on either side of Edgemont Avenue,
bordered to the west by Ocean Place and to the east by the unnamed
street shown on the 1883 map. Kassin purchased its lots in 1995, and
shortly thereafter created a twelve to fourteen foot high sand berm
along the westerly border using a bulldozer.
Plaintiffs appealed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs'
easement was extinguished because the easement area was below the
mean high water line. Plaintiffs also appealed the dismissal of its claim
that Kassin's sand berm interfered with plaintiffs' right to an
unobstructed view of the Atlantic Ocean and that Kassin's six-foot
fence violated a restrictive covenant.
The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's
finding that all of the area described as Beach and Bluff on the 1883
map was below the mean high water line. However, the court found
that the deeds to plaintiffs' predecessors in title conveyed implied
private easements over Edgemont Avenue to afford access to the beach
and the ocean. The erosion of the Beach and Bluff did not extinguish
those easements.
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When land was sold with reference to a map on which lots and
streets were delineated, the purchaser acquired an implied right of way
over the streets. The scope of the implied right included the intention
at the time. In most circumstances, only use of the streets shown on a
map that was necessary and useful for the beneficial enjoyment of the
lot conveyed was a right of way or access from or to some public
highway. However, if the circumstances surrounding the conveyance
indicated that a more expansive right of way was necessary to obtain
the full beneficial enjoyment of the lot, courts would recognize
whatever required implied right of access to achieve the conveyance's
intent. Additionally, such a sale of lots on which streets are delineated
constituted a dedication of the streets to the public, whether a
municipality accepts or vacates the dedication.
Here, plaintiffs' predecessors in title purchased lots in a planned
development immediately adjoining the Atlantic Ocean. Any person
acquiring those lots could reasonably assume that one of the benefits
of property ownership was convenient access to the beach and ocean
by means of this street network. The express easement over Beach and
Bluff indicated the developers' intent.
Additionally, the court concluded that the erosion of Beach and
Bluff did not extinguish plaintiffs' private rights of access to the beach
and ocean. The word "beach" was commonly understood to refer to
the area between the low and high water lines. It was reasonable to
assume that the parties to the original conveyances contemplated that
a portion of the land subject to the express easement over Beach was
below the mean high water line.
The mean high water line delineated the boundary between public
and private land and the upland owner did not own the land below the
mean high water line. When the area designated as Beach and Bluff
on the map remained below the mean high water line, plaintiffs' right
to use the beach area was governed by the public trust doctrine. If the
mean high water line shifted eastward due to accretion, plaintiffs'
express easement over the Beach and Bluff was revived.
Because the trial court found the easement extinguished, it did not
reach the question of remedies. The court remanded the case to
afford the parties the opportunity to present evidence or arguments
for remedies.
The court found no merit in plaintiffs' argument of inconsistency
between the Loch Arbor beach fence ordinance and the restrictive
covenant. However, the court stated plaintiffs could assert a claim that
Kassin or its predecessor in title erected fences violating the restrictive
covenant that prohibited any fence more than four feet in height
within fifty feet of Edgemont Avenue and Ocean Place. By remanding
the case, the court permitted plaintiffs to pursue their claim that
Kassin's fence violates the restrictive covenant.
The court dismissed plaintiffs' claim that Kassin's sand berm
interfered with plaintiffs' right to an unobstructed view of the ocean.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Department of Environmental Protection
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regulations adopted under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act was
misplaced. The regulations stated that coastal development adjacent
to all coastal waters must provide "[a]ccess to the waterfront to the
maximum extent practicable, including both visual and physical
access." The court held the regulation did not impose an absolute
prohibition against oceanfront development that interfered with the
view of inland property owners.
ElaineSoltis

NEW YORK
United Water New Rochelle, Inc. v. City of New York, 687 N.Y.S.2d
576 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that contract provisions allowing the
City to unilaterally discontinue water delivery to utility were
unenforceable, contract provisions govern City's obligation to
chlorinate water, and City is not entitled to recompense for the value
of water they discarded in order to fulfill their obligations).
United Water New Rochelle ("United Water"), a privately owned
public utility, and Briarcliff, a municipal corporation, supplied water to
residents and businesses within its borders. New York City ("City") and
its administrative agency, the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP"), oversaw and administered New York's statewide water system.
The City and DEP controlled much of the water flowing through New
York's system of rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and aqueducts, including the
Catskill and Croton Aqueducts. The City and DEP issued permits to
United Water and Briarcliff allowing them to tap into the Croton and
Catskill Aqueducts. United Water and Briarcliff received most of its
water from these aqueducts.
The City's contract with United Water provided for partial chloride
treatment of the water from the Croton Aqueduct. Briarcliff's contract
with the City did not create an obligation for the City to chlorinate the
water. The contracts specified that both United Water and Briarcliff
were responsible for final chlorination at their own facilities. In July
1998, the DEP notified Briarcliff and United Water that it intended to
shut down the aqueducts during September, the peak demand period
of the year, in order to make repairs and provide better quality water.
The health and safety risks to residents as a result of a prolonged
shutdown caused United Water and Briarcliff concern.
United Water and Briarcliff sought declaratory and injunctive
relief regarding the City's ability to shutdown the aqueduct. They
argued that they were contractually entitled to receive potable water
and requested the court to determine whether the City was obligated
to chlorinate water in the aqueduct. The City counterclaimed to
recover the value of potable water that United Water and Briarcliff
discarded. The City agreed to continue supplying potable water in the
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aqueduct until the matters were resolved. The parties then sought a
judicial determination of their rights in order to avoid future conflict
and litigation.
The court considered: (1) whether the contractual provisions
allowing the City to unilaterally discontinue water delivery were
unenforceable and invalid as contrary to public policy; (2) the City's
obligations concerning the chlorination of the water in the Croton
Aqueduct for United Water's and Briarcliff's use; and (3) whether
United Water or Briarcliff was unjustly enriched by discarded water.
The court held that the contract provision allowing the City to
unilaterally discontinue delivery of potable water to United Water and
Briarcliff was unenforceable and invalid on public policy grounds.
The courts will not enforce contracts that injuriously affect the public
interest.
The court recognized that the City could not deny
applications from municipal corporations and water districts to tap
into its system, but could establish reasonable rules and regulations
governing the means by which the water was taken and the quantity.
The court reasoned that because United Water and Briarcliff had
limited alternative water sources and water storage capacity, a shortage
during the peak demand period could pose severe health and safety
risks for the communities served.
The court next considered whether the City was obligated to
chlorinate water in the Croton Aqueduct. The court held that the City
was not required to chemically treat the water as a condition of the
State's delegation of eminent domain power. The court stated that the
issue was one of cost, not public policy, and that unlike the obligations
to permit access to and delivery of water, the City's obligations to
chlorinate was established by the parties in the terms of their contracts.
The court determined that according to United Water's permit,
the City was contractually bound to partially chlorinate the water
available from the aqueduct. Because of the provision, United Water
was not unjustly enriched, and not liable to the City for the cost of
water discarded in order to fulfill the City's contractual obligations.
Briarcliff, however, had no contractual provision requiring the City to
chlorinate the water made available to them. Briarcliff asserted that
the City could have provided a reduced volume of potable water
without waste. The court remanded to determine whether Briarcliff
was liable to the City for discarded water, and if so, how much it owed.
Sommer Poole

Vinciguerra v. State of New York, 693 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1999) (holding
that head wall and culvert constructed partially on landowners'
property by State was not a de facto appropriation, and resulted in
acquisition of a prescriptive drainage easement).
Claimants purchased eight parcels of vacant, undeveloped land
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between January 1973 and November 1990. A concrete head wall and
culvert, part of a drainage system for a nearby state highway that had
been constructed by the State of New York ("State") in 1948,
encroached approximately two to two and one-half feet on claimants'
land, and directed water across claimants' property.
Claimants did not discover the head wall or culvert until 1989,
when they began grading and filling the property for construction of a
strip mall. A separate, visible stream flowed across the land and
accumulated in an area near the head wall and culvert, thereby
covering them when the steam flowed, purportedly the reason that
claimants never noticed the head wall and culvert. The claimants
never surveyed the property prior to their purchase in 1948, however,
they were aware of the ditch that carried the stream of water.
Claimants admit that the stream ran intermittently over the property,
and was dry at the time of the purchase of the property.
Claimants requested that the State redirect the waters flowing onto
the property as a result of the head wall and culvert. The State
declined, claiming that since the drainage system had been
uninterrupted in use since 1908, a prescriptive drainage easement
burdened the claimants' property. Claimants commenced an action
seeking damages for trespass, de facto appropriation, and prima facie
tort. The Court of Claims dismissed the prima facie tort claim on
summary judgment, and found that the State's action constituted a de
facto appropriation, not a trespass, for which the statute of limitations
had expired. The Court of Claims dismissed the claimants' action, and
claimants appealed.
The court addressed two issues: first, whether the State's action was
a constitutional taking which constituted a de facto appropriation, and
second, whether the State had gained a prescriptive easement, thereby
barring a claim for continuous trespass. The court held that the
State's actions did not reach the level of a constitutional taking and
therefore, was not a de facto appropriation of the claimants' property
requiring compensation. The court further ruled that the State
established a prescriptive easement for drainage over the claimants'
property.
The court first discussed the applicable scope for reviewing Court
of Claims holdings. The court stated that the scope was not limited to
determining whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence,
but that the court could factually assess whether the Court of Claims
granted a judgment warranted by the evidence, giving due deference
to trial court's decision.
In addressing the first substantive issue, the court stated that to
constitute a de facto appropriation, the government's intrusion on the
citizen's property and interference with the owner's property rights
must reach a degree that amounts to a constitutional taking requiring
compensation. The distinction between such a taking and trespass
"lies in the egregiousness of the trespass and whether it is of such
intensity as to amount to a taking." The court further noted that if the
interference with property rights was only temporary, casual, or

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

intermittent, without permanent use or appropriation or destruction
of an existing right, only a mere trespass has occurred.
The court, based on these principles, found that the head wall and
culvert, and resulting intermittent surface water runoff from the state
highway, at most, hampered and complicated the claimant's
development plans, but were not so egregious as to amount to a
constitutional taking. Therefore, the State's action did not constitute a
de facto appropriation.
The court distinguished the impacts on the claimants' property
from other cases where the court had held a taking had occurred.
These cases involved the redirection of surface water to deprive a
litigant's access to thirty-five acres and destroy its value as a trout
stream; the appropriation of land for use in conjunction with an
adjacent landfill by installation of fencing, a trash compactor, and toll
gate, and erection of signs indicating that the property was a town
landfill; and placement of a drainage ditch occupying approximately
2.46 acres of claimants' land.
The court then assessed whether the State's action amounted to a
continuous trespass that could be barred by creation of a prescriptive
easement. The court stated the rule that a prescriptive easement is
established through clear and convincing evidence that use of the
subject property was adverse, open and notorious, and continuous and
uninterrupted for the prescribed period. The court found that the
State met this standard.
First, the court held that discharge of the surface water from the
highway, and placement of the head wall and culvert were adverse to
the claimants, as well as continuous and uninterrupted for the
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period in New York is ten years,
and the State had completed the head wall and culvert in 1948.
Second, the court ruled that the State's infringement on the
claimants' property was both open and notorious. The court found
that undisputed testimony revealed that at certain times during
claimants' ownership of the property, the stream near the head wall
and culvert was dry, making the head wall and culvert visible upon
inspection. Additional testimony revealed that when water ran onto
the property, the ditch in front of the claimants' property was
inundated with water, and a catch basin became openly visible. The
court reasoned that these facts, coupled with claimants' admission that
they never inspected the ditch and failed to survey the property prior
to purchase, supported the open and notorious nature of the State's
infringement. The court concluded that the State therefore had a
prescriptive drainage easement barring claimants' continuous trespass
claim.
Steven Marlin
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NORTH CAROLINA
Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, No. COA98-961,
1999 WL 506986 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs'
nonconstitutional claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation, holding that since
plaintiffs previously received a variance permit, they were precluded
from challenging the constitutional validity of permanent erosion
control structure rules, and that plaintiffs were not deprived of due
process).
Shell Island sought permits to construct various hardened erosion
control structures to protect Shell Island Resort from the southward
migration of Mason's Inlet. The North Carolina Coastal Resources
Commission denied their application relying on the "hardened
structure rule." Shell Island filed a complaint seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, but the trial court dismissed the claims for failing to
exhaust administrative remedies and for failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
Shell Island challenged the North Carolina Coastal Resources
Commission's "hardened structure rule" and variance provision. The
rule stated that "[p]ermanent erosion control structures may cause
significant adverse impacts on the value and enjoyment of adjacent
properties or public access to and use of the ocean beach, and,
therefore, are prohibited."
Shell Island asserted both constitutional and nonconstitutional
claims. In addressing Shell Island's nonconstitutional claims, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded the court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that when the
legislature provides administrative remedies, those remedies must first
be exhausted before pursuing recourse with the courts. Shell Island
failed to pursue any of the mandatory options available to them under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Coastal Area
Management Act ("CAMA") for timely review of the permit and
variance denials.
Shell Island argued that it should not have to exhaust
administrative remedies under the APA and CAMA because the relief
they provided was inadequate, but the court stated that Shell Island
failed to establish their inadequacies. The court also held the relief
provided by the APA and CAMA commensurate with Shell Island's
claims, acknowledging that if Shell Island prevailed it may have been
entitled to a determination that the defendants acted beyond their
authority or the regulations were invalid. Furthermore, it may have
been entitled to a variance or allowed to construct a hardened erosion
control structure. Accordingly, the court dismissed this claim.
Shell Island also challenged the constitutionality of CAMA and the
promulgation of its various rules and regulations. It claimed a
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violation of equal protection and due process, and sought just
compensation for taking their property.
In such a challenge,
administrative remedies are deemed inadequate and exhaustion of
those remedies is not required. The trial court dismissed the
constitutional claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
The court of appeals noted that because Shell Island benefited
from the same rules they were challenging, they could not question
their constitutionality. In September 1997, Shell Island applied for
and received a variance permit to construct a sandbag revetment to
protect Shell Island Resort, under rules they now challenge. Shell
Island acknowledged in its complaint that it sought, received, and took
advantage of a variance granted pursuant to the challenged statute.
The court of appeals stated that "one who voluntarily proceeds under
a statute and claims benefits thereby conferred will not be heard to
question its constitutionality in order to avoid its burdens." The court
further stated that even if a benefit rose out of necessity, or involuntary
acceptance, Shell Island was still precluded from challenging the
statutes' constitutionality. Thus, the plaintiffs could not challenge the
constitutionality of the hardened structure rules and their regulatory
scheme.
The court of appeals also upheld the trial court's decision to
dismiss Shell Island's takings claims. Shell Island alleged that the
hardened structure rules effected a regulatory taking of property
withoutjust compensation. The court stated that Shell Island failed to
identify, in the complaint, any legally cognizable property interest
taken by the defendants.
The court noted that Shell Island's
allegations stemmed from the "natural migration of Mason's Inlet, and
[Shell Island] based their takings claim on their need for a
'permanent solution to the erosion that threatens its property' and the
premise that 'the protection of property from erosion is an essential
right of property owners.'
In addressing Shell Island's takings claim, the court found no legal
support for the claim.
Furthermore, Shell Island provided no
persuasive authority that "a littoral or riparian landowner has a right to
erect hardened structures in statutorily designated areas of
environmental concern to protect their property from erosion and
migrations." The court stated that a tract of land bordering a body of
water is subject to gradual and imperceptible change or shifting and
what is left remains the boundary line of the tract. Thus, the owner of
the riparian land loses title to the portions worn or washed away or
encroached by the water. Defendants' enforcement of the hardened
structure rules was merely incidental to the natural occurring events
that affect plaintiffs' property. Also, the court concluded that the
significant reduction in use/value of the Hotel was insufficient to
support a takings claim. Finally, the court concluded that because
Shell Island's takings claim failed, there was no need to address the
claim for inverse condemnation.
Anna Litaker
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NORTH DAKOTA

,

Graber v. Logan County Water Resource Bd., 598 N.W.2d 846 (N.D.
1999) (upholding Water Resources Board's findings that landowner
constructed a drain without required permit and was not exempted
from permit requirement, and that owner of adjacent land damaged
by drainage had standing to file a complaint).
David Graber ("Graber") owned farmland in Logan County, North
Dakota. A small wedand containing an outlet, and a channeled,
multi-culvert artificial drainage ditch lay northwest of this farmstead.
Graber claimed the ditch had been present in that location for many
years. Graber cleaned out the ditch in 1967 and 1994, and placed
culverts to create permanent access across the ditch in 1974 or 1975.
Water from the ditch flowed east and northeast across Graber's
property to farmland owned by his neighbor, Vernon Burkle
("Burkle").
In July 1995, Burkle filed a complaint with the Logan County
Water Resource Board ("Board"), alleging that water from Graber's
drain flooded his land and fences, and that livestock waste from
Graber's feedlot operations flushed down the drain onto his property,
polluting downstream waters, killing fish stocked in his slough, and
sickening his own livestock. The Board conducted an on-site
inspection of the ditch and its drainage, and ordered Graber to restore
the slough to its original level and fill the ditch.
Graber appealed the Board's order to the district court. Upon
remand, the Board dismissed Burkle's claim, stating that the complaint
failed to prove that construction of the drain did not occur prior to
1957, when the state law requiring a permit to construct a drain
became effective. The Board further held that work done on the drain
after 1957 was merely maintenance in nature and did not increase the
volume of water being discharge. Burkle appealed the Board's order.
Following a second hearing during which the parties presented
additional evidence, the Board ruled that construction of the drain
without a permit occurred after 1957, and the drain adversely affected
Burkle's property. The Board ordered Graber to close the drain.
Graber appealed, challenging the Board's closure order. The district
court found that the Board's decision was not arbitrary and capricious,
and affirmed. Graber appealed this decision.
This court held that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably in ordering Graber to close the drain. The court
addressed four issues on appeal: (1) whether Graber dug the drainage
ditch on his property, and therefore, needed a permit under the state
law which became effective in 1957; (2) whether state law exempted
Graber from the permit requirement because he dug the ditch under
state or federal supervision; (3) whether Burkle had standing to file a
complaint with the Board because he experienced adverse effects from
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an unauthorized drain; and (4) whether Graber had obtained a
prescriptive drainage easement over Burkle's land.
The court noted that the appeal of a local governing body's
decision under state law limits its scope of review. The court stated
that its function is to independently determine the propriety of the
Board's decision, without according any special deference to the
district court's decision, and that the Board's decision must be
affirmed unless the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably, or no substantial evidence supports the decision.
In addressing the first issue on appeal, the court noted that Graber
did not obtain a permit or flowage easements from downstream
landowners prior to working on the ditch in 1967 and 1994. However,
Graber claimed that state law did not require him to obtain a permit
because construction of the ditch occurred before the state statute
requiring drainage permits was enacted in July 1, 1957. Moreover, he
performed merely maintenance work on the ditch in 1967 and 1994.
The court stated that, "[t]he law in effect at the time a drain is
constructed controls." The court pointed out that testimony given by
several witnesses, including individuals who had previously leased the
farm or had been present on the property, established that no
drainage ditch existed on the property prior to July 1, 1957. The court
held that the Board therefore, had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably in finding that construction of the ditch occurred after
July 1, 1957, and thus, state law required a permit.
The court next addressed Graber's claim that state law exempted
him from the permit requirement because he had constructed a drain
"under the supervision of a state or federal agency." Graber and
his
father testified that in 1967, an agent from the local Soil Conservation
Service ("SCS") office surveyed the property to determine the bottom
of the lake and ditch, and in 1994, SCS had granted Graber permission
to clean out the ditch.
The court, however, reiterated that
"supervision" requires greater involvement in a drainage project
than
rendering mere technical assistance. The court concluded that the
Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in finding
that no supervision by a federal or state agency occurred to exempt
Graber from the permit requirement.
The third and fourth issues raised on appeal involved Graber's
challenge to Burkle's standing to file a complaint concerning the
impact of drainage on his property. The court pointed out that under
North Dakota law, only a landowner experiencing flooding or adverse
effects of an unauthorized drain constructed prior to January 1, 1975,
can file a complaint to the Board. Graber claimed that any adverse
effects experienced by Burkle were not the result of the drain, but of a
dam located downstream which blocked water back onto Burkle's
property. The court, however, noted that Board members conducted
an on-site inspection and observed water flowing from Graber's drain
onto Burkle's property. Burkle also testified that water began flowing
onto his property when Graber re-dug the drain in 1994, and that this
water flooded fifteen to twenty acres of his property, destroying fences,
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and killing grass. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the
Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in finding
that the drainage damaged Burkle's property, thereby giving him
standing.
The court also addressed Graber's claim that Burkle lacked
standing to file a complaint with the Board because Graber acquired a
prescriptive drainage easement over Burkle's property. The court
stated that a prescriptive easement on flooded land required
continuous and uninterrupted adverse use for the twenty-year
prescriptive period under state law. According to the court, the
Board's findings revealed that Graber failed to establish that drainage
over Burkle's property was continuous and uninterrupted for the
twenty years. Testimony from several individuals established that no
drainage occurred shortly after 1967 when Graber's father filled in the
ditch, and that no drainage onto Burkle's property occurred at all
from the 1970s until 1994, when Graber reopened the ditch.
Accordingly, the court held, Graber did not acquire a prescriptive
drainage easement over Burkle's property.
Steven Marlin

State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 592 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1999)
(holding that the ordinary high watermark of a river is determined
according to its current condition).
The State of North Dakota and Mills had competing interests in
sixty-two acres of shore zone along the Missouri River. Shore zone is
the area between the ordinary low watermark and the ordinary high
watermark of a river. North Dakota law gives the state property rights
up to the ordinary high watermark, and Mills owned the land above
that boundary. Mills asserted that he held exclusive rights to the
disputed shore zone because it was above the ordinary high watermark
of the river prior to the operation of the Missouri River dam system.
The State instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine
the parties' interests in the disputed land. In an earlier proceeding,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that the State and
Mills shared correlative, overlapping rights in the shore zone. Upon
remand, the trial court determined the Missouri River's ordinary high
watermark based on the river's current, post-dam condition. Mills
appealed this judgment contending that the trial court erred in not
assessing the River's ordinary high watermark according to its natural,
pre-dam state.
The specific issue on appeal was whether the ordinary high
watermark of a river should be determined by its current, artificial
condition or by its natural, pre-dam position. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's ruling by holding that the current water line
is the boundary line regardless of whether it has been affected by
natural or artificial changes. Thus, the court held that the ordinary
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high watermark of a river is determined based upon the current
condition of the river.
The supreme court concluded that its opinion coincided with case
law from other jurisdictions and public policy concerns. In particular,
the supreme court noted that the purpose underlying state ownership
of the beds of all its navigable waters is to protect the public's right of
navigation. Thus, the court found that any policy other than setting
the boundary at the current, post-dam waterline would yield absurd
results.
Vanessa L. Condra

OHIO
City of Northwood v. Wood County Reg'l Water & Sewer Dist., 711
N.E. 2d 1003 (Ohio 1999) (holding that a municipality may exercise
the power of eminent domain over public utility facilities of a regional
water and sewer district as long as such taking does not destroy the
existing public utility).
In 1992, by petition to the Common Pleas Court, several Ohio
municipalities formed the Wood County Regional Water and Sewer
District ("District"). The City of Northwood ("City"), however, elected
not to join the District as a result of an earlier study concluding the
City's best interests to own and operate its own water and sewer system
was more beneficial. In the meantime, the City's residents received
services from the District and many of the facilities owned and utilized
by the District in providing such services were located within the City.
In 1995, the City made an offer to purchase the District's facilities
located in the City. The District rejected the offer and, as a result, the
City announced its intent to appropriate the District's facilities within
the City.
The District responded by filing a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief preventing the City from accessing the District's utility
lines without authorization. Soon thereafter, the District filed a
second complaint seeking a declaratory judgment rendering the City's
proposed appropriation unlawful. In late 1995, the City filed a
petition for appropriation. The trial court ruled that the City could
appropriate the District's utility lines that served only City residents
and that the City had no authority to appropriate the District's main
lines passing through the City. Both the City and the District
appealed. The appellate court held that the City had neither the
constitutional nor statutory authority to appropriate the District's
property and that the City did not have the power to appropriate the
public utility facilities of another political subdivision.
The court allowed a discretionary appeal to decide the issue of
whether a municipality may exercise eminent domain over public

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

utility facilities owned and operated by a regional water and sewer
district.
The Utility Clause of the Constitution authorized
municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire
existing public utilities. Thus, the court concluded that the City, in
exercising its power of eminent domain over the District's facilities
within its boundaries, acted within the intended purpose of the Utility
Clause. However, a municipality may not exercise its power of
eminent domain over the property of another municipal corporation,
if the municipality's actions would either destroy the existing use or
interfere, leading to destruction of the use. The court broadly
interpreted this limitation making necessary the determination of
whether the proposed appropriation would interfere with the District
to such an extent that it would effectively lead to the destruction of the
District itself.
Although recognizing the existence of substantial evidence
regarding the effect of the proposed appropriation, because neither
the trial court nor the appellate court considered this issue clearly, the
court remanded the case for findings as to the effects of the City's
proposed appropriation of the District property. If the proposed
appropriation would result in the destruction of an existing public use
or the destruction, including economic destruction, of an existing
public utility operated by the District, the appropriation was
prohibited. If no such destructive effect was found, however, the City
would rightfully be exercising its power of eminent domain over an
existing public use.
Lucinda K Henriksen

OREGON
Kinross Copper Corp. v. State, 981 P.2d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the state's decision to deny plaintiff's NPDES permit
application did not effect an uncompensated taking of plaintiff's
unpatented mining claims).
In 1975, Amoco Minerals Company ("Amoco") staked unpatented
mining claims in the North Santiam River Subbasin in the Willamette
In 1977, the Oregon Environmental Quality
National Forest.
Commission ("EQC") promulgated the Three Basin Rule prohibiting
any new or increased waste discharges to the North Santiam River
Subbasin.
In 1989, Amoco leased the unpatented mining claims to the
plaintiff, Kinross Copper Corporation ("Kinross"). Two years later,
Kinross developed a plan of operations for a copper ore mining
project. The plan required Kinross to discharge wastewater and
groundwater pumped from the mine into the North Santiam
Subbasin. The plan included obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit under applicable state and
federal laws.
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In 1992, Kinross submitted an application for an NPDES permit to
the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). The
DEQ concluded that: (1) the discharge would not violate applicable
water quality standards; (2) no viable alternatives to discharging the
wastewater from the proposed mining operation existed; and (3)
without the NPDES permit, Kinross would be unable to develop and
operate its proposed copper mine. In 1995, however, the DEQ denied
the Kinross's application for an NPDES permit since the Three Basin
Rule prohibited any new discharges into the North Santiam River
Subbasin.
Kinross then brought inverse condemnation claims against the
state. Kinross alleged the state's denial of Kinross's permit application
reduced the value of its mining claims to zero, and constituted a
compensable taking under both the state and federal constitutions.
The state argued that because unpatented mining claims are subject to
state regulation, the plaintiff never had the right to develop its mining
claim in violation of state law.
The trial court entered judgment for the state. The court held
that the state's permit denial did not constitute a taking because
unpatented mining claims constitute a unique form of property right.
The court reasoned that this unique property right was subject to state
and federal regulations and was more appropriately analogized to a
contract right than subject to a condition subsequent.
On appeal, Kinross argued that the trial court erred by concluding
that the state was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that
Kinross' property was not taken under the state or federal
constitutions. In analyzing this issue, the court stated that two settled
principles of takings law applied. First, the court recognized that
under both state and federal constitutions, government actions
depriving property of all value without compensation is an
unconstitutional taking. Thus, the court found that under both the
Oregon and federal constitutions, property owners could maintain an
action for inverse condemnation against a government agency that has
taken action depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use of
the property.
The second applicable principle of takings law was that
governmental action could not be a taking if what the government
prohibited did not amount to a private property right in the first place.
Looking to United States Supreme Court precedent, the Oregon court
explained that regulations that deprive land of all economically
beneficial use will not give rise to takings liability if the inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not originally part of his title.
Kinross argued that it suffered a taking because it was denied the
right to mine copper as otherwise permitted by its unpatented mining,
claims. The court explained that the EQC did not prohibit Kinross
from mining, but rather prohibited the plaintiff from discharging
wastewater into the North Santiam River Basin. The court further
explained that Kinross carried the burden to show that it had a right to
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discharge wastewater into a state river. If Kinross did not have the
right to discharge water into the river basin, then Kinross could not
complain that it suffered an uncompensated taking.
Kinross then argued that EQC's denial of a permit to discharge
mining wastewater constituted a deprivation of a private property
right. The court stated that, historically, rights to use water in mining
operations were obtained as an incident of mining activity and that
competing claims to the use of the water was determined by the time
of actual appropriation of the water for use. The court noted that
Congress first recognized the rule of prior appropriation in the
Mining Act of 1866. The statute stated that rights to use water for
mining, obtained by prior possession, which are vested and recognized
by the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts, shall be
maintained and protected. Further, the court noted that although the
basic grant of unpatented mining claims originated in the Mining Law
of 1872, that law did not change the preexisting recognition of state
water rights rules pertaining to mining claims. However, the Desert
Land Act of 1877 did. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that, in
enacting the Desert Land Act of 1877, Congress effectively severed title
to all pubic land, not just desert lands, from title to the nonnavigable
waters on that land.
Moreover, in 1909, Oregon adopted the doctrine of prior
appropriation and established a comprehensive permit system for
appropriating water. Under the rule of prior appropriation, water
rights were determined not as an incident of land ownership, but as a
function of actual diversion of water to a recognized beneficial use.
Thus, the court found that no water rights were granted as part of an
unpatented mining claim. Water rights must be obtained as provided
in the water rights of the state in which the site of the claim is located.
Kinross next asserted that under current state water law, it was
entitled to use up to 5,000 gallons of ground water without a permit.
The court found that the Oregon statute permitted consumption of
ground water, but did not permit the discharge of anything into a state
river.
Finally, the court found that Kinross's takings claim was predicated
on the loss of the right to discharge mining wastes into the waters of
the state. Because this was a right Kinross never possessed, the court
held that the state's NPDES permit denial did not constitute an
uncompensated taking of property. Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's rulings.
Kris A. Zumalt
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Norden v. Oregon, 973 P.2d 910 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the
reviewable record is made in the circuit court for in other than
contested cases and the evidence supported the finding that spring
water would flow to creek if undiverted requiring user to obtain
permit).
Petitioner, Dorothy Norden, owned lands which bordered McKay
Creek in Umatilla County, Oregon. A spring flowed on the property
down a rock-lined channel until an irrigation ditch diverted one part
and the remainder flowed into a pond. A watermaster for the State of
Oregon's Water Resources Department ("Department") investigated
the property in 1994 and concluded that, if not for the diversions, the
water would continue to flow into McKay Creek and eventually into the
Umatilla River. He then issued an order informing Norden she could
not divert the water from the spring without first obtaining a water
rights permit.
Norden petitioned for judicial review of the order in circuit court
as an order in other than a contested case.
Norden and the
Department both submitted evidence about the property and the
water flow from the spring. The trial court found the spring would not
flow off Norden's land naturally and reversed the Department's order
for lack of substantial evidence. On appeal the issues included: (1) the
appellate court's scope of review, specifically whether this court could
consider the evidence produced at trial; and (2) whether the evidence
sustained the finding that spring water would flow to creek if
undiverted.
This court reversed the trial court and held that the record is made
in the circuit court for orders in other than in contested cases and that
the evidence sustained the finding that spring water would flow to the
creek if undiverted. The court looked at the Oregon Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") to determine the proper scope of review for
this case. The APA sets out different standards of review for orders
issued in contested cases and orders issued in other than contested
cases. Norden's situation fell under the second category. In other
than contested cases, an agency is not required to make its decision on
the basis of a record developed before decision. Additionally, the
proper avenue forjudicial review is to the circuit court rather than the
appellate court. This enables the circuit courts to develop an
evidentiary record against which to evaluate the agency's decision.
This court also cited several cases that supported its conclusion that an
appellate court could consider the evidence produced at trial. Thus,
the court found it could consider evidence produced at trial to address
the issues presented on appeal.
Oregon law requires a permit for a spring only if it produces
sufficient water to flow, undiverted, off of the land on which it arises,
whether onto the property of another or into another watercourse.
The Department found that Norden needed a permit for this reason.
The court then looked to see if substantial evidence existed to support
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the department's decision. Both sides presented testimony to support
their point. The court found substantial evidence that the spring
flowed in sufficient quantity and the ground was sufficiently saturated
that the water, if left undiverted, would make its way to McKay Creek.
Thus, Norden was required to obtain a permit to use water from the
spring.
Melinda B. Barton

PENNSYLVANIA
Lehigh Fals Fishing Club v. Andrejewski, 735 A.2d 718 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (holding that the Lehigh River in Pennsylvania is navigable,
therefore fishing club cannot claim a section of the river as private
property).
The Lehigh River transverses land owned by the Lehigh Falls
Fishing Club. In 1995, John Andrejewski began fishing on the section
of the Lehigh River that flows through the Fishing Club's private land.
Andrejewski accessed this section of the river by crossing over land coowned by his father. The Fishing Club attempted to eject Andrejewski,
claiming that the waters bisecting its land were private. Andrejewski
refused to leave, claiming he had a right to fish there because the
waters in question were navigable.
In Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth owns all navigable waters, and
navigable waters are thus open to the public. The Fishing Club sought
a declaration that the Lehigh River was not navigable, and therefore
was private property. The trial court determined that the Lehigh River
was navigable. The Fishing Club then appealed to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania.
The single issue on appeal was whether the Lehigh River was
navigable. The test for a river's navigability was whether a river was
navigable in fact. The Fishing Club submitted detailed evidence
concerning the depth and navigability of its particular section of the
river. However, nearly century old judicial decisions and legislative
declarations from the 19th Century indicated that the river was
previously considered navigable. The court decided to follow this
precedent for determining navigability in this case. Also, the court
concluded that rivers must be considered navigable as a whole. The
court refused to do a piecemeal analysis to determine whether a
particular section of the Lehigh River was navigable or not.
Subsequently, the court concluded the Lehigh River was navigable,
and affirmed the trial court's decision.
Kirk Waible
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SOUTH CAROLINA
Barnhill v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 511 S.E.2d 361 (S.C. 1999)
(holding an ordinance restricting jet-ski landing on a public beach
was within the city's police power, not preempted by state law, did not
violate a state constitutional right to access navigable waters, was not a
regulatory taking, and did not violate the equal protection clause).
Plaintiff-respondent, Bob Barnhill, operated a jet ski rental
business. The City of North Myrtle Beach enacted an ordinance
prohibiting launching and beaching jet skis between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m. from May 15 to September 15 annually on the beach where
Barnhill operated his business. This ordinance effectively denied
Barnhill's clientele the use of jet skis during the day throughout the
duration of the summer. Barnhill bought a declaratory judgment
action challenging the ordinance's validity and seeking an injunction
against its enforcement. A special referee, upon reviewing the case,
declared the ordinance invalid. The South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.
The supreme court addressed: (1) the purview of municipal police
power; (2) potential state statute preemption of the ordinance; (3)
potential inconsistencies between the ordinance and the state
constitution; (4) whether the ordinance constituted a regulatory
taking; and (5) the applicability of the equal protection clause.
When addressing the municipal police power argument, the
supreme court held that municipalities have broad powers to enact
ordinances promoting safety and that the exercise of the
municipality's police power in enacting the ordinance had a
reasonable relation to the protection of people on crowded beaches
during the summer.
The court held that state statutes do not preempt the ordinance.
The court determined that in order for a state statute to preempt a
municipal ordinance, the two must be inconsistent or irreconcilable.
The state statutes alleged by Barnhill to preempt the ordinance
addressed only activities "on the water of the state" and failed to
mention public beaches; therefore, the court held that the ordinance
was neither inconsistent nor irreconcilable with the laws of the state
because it addressed an area the state legislation failed to address.
After examining the language of the state constitution, the court
held that even though the constitution required public access to the
state's navigable waters, a municipality could constitutionally subject
The court interpreted
public access to reasonable regulation.
reasonable regulation as regulation rationally related to a legitimate
purpose. The court held that since some access remained, the
restriction was reasonable and the government's purpose of safety was
adequate to survive a constitutional challenge.
Additionally, the court held that a person does not have a private
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vested right in a particular use of government property and therefore
denied Barnhill's regulatory takings claim.
When addressing the equal protection claim, the court held that
an equal protection claim is actionable if a municipality intentionally
enforced a law discriminatorily. The court held the municipality did
not enforce this ordinance discriminatorily. The ordinance survived
all of Barnhill's challenges.
Amy W Beatie

TEXAS
Brainard v. State, No. 98-0578, 1999 WL 795545 (Tex. Oct. 7, 1999)
(holding that the doctrines of riparian ownership, such as accretion,
reliction, and erosion, apply to changes in a river's course due to
artificial as well as natural causes for deciding boundary disputes).
In 1962, the United States Bureau of Reclamation constructed the
Sanford Dam on the Canadian River to create a water supply for city
members and to provide regional flood controls. Three years after the
dam's completion, the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority
("CRMWA"), a state agency, took control of the dam. The dam
reduced the flow of river water and encouraged more vegetation in the
river's former riverbed.
Twenty years later, in 1985, the General Land Office ("GLO")
announced its intention to determine the historical gradient line prior
to the artificial changes caused by the dam. In 1987, the GLO sent a
position paper to the people who owned land along the river
("Landowners"), claiming the former streambed was the State's
property. The GLO's artificial change theory asserted that surveyors
marking the gradient boundary of the river need not consider
conditions on a river influenced by human activity, like the Sanford
Dam's construction. The Landowners disagreed with the State's
position. Although both parties agreed that the Landowners were
riparian owners and that the State owned the bed of the Canadian
River, each party sought a judicial declaration of the boundary
between the State's riverbed and Landowner's riparian tracts. The
parties also agreed that the gradient boundary methodology would
determine the line between public and private ownership along the
banks of a navigable stream.
The Landowners sued the State and the GLO to establish the
boundary of the Canadian River. Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment asking the trial court to rule on the correct survey
to mark the boundary. The GLO asked for a ruling based on the
artificial change theory, and the Landowners asked for the court to
consider the present conditions. The trial court rejected the State's
artificial change theory as a matter of law. The court held that the
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Landowners were entitled to the riparian land established by the
survey done under present conditions of the Canadian River, and not
as of a date before the Sanford Dam was built. The trial court awarded
the Landowners attorney's and surveyor's fees and found the State and
GLO actions unreasonable under the Frivolous Claims Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed the part of the judgment decreeing
Landowners' recovery of attorney's and surveyor's fees. It also held
that the trial court erred by holding the State's survey inadmissible.
The Court of Appeals thus reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for a factual determination of the correct gradient
boundary. Both parties filed petitions for review.
The Texas Supreme Court reinstated, in part, the trial court's
judgment declaring that the Landowners' survey correctly marked the
boundary between the State's riverbed and the riparian tracts. The
court held that determining which survey used the correct
methodology to mark the boundary was a question of law, not a
question of fact. Instead, the validity of the parties' conflicting surveys
required a determination of the validity of the artificial change theory
in light of: (1) the accepted method for determining the boundary
between state riverbed and riparian land; and (2) the traditional rules
of riparian ownership. Because the parties already agreed on the
gradient methodology, the Court determined the general rules of
riparian ownership.
The court followed the accepted rule in Texas that when the
margin or bed of a body of water that is the boundary of a tract of land
is gradually and imperceptibly changed or shifted by accretion,
reliction, or erosion, the margin or bed of the body of water, as so
changed, remains the boundary line of tract. Accretion is the process
of increasing real estate by the gradual and imperceptible disposition
by water of solid material, through the operation of natural causes so
as to cause that formerly submerged land to become dry. Accretion by
reliction is the gradual addition made to land by a recession of the
water, as when the water shrinks below the usual watermark.
The court also determined that the riparian rights to additions by
accretion or reliction were vested property rights. In addition, the
court made no distinction between naturally and artificially created
gains and losses to riparian land due to accretion, reliction, and
erosion. However, the court noted that if the riparian owner caused
the accretion herself or directly participated in the accretion, the
owner lost her rights to the accreted land. The court rejected the
artificial change theory in the context of an artificial structure that
merely affected the current or flow of a river so as to cause artificial
accretion. The court also rejected the State's argument that the
doctrine of avulsion applied to the changes created by the Sanford
Dam and did not to alter the boundary of the Canadian Riverbed.
The court next determined which survey established the boundary
as a matter of law. Since the State's survey did not reflect changes in
the Canadian River that occurred after the closing of the dam, it did
not represent a present-day survey. The court therefore rejected the
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State's survey. The court instead relied on the Landowners' survey,
which comported with the gradient boundary methodology, to serve as
the correct marker.
In addressing attorney's fees, the court rejected the Landowners'
characterization that the suit was a boundary dispute and a declaratory
judgment action. Instead, the court held the legislative resolution
authorizing the suit did not entitle Landowners' recovery of attorney's
fees. Finally, the court found the Frivolous Claims Act did not apply.
Because the State's defense to the boundary dispute demonstrated an
arguable basis for the claim, the court found it was not frivolous.
M. Elizabeth Lokey

City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that the City of Saginaw cannot claim sovereign immunity to deny
jurisdiction to a claimant pleading an intentional taking and
intentional nuisance by the City's operation of street and storm sewers
resulting in intentional flooding of claimant's property).
An increased volume and velocity of diverted surface water
allegedly caused by the City of Saginaw's ("City") operations resulted
in erosion, destruction, and endangerment to human lives on the
Carter property. The Carters alleged the City caused intentional
flooding of the property by their operation, control, and maintenance
of street and storm sewers. The Carters asserted two claims: (1)
intentional taking under Article I, § 17 of the Texas Constitution; and
(2) intentional nuisance.
The City filed a plea arguing the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the
City's plea. The City brought an interlocutory appeal alleging
erroneous denial.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the plea. A
governmental entity cannot use sovereign immunity to end a suit on
jurisdictional grounds without a showing of fraudulent pleading to
confer jurisdiction by the plaintiff. The City did not show fraudulent
pleading by Carter. The pleading alleged intentional acts and,
therefore, did not lack jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity, as it
would if it were a claim for negligent performance of governmental
functions. The court also reported summary judgment was the proper
avenue if the City believed Carter did not tender sufficient facts to
show intentional acts.
Tiffany Turner
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UTAH
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999)
(holding a notice of appeal must designate the judgment appealed
from and the negligence standard applies to reservoir flooding
situations).
The defendants, Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA") and five
irrigation companies partially owned by IPA, owned appropriation
rights in the Sevier River ("River") and storage rights in the Sevier
Bridge Reservoir ("Reservoir"). These easements gave IPA the right to
store water up to the Reservoirs capacity of eighty feet. The plaintiff,
L. Carl Jensen, owned property adjacent to the Reservoir, portions of
which straddled the Reservoir's eighty foot contour as well as other
portions completely below the eighty foot contour.
In June of 1983 and 1984, the River flowed at an unprecedentedly
high level, flooding portions of Jensen's land. Jensen claimed the
flooding damaged his property along the eighty foot contour by
leaving silt, salt, and alkali deposits as well as damaging fences, roads,
and corrals. In addition, Jensen claimed the flooding hindered his
ability to graze cattle on his land below the eighty foot contour,
causing him injury. In an unrelated claim,Jensen argued his property
and water rights were not subject to IPA's easement.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of IPA
regarding the easement and water rights claims. The court held as a
matter of law that IPA had an easement to store water in the Reservoir,
and thatJensen's land and water rights were subject to that easement.
With respect to the flooding, a jury found that IPA did not act
negligently. Jensen appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah
Supreme Court. On appeal, Jensen challenged: (1) the partial
summary judgment on the easement and water rights claims; (2) the
trial court's use of the negligence standard with regard to the flooding
claims; (3) the admission of statistical evidence; and (4) the proffered
jury instructions.
In addressing Jensen's easement and water rights claims, the court
found that neither of the judgments listed in the notice of appeal dealt
with the partial summary judgment. For these claims, the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure required the notice of appeal to designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof appealed from, whichJensen failed
to provide. Thus, the court held it had no jurisdiction to review
Jensen's easement or water rights arguments.
With respect to the flooding claims, Jensen argued strict liability,
instead of negligence, was the standard to determine liability for
damages caused by the erection of a dam. The court determined the
strict liability standard only applies in situations where flooding occurs
from a person releasing water from a dam into a stream bed knowing
the dam has decreased the stream's natural capacity. The court held
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the negligence standard applies in all other flooding circumstances
unrelated to changes in a river's carrying capacity.
Jensen next argued the trial court erred by admitting statistical
evidence of historical River runoff levels. Jensen contended the trial
court should have excluded the evidence, under Rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, because its prejudicial effect outweighed its
probative value. The court held the probative value of the statement
"that flooding of the 1983's and 1984's magnitude would occur only
once every 200 to 30,000 years" was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. The court supported this holding with the fact that
Jensen had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and establish
the 200 to 30,000 year flood occurred in two consecutive years.
Jensen also argued the trial court should have excluded a
videotape depicting a dam downstream of the Reservoir collapsing as a
result of the 1983 flooding. Jensen claimed the video was irrelevant
because it depicted a flooding area far downstream from Jensen's land.
The court found that IPA introduced the video to support its position
that system wide flooding necessitated considerations of conditions
downstream in the management of the Reservoir. Therefore, the
court upheld the admission of the video as relevant in IPA's defense of
negligence.
Finally, Jensen appealed ajury instruction relating to the authority
of the River Commissioner. The instruction in dispute instructed the
jury to find for the plaintiff if they found IPA had the right or ability to
control the discharge of water from the Reservoir, and the River
Commissioner was IPA's agent. Jensen argued this instruction ignored
the fact that IPA negligence may result even if the commissioner did
not act as IPA's agent. The court held that if the jury instructions,
taken as a whole, instruct jury on the applicable law, then reversible
error does not occur because one instruction, standing alone, is
inaccurate. The jury instructions here considered as a whole, allowed
the jury to find IPA negligent even if the River Commissioner did not
act as IPA's agent. Therefore, the court held the trial court did not err
in instructing the jury on the applicable law.
Ryan 0. Reimers

Workman v. Brighton Properties, Inc., 976 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1999)
(holding a property owners association can levy assessments on a
property owner in accordance with the associations governing
documents even when the expenditure does not benefit the owner's
property).
H. Ross Workman ("Workman") filed suit to prevent Brighton
Properties, Inc. ("Brighton") from levying an assessment for the
development of a water system in Silver Lake Estates Subdivision No. 1
that did not benefit Workman's property in Silver Lake Estates
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Subdivision No. 2.
Silver Lake Estates consisted of two subdivisions, No. 1 and No. 2,
located approximately one mile apart in Big Cottonwood Canyon.
Brighton, a non-profit organization, provided services to lot owners in
Subdivisions No. I and No. 2. The lot owners in Silver Lake Estates
each owned one share of Brighton stock. The same articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and restrictive covenants governed both
subdivisions.
In 1986, Workman and his wife entered into an agreement to
purchase lot three in subdivision No. 2. The warranty deed conveying
the property to Workman subjected the property to covenants,
conditions, rights of way, easements, and reservations of record
enforceable in law or equity. In 1996, Brighton notified Silver Lake
Estates property owners of a $300 assessment to fund a study of
Brighton's water source and distribution system. The sole issue before
the Utah Supreme Court was whether the trial court correctly held
Brighton could levy the $300 assessment against Workman.
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis with the relevant
documents.
It found that Brighton's articles of incorporation
intended the corporation to own water rights and engage in water
development for the benefit of the two subdivisions. In addition, the
bylaws empowered the Board of Trustees to assess each shareholder
necessary amounts to carry out the purposes of the corporation. The
court recognized that Workman's warranty deed subjected his lot to
restrictive covenants, and found the covenants addressed the
relationship between water development and assessments levied on the
two subdivisions in great detail.
The court held the bylaws of a corporation, the articles of
incorporation, the statute under which the corporation was
incorporated, and the members' application constituted a contract
between the member and the corporation. Furthermore, the court
held that recorded restrictive covenants were enforceable against
property owners who purchased property subject to those covenants.
Workman did not dispute his contractual obligations to Brighton,
however, he argued Brighton could only levy an assessment against
him if his lot benefited from the expenditure. The court found that
the aforementioned documents clearly contemplated improvements to
both subdivisions, however, not necessarily at one time. Relying on
precedent, the court held that although a landowner may not benefit
from an assessment, the terms of the governing documents still
required him to pay the full assessment. The court noted that
Workman did not receive an overriding inequity because he had
notice of his obligation to pay assessments, and there was no evidence
the assessment was used to disproportionately benefit one group of lot
owners. Therefore, the court upheld the trial court decision.
Ryan 0. Reimers
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VERMONT
Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. Irish, No. 97-509, 1999 WL
424317 (Vt. June 25, 1999) (holding that without sufficient factual
findings, classifying excavation work as conditional or allowed as
defined in the Vermont Wetland Rules is improper, and application of
conditional penalties are not allowed).
Defendant-appellant Frank Irish ("Irish") owned a twenty-six acre
parcel of land in South Burlington, Vermont ("City"). A wetland that
appeared on Vermont's National Wetland Inventory ("NWI") maps
was located in the middle of Irish's property. In February 1996, the
Irish Development Corporation applied for a permit to build a
subdivision on Irish's property. In March 1996, the City asked the
Agency of Natural Resources ("Agency") to send a wetlands
coordinator to visit the site. On site, the coordinator informed one of
the development corporation's agents that the site included significant
wetlands and required a conditional use determination ("CUD"). The
coordinator also advised the corporation to hire a wetlands consultant.
Later that month, Irish began excavating a drainage ditch on the
site. The ditch caused substantial erosion and discharged silt into a
nearby stream. In April 1996, the same coordinator from the Agency
visited the site in response to a complaint. After this visit, the City and
the Agency sent notice of violation to the Development Corporation.
In May 1997, the Secretary of the Agency found that Irish had failed to
obtain a CUD before beginning excavation of the wetland, causing
discharge into state waters. That same month, the city filed a
complaint claiming Irish violated some of the zoning bylaws. The
City's complaint was consolidated with the administrative order. Irish
requested a hearing with the Environmental Court.
The
Environmental Court found that Irish had committed the violations.
Irish appealed on six assertions.
First, Irish claimed he was not adequately notified about the need
for a CUD. The Environmental Court found that the wetland was
clearly shown on the NWI maps, and the Agency's coordinator notified
the corporation of the need for a CUD in two follow-up letters. Since
these determinations were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court
of Vermont affirmed the lower court's decision that there was
adequate notice.
Second, Irish argued that by law, the Water Resources Board
should have evaluated the site to designate it as a significant, and
therefore protected, wetland. Any wetland designated on a NWI map
was a Class Two wetland, and all Class Two wetlands were considered
significant. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling that
because all Class Two wetlands were significant, there was no need for
the Water Resources Board to review each wetland separately.
Third, Irish noted that under the Vermont Wetlands Rules,
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agricultural land, or any land being prepared to become agricultural
land, was not classified as a wetland. The lower court found that the
site was not currently used for agricultural purposes, but failed to
determine if Irish were preparing the land for agricultural use. The
supreme court reversed the lower court's findings that Irish violated
the Vermont Wetlands Rules and remanded for further factual
findings on the issue.
Fourth, Irish argued there was no conclusive evidence that he
violated Vermont Statutes by discharging without a permit. Irish
argued the discharge was due to the Agency's stop-work order. He
claimed he did not intend the violation, and had he been allowed to
finish the discharge would not have occurred. The lower court found
that the statute did not require intent to violate, and the coordinator
from the Agency observed the discharge a month before the agency
issued the stop-work order. Since the lower court's finding that the
State did not need to prove Irish's intent to violate the statute was not
clearly erroneous, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
decision that Irish violated the statute.
Fifth, Irish claimed that the evidence did not support the findings
of zoning bylaw violations. The bylaws stated that one cannot
qualitatively or quantitatively damage waters and may not excavate
beyond what is necessary for the permitted use. The lower court
found that Irish had damaged surface water and had excavated beyond
necessity, thus violating the statute.
Because the lower court
adequately assessed this issue, the supreme court affirmed.
Finally, Irish argued the penalties were improper. However, the
supreme court agreed that the base fine penalties and the penalty for
avoiding the costs of a wetland consultant were proper. However, the
supreme court recognized that Irish could be liable for civil penalties if
he sold his land for residential development. Thus, if Irish sold his
land for purposes other than agriculture or open space, enhanced
penalties were justified.
At trial, Irish was assessed conditional penalties totaling $34,755.
The lower court reasoned that the penalties should be large because of
the potential for Irish to sell the land at an increased value due to the
violation. The supreme court found that the lower court did not make
the necessary factual findings necessary to justify the penalties. If Irish
were preparing the land for agricultural use, it could not be sold at an
increased value. The supreme court reversed and remanded for the
lower court to determine whether Irish was using his land for an
agricultural purpose, and if he sold his land at an increased value.
Rebekah King
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VIRGINIA
Costello v. Fredrick County Sanitation Auth., No. 97-59, 1999 WL
231720 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 9, 1999) (holding that statute of limitations
period for inverse condemnation begins to run when pumping
damages the adjacent landowner's property, and that where defendant
argues the English Rule applies, a substantial showing that the English
Rule is consistent with the particular needs and requirements of
Virginia as it approaches the twenty-first century is required).
Plaintiff, Costello, owned approximately 105 acres of land in
Frederick County, Virginia.
Defendant, Town of Stephen City
("Stephen City"), owned an adjacent tract of land that containing a
quarry. On June 8, 1992, Stephen City and co-defendant, Fredrick
County Sanitation Authority ("Sanitation Authority"), entered into a
contract permitting Sanitation Authority to pump groundwater from
Stephen City's tract. In January 1994, Sanitation Authority began
pumping approximately two million gallons of water per day from the
Stephen City tract.
Costello alleged that Sanitation Authority's pumping of water
caused the drying up of springs and a stream that crossed property on
Costello's tract. He also alleged the pumping created sinkholes and
related depressions. Costello argued withdrawals of excessive and
unreasonable amounts of subterranean water, diversion of water by
upper riparian owner, breach of contract, nuisance, negligent
withdrawal of lateral and subadjacent support, violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and violation of a corresponding state provision on
inverse condemnation. The court previously overruled defendant's
demurrers, and granted an issue out of chancery. Here, the parties
argued several pretrial issues.
Defendants argued the statute of limitations barred Costello's
claims. The parties agreed a three-year statute of limitations applied
to inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs Bill of Complaint alleged that on
or aboutJanuary 19, 1994 orJanuary 14, 1994 (conflicting dates in the
opinion), the Sanitation Authority began pumping water from the
Stephen City tract. Defendant, citing section 8.01-230 of the Code of
Virginia, argued that the "limitation period shall begin to run...
when the breach of contract or duty occurs in the case of damage to
property and not when the resulting damage is discovered except
where the relief sought is solely equitable ...

."

Defendants alleged

the breach occurred in January 1994, when the first pumping began,
and more than three years passed before Costello filed his action;
therefore, the statute of limitations barred Costello's action.
The court found no Virginia appellate precedent regarding the
statute of limitations on inverse condemnation without immediate and
obvious damage. It held, however, that the statute begins to run when
the pumping damages the adjacent landowner's property. The court
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reasoned that to find otherwise required an adjacent landowner to file
suit within three years from any pumping of groundwater from
adjoining lands in case such pumping caused future damage.
Alternatively, Stephen City argued that the English Rule, not the
American Rule, applied for dealing with legal rights and liabilities of
subterranean water. The English Rule permitted a landowner
unlimited exploitation of the water beneath his land. The American
Rule permitted the owner of surface land to make reasonable use of
subterranean percolating waters, but prohibited unreasonable
withdrawal for sale or distribution for uses not connected with the
beneficial use and enjoyment or ownership of the land. Defendants
argued that pursuant to section 1-10 of the Code of Virginia, the
Common Law of England applied unless overruled by statute or found
repugnant to the principals of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of
the Commonwealth. Therefore, the English Rule was applicable
because the Virginia legislature never modified the English Rule.
The court reviewed the history of section 1-10 and the English
Rule, recognizing that most states rejected the English Rule.
Precedent established that if the question of whether the English or
American Rule would be adopted in Virginia rose again, the court
would address it "de novo." However, the court stated it was too
premature to reach a definitive answer in this action.
The court stated it would require a substantial showing that the
English Rule was consistent with the peculiar needs and requirements
of Virginia as it approaches the twenty-first century. Additionally, the
court provided guidance to counsel in the presentation of their case.
The court noted that prudence dictated the case be tried on the
assumption that the rule requiring the most substantial amount of
evidence would apply. Therefore, the American Rule, requiring proof
of unreasonable amounts of water, methods of extraction, failure to
take remedial steps, and/or sale of water off premises was applicable.
Elaine Soltis

WASHINGTON
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Fitzsimmons, 982 P.2d 1179 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding Department of Ecology action arbitrary and
capricious by failing to object to Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission licensing where project was substantially noncompliant
with state law).
On November 15, 1974, the City of Tacoma applied to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for licensing of the
Cushman Dam Project ("Project"). The proposed project would
balance the designated uses with the public health and safety concerns
of the flood prone Skokomish River. The Skokomish Indian Tribe
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("Tribe") actively participated in the proceedings as an interested
party.
Part of the licensing process required FERC to determine whether
the proposed project comported with the Coastal Zone Management
Program ("CZMP") of the state. The city's licensing application
submitted to FERC included a "consistency certification" stating the
project complied with Washington's CZMP. The federal Coastal Zone
Management Act ("CZMA") required a state or designated agency to
concur or object to this "consistency certification" within six months.
Concurrence is conclusively presumed if the state fails to respond by
the deadline. The Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE") had
until May 30, 1997 to concur or object to the city's 'consistency
certification.'
On May 7, 1997, the DOE issued a letter constituting the agency's
'formal action.' This letter admitted that the proposed project failed
to comply with the requirements of Washington's Coastal Zone
Program. However, citing the already exorbitant amount of time the
project had taken to license, and the likely gridlock an objection
would cause, the agency determined that the purpose of the program
is served better by declining to take any action; therefore, it expressly
declined to object.
FERC issued the license for the project on May 30, 1997. On June
5, 1997, the Tribe filed a petition for review of the agency's May 7"
letter. On May 1, 1998, the district court dismissed the Tribe's petition
for review, holding that even if jurisdiction existed, the case was moot
because the State's opportunity to object had passed with the
expiration of the six-month review period and FERC's issuance of the
license. The Tribe appealed.
On appeal, the DOE argued that because the state court could not
order FERC to rescind the city's license, the court could provide no
'effective relief and, therefore, the Tribe's petition was moot. The
Tribe responded, and the court of appeals agreed, that armed with a
state court judgment, the Tribe could compel FERC to reopen the
Project's application. Reevaluation of the licensing decision required
FERC to consider whether its decision complied with the CZMP.
Upon reconsideration and exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
Tribe could then seek review of the agency's decision in federal court.
Thus, the state court could provide "effective relief' on the Tribe's
petition.
Washington's Shoreline Management Act ("SMA") appointed the
DOE the state's representative in actions involving FERC, and directed
the DOE to take "all reasonable steps necessary" to preserve the
integrity of the state's SMA policies. This court found that DOE's
letter declining to take action under CZM authority constituted, in its
own words, "formal agency action," opening it to the scrutiny of the
court. Taking this action under review, the court held that the DOE's
decision to acquiesce without regard to the acknowledged
noncompliance directly undercut the policies the agency was meant to
preserve and thus, was arbitrary and capricious. The court reversed
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the lower courts decision and remanded with directions to the DOE to
issue a new letter in response to the city's "consistency certification"
which comported with state law and accurately and affirmatively stated
DOE's concurrence or objection to the city's certification.
John B. Ridgley

WISCONSIN
Milam v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 98-1585, 1999 WL
391577 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources properly denied the Milams' request for the
water quality certification necessary to fill a wetland on their property
in order to construct residential housing).
James and Herminia Milam owned seventeen lots on which they
wanted to construct a subdivision. Three of the lots contained a
wetland totaling three-quarters of an acre. The Milams applied to the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") for a water
quality certification to fill the wetland. According to the Wisconsin
Code, the DNR must consider practicable alternatives to the proposed
property use, which will not adversely affect the wetland or create
significant adverse impacts. The DNR's wetland/water management
specialist denied the application because a practicable alternative to
filling the wetland existed and filling would cause adverse impacts.
The specialist proposed combining four lots into two larger lots and
building homes on the upper portions of the two plots that did not
encompass the wetland area. This created fifteen residential units, as
opposed to the original seventeen. The Milams requested a contested
case hearing before an administrative lawjudge ("ALJ").
The ALJ found the DNR properly denied the Milams' request for
the water quality certification. The ALJ held the Milams had not
demonstrated the absence of practicable alternatives and the filling of
the wetland would result in detrimental impacts to its functional
values. The circuit court affirmed the decision.
The issue before the appellate court was whether substantial
evidence supported the ALJ's determination. The court of appeals
reviewed only the decision of the ALJ, not that of the circuit court. The
ALJ determined a practicable alternative to filling the wetland existed.
The court stated that a practicable alternative included one which
considered cost, available technology, and logistics in light of the
overall project purposes. The ALJ determined that fifteen of the lots
contained developable land for the purpose of residential
development. Clearly, the alternative allowed the construction of
houses on the residential lots with only two less than the Milams'
original plan. The court also found substantial evidence supporting
the ALJ's environmental impact determination because the specialist

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

testified to an adverse result and the Milams did not contest it. Since
the Milams' did not demonstrate the absence of either a practicable
alternative or adverse environmental impact from their proposal to fill
the wetland, the ALJ and the circuit court came to the correct
determination.
Kristen L. Cassisa

WYOMING
Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that the one
who holds the water right also owns the ditch in which the water
flowed to the irrigated land).
The water right conveyed to the Rennards ran through a ditch on
the Vollmars' property before reaching the Rennards' irrigated land.
The Vollmars' property did not consist of any irrigated land. The two
adjoining properties once existed as one, and subsequent transactions
divided them into individual parcels.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Vollmars on the issue of a prescriptive easement. It held that the
Rennards failed to prove the necessary elements of law for a claim
under implied easements, and that the rule from Frank v. Hicks did not
apply.
The issue on appeal was the applicability of the Frank rule. The
rule states that "a right to the use of water for the irrigation of land,
together with the ditch making such right available, becomes.., so
attached to the land irrigated as to pass by a conveyance of the land
without mentioning the water right .... " The Supreme Court of
Wyoming reversed the district court's order and remanded with
directions thatjudgment on this issue be entered for the Rennards.
The Rennards asserted that the court adopted the Frank rule in
1893. Thus, the ditch conveying the water right attached to the
irrigated land. The Vollmars argued that the owners conveying the
land to the Rennards did not intend to create a ditch easement across
the Vollmars' non-irrigated parcel, and that the prior use of the ditch
had always been permissive. They contended that no implied or
prescriptive easement existed.
The court held that Frank stated the applicable rule. It went on to
analyze the rule as applied in Frank and the instant case. Thus,
"whoever grants a thing grants, by implication, that which is necessary
to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the thing granted." Since the
water right would be useless without the ditch conveying the water, the
parties intended that the water right and the ditch for the water right
were to become part and parcel of the irrigated land when they
divided the once unified parcel.
Melody Divine
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Scott v. McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966 (Wyo. 1999) (holding no
abandonment exists where an appropriator's nonuse was involuntary
when circumstances beyond his control prevented his water use).
The Scotts owned property adjacent to the McTiernan property in
Sheridan County. The two properties were previously owned in
common. The prior owner developed an intricate ditch irrigation
network to utilize his water rights on the entirety of his property. As a
result of partitioning the property, Scott's irrigation water was
conveyed through ditches across McTiernan's land.
The Scotts irrigated two parcels of property with water from the
John Ross Appropriation with a priority date of May 1883, number
three priority on Smith Creek. The adjudicated point of diversion for
the John Ross Appropriation from Smith Creek was Ross No. 1 Ditch.
The Scotts' did not divert irrigation water for these two parcels
through Ross No. 1 Ditch, but through the prior owner's network of
multiple points of diversion, crossing McTiernan's land. The Scotts
also asserted a right to irrigate their Shallcross property with water
from the John Ross Appropriation.
McTiernan deliberately shut down the ditches running to the Scott
property in 1991. McTiernan's ranch manager and another employee
assured the Scotts that the ditches would be replaced. On August 29,
1996, McTiernan petitioned the Board of Control of the State of
Wyoming ("Board") for a declaration of abandonment by the Scotts of
their water right, claiming that the Scotts' failed to beneficially use
their John Ross Appropriation right in the preceding five years. The
Scotts filed a petition for the declaration of abandonment of several
McTiernan rights. The Board consolidated the petitions in a single
abandonment hearing.
On January 5, 1998, the Board ruled that part of the John Ross
Appropriation was abandoned and reduced the Scotts' appropriation
from 1.78 c.f.s. for the irrigation of 125 acres to .46 c.f.s. for the
irrigation of thirty-two acres. This measurement reflected the Scotts'
irrigation practices during the previous five years. The Scotts appealed
this decision, and the district court certified the case to the Wyoming
Supreme Court. McTiernan did not appeal the Board's abandonment
determination regarding his property.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the Board's decision with
deference. Wyoming statute obligated the Board to make its factual
findings on all of the material issues upon which its conclusions were
based. The court reversed the Board's determination that the Scotts
had abandoned their John Ross Appropriation water right. It decided
the Board's finding of fact regarding the Scotts' Shallcross property
irrigation water was inadequate and remanded this issue for further
determination and additional fact finding. The court affirmed that
the John Ross Appropriation did not apply to 10.1 acres south of Smith
Creek. The Board's determination was supported by substantial
evidence that the lay of the land prevented irrigating this acreage from
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the Ross No. 1 ditch because the ditch was located on the opposite
bank. The 10.1 acres was irrigated instead with water from the Morrill
Ditch.
Abandonment under Wyoming statute exists where the holder of
an appropriation fails either intentionally or unintentionally to use the
water for a beneficial purpose during any successive five year period.
The Board, following the legislature's language determined that even
if unintentional, the Scotts' failure to use their Smith Creek right
during the preceding five years triggered an abandonment of that
right. The court distinguished this language and determined that a
right could not be abandoned involuntarily, when caused by
circumstances not under the appropriator's control. The court found
intent to abandon is not required. Thus, because the Scotts' failure to
use their water right was the direct result of McTiernan's flow
prevention practices, the Scotts did not abandon their water right.
The Board's record of decision was inadequate to determine the
Scotts' irrigation practices on their Shallcross property. The Board
decided that the Scotts' had irrigated only 14.1 acres of this property
during the preceding five years. The court found the Board's
argument for its decision was ajustification made in hindsight, and the
Board's calculations flawed regarding the Shallcross property. Thus,
the court remanded this portion of the Board's decision for
reconsideration and additional fact finding.
Finally, the court upheld the Board's determination that 15.5 acres
of the Scott property were historically and were irrigated currently
through the Morrill Ditch. The court determined that 10.1 acres
irrigated under this permit were not included in the John Ross
Appropriation blanket land description, covering 160 acres.
The original description of the John Ross Appropriation included
the Scotts' 10.1 acres and provided water sufficient to irrigate 125
acres. In 1929, a previous common owner of the Scott and McTiernan
properties received a permit to irrigate 98.1 acres from the Morrill
Ditch that included the 10.1 acres at issue. Thus, both the blanket
John Ross Appropriation land description and the Morrill
Appropriation permit included the 10.1 acres. The court deferred to
the Board's authority to define and quantify water rights, as the scope
of the original adjudication documents was unclear. The Board's
decision reflected its finding that the 10.1 acres at issue were located
on the opposite bank of Smith Creek from the Ross No. 1 ditch, the
supply of the Scotts' asserted irrigation rights. The court affirmed the
Board's determination that the 10.1 acres were not a part of the John
Ross Appropriation.
Chip Cutler

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FROM COORS BREWING COMPANY ("COORS") FOR AN
AMENDED APPLICATION: (X) FOR SEXENNIAL FINDING OF REASONABLE
DILIGENCE FOR CONDITIONAL RIGHT OF EXCHANGE, IN JEFFERSON

COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 99CW062 (89CW234) (Water Division
1, June 1999). Applicant: Coors Brewing Company ("Coors") (Attys.
Jack F. Ross, Esq. and Joanne Herlihy, Esq., Dufford & Brown, P.C.)
1. Application
Coors Brewing Company ("Coors") seeks a finding of reasonable
diligence on a conditional right of exchange. In Water Court Case No.
89CW234, the court decreed the exchange on April 30, 1993. Many
objectors filed letters of opposition at that time.
The location of Coors' exchange reach lies between the headgate
of the Farmers High Line canal which diverts from Clear Creek on the
north bank of Clear Creek in the NW/4 of the SW/4 of Section 27,
Township 3 South, Range 70 West, of the 6th P.M. This is only a short
distance below the Ford Street Bridge across Clear Creek in the City of
Golden, Jefferson County, Colorado. It is approximately 950 feet East
and 1,500 feet North of the Southwest corner of said section and
Coors' easternmost reservoir of the Jefferson Storage System, being
Prospect Park Lake, located in the W1/2 Section 21, Township 3
South, Range 69 West of the 6th P.M.
Clear Creek is the source of the water at issue. Coors can store or
divert this water right as it was changed by Decree in Case No.
89CW234. The original appropriation date for this water is December
29, 1989. The amount of water currently at issue is up to 13.2 c.f.s. for
an annual volume of up to 1,500 acre-feet. This water may be used for
all the purposes for which water may lawfully be used through the
structures to which the exchanges are made.
Coors has been engaged in the use, construction, and completion
of the diversion facilities and water rights involved. Coors has also
been involved in the legal defenses and protection of these water
rights. It has continued in the planning, designing, and exploration of
the physical and business problems associated with the construction
and use of the diversion facilities and water rights involved through
the following activities: (1) installation of new pumps; (2) metering;
(3) continual operation of water systems; (4) storage and beneficial
use of the water; (5) regular inspection of the reservoirs; (6)
construction of a lake; (7) installation of aeration systems; (8)
maintenance; (9) entering into a gravel lease; (10) completion of a
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separate case focused on continuing the development and protection
of the water rights; (11) objections in numerous cases to protect the
water rights from injury; (12) spending approximately $2,000,000
during the due diligence period in continuing to develop the system;
and (13) completing the transfer of a gravel mining lease.
The Original Application for Diligence did not include specific
identification, including a full legal description, of the structures
involved in the exchange. Coors then filed this Amended Application
which includes detailed legal descriptions of the structures including
Farmers High Line, the Wannamaker Ditch, the Agricultural Ditch,
numerous Coors' Underground Springs, and Jefferson Storage System
reservoirs and lakes.
Coors also filed a Motion for Determination that republication is
unnecessary pursuant to Water Court Rule 4(c). This Rule states that
the court may determine it unnecessary to republish Applicant's
Amended Application for Diligence if it decides that it will cause no
injury. Water Court Rule 7 sets forth seven enumerated instances
when the republication of an Application or an amendment thereto is
required: (1) a change of over 200 feet in structure location; (2) a
change casing the well to come within 600 feet of an existing decreed
well; (3) a change or moving of a structure to a different quarter
section; (4) an increase in amount of use or addition of type of use;
(5) a request for an earlier date of appropriation; (6) a change in the
source of water; or (7) any other change not specifically described that
the court deems material.
Coors argues that amending the Application to include specific
identification, including full legal descriptions of the structures
involved in the exchange, is not one of the instances that requires
republication. First, Coors argues that republication is unnecessary
because the Application for Diligence is only to prove that the
applicant has been diligent in seeking to place the conditional water
right already decreed to beneficial use. Second, Coors argues that the
court should not deem this Amended Application a material change
because all interested parties have reasonable inquiry notice.
Colorado law requires no more than inquiry notice. The Original
Application was sufficient to inform or put any interested party on
inquiry of the nature, scope, and impact of the proposed application.
The Original Application included detailed descriptions of the
diligence conducted on various components of the structures involved
in the exchange; therefore, an interested party had sufficient notice of
the involvement of those structures. The attorneys ask that the court
find that Coors has made a showing that no person will be injured as a
result of not publishing the Amended Application and asks that the
court make a determination that republication of the Amended
Application is unnecessary.
On August 16, 1999, a consultation was held with the Office of the
State Engineer. At this time, the Division Engineer could not
recommend approval of the application. It requested that Coors
provide the court with proof that the work claimed for diligence was
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toward the completion of this water right and occurred in this
diligence period. No action has been taken on either the motion or
the consultation disapproval.
2. Opposition
No letters of opposition were filed
Application.

against the Amended
Melinda B. Barton

WATER COURT DIVISION 2
APPLICATION

NONTRIBUTARY

FOR

UNDERGROUND

WATER

RIGHTS

SOURCES AND FOR APPROVAL OF A PLAN

FROM

FOR

AUGMENTATION FOR REPLACEMENT OF EVAPORATION OF IMPOUNDED

SURFACE WATER, EL PASO COUNTY, COLORADO.

Case No. 99CW109

(Water Division 2, Sept. 1999). Applicant: Gene and Diane Melssen
(Atty. Robert E. Schween).
1. Application
Gene and Diane Melssen ("Applicant") seek to adjudicate,
quantify, and vest the groundwater rights in Denver, Arapahoe, and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers underlying their property and to
adjudicate a plan for augmentation for replacement of evaporative
losses for the pond on their property.
The location of wells is unknown and depends upon build-out
configurations not yet determined. The location of the wells, which
will withdraw groundwater from the nontributary Denver, Arapahoe,
and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers, is part of the Applicant's overlying
property. The overlying land area consists of 10.2 acres, more or less,
located in the SE of the NE 'A, Section 9, T.11 S., R.67 W of the 6th
P.M., El Paso County, Colorado. The location of the pond is the
central part of the Melssens' property. The pond is approximately 12
feet deep at its deepest point. The groundwater in the Denver,
Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers is nontributary
groundwater as defined in Colorado Revised Statute section 37-90103(10.5). The water impounded in the pond is a combination of
groundwater and tailwater from irrigation and surface run-off water.
The Melssens' nontributary groundwater may also fill the pond. The
Melssens will withdraw the subject groundwater through wells located
anywhere on their property. They seek confirmation of the absolute
right to withdraw all of the legally available groundwater in the
claimed aquifers lying below their property.
The Melssens' propose to use all water withdrawn from the
aquifers in a water system and after use lease, sell, or otherwise dispose
of the water for the following beneficial purposes: domestic, industrial,
commercial, irrigation, livestock watering, recreational, fish and
wildlife, and fire protection. They will use the water for immediate
application, both on and off the property, for storage and subsequent
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application, exchange purposes, replacement of depletions resulting
from the use of the water from other sources, and augmentation
purposes.
The Melssens seek approval of a plan for augmentation for the
replacement of evaporative losses of groundwater, tailwater, and other
surface run-off exposed to the atmosphere while impounded in their
pond. The exposed surface area of the pond is approximately
acre.
The evaporation factor at this location and altitude is 2.0 acre-feet per
acre of exposed water. Therefore, the total evaporative losses
augmented calculate out to one acre-foot per year. The Melssens plan
to use the nontributary Denver aquifer groundwater as their primary
in-facility supply source. They estimate that the return flows from the
use of Denver aquifer groundwater are sufficient to replace actual
evaporative losses incurred by the impoundment of water in the pond.
The Melssens plan to replace the remaining amount of evaporative
losses by direct discharge of nontributary groundwater into the pond.
The Melssens claim that the water is legally available for withdrawal
by the wells proposed. Also, they state that the withdrawal of the
Denver, Arapahoe, Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer and plan for
augmentation still protect vested or conditionally decreed water rights
of others. Finally, the plan for augmentation of evaporative losses
from the pond using return flows or discharges of nontributary Denver
aquifer groundwater is adequate to prevent injury to other vested and
decreed conditional water rights. Therefore, the Melssens request
their water right be a final water right.
2. Opposition
Objecting are: the Town of Palmer Lake, City of Colorado Springs,
Harold D. Simpson, and StevenJ. Witte.
Objectors claim the proposed change in use and plan for
augmentation may adversely affect the vested and conditionally
decreed rights of water users in Colorado Springs and Palmer Lake.
They seek to hold the Melssens to a standard of strict proof to show
ownership or entitlement to use the water rights claimed in the
application.
Objectors claim all groundwater in the Denver, Arapahoe, and
Laramie-Fox Hills Aquifers underlying the property named in the
application has been decreed to Palmer Lake; therefore, there is no
water available to the Melssens. Objectors request that if there is any
groundwater available, the Melssens must be held to a showing of strict
proof with respect to each element of their claim to the groundwater.
Objectors also request the Melssens be held to a showing of strict proof
with respect to each element of their claim for approval of their plans
for augmentation.
Additional objections stem from the lack of specificity in the
Melssens' application. The opposition asks that if the Melssens are
claiming to use the aquifers and groundwater for augmentation,
appropriate terms and conditions to address administration,
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accounting, and identification of the water rights must be included in
the application to prevent injury to the water users of Colorado
Springs.
Sheela Parameswar
WATER COURT DIISION 3
APPLICATION

FOR APPROVAL

OF PLAN FOR

AUGMENTATION,

IN

COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO. Case No. 99CW8 (Water Division 3,
March 15, 1999) Applicant: Evan L. Melby, Inc. (Atty. Erich
Schwiesow, Esq., Lester, Sigmond & Rooney).
1. Application
Evan L. Melby, Inc. ("Melby") seeks augmentation of Melby Ranch
Well No. 2. Melby seeks to use the 125 shares it owns or controls in
the Sanchez Ditch and Reservoir Company for augmentation. These
rights produce an average historic yield of roughly eight inches, or
two-thirds of an acre-foot per share.
Melby owns approximately 10,000 acres of land on Wild Horse
Mesa. This plan will allow Melby to utilize a well to be located in the
NE/4 of the NW/4 of Section 35, Township 2 North, Range 72 West,
6th P.M. to supply up to 750 new homes on Wild Horse Mesa with
domestic water. In the alternative, individual homeowners on more
than thirty-five acres may construct individual wells, which are
presumed exempt under Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-602.
Melby expects consumptive uses to equal 39.3 acre-feet per year and
the total diversions to the development to be 158.18 acre-feet per year.
The water source is an unconfined aquifer below Wild Horse Mesa.
In the case of individual wells, each landowner would have the
responsibility to construct the well and the augmentation plan would
augment the rights of senior vested rights if these wells were located in
a designated groundwater basin. Dedicating the 125 shares to
recharge would compensate any depletions to this aquifer and alleviate
any injury to senior vested water rights.
2. Opposition
The Sanchez Ditch & Reservoir Company ("Company") and
Harold D. Simpson have filed statements of opposition to the
application.
The Company claims that its Bylaws prohibit water delivery from
the Sanchez Reservoir from October 1 through the next irrigation
season. Even if not disallowed by the Bylaws, the Company claims that
it cannot provide a continuous water supply during non-irrigation
season because another user has first priority. In addition, the
Company's Articles of Incorporation provide that all the waters the
Company diverts and stores must be used for land irrigation and
domestic use. As of March 3, 1999, a Bylaw amendment provides that
the water may only be used for irrigation and associated agricultural
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purposes. The water associated with Melby's certificate also authorizes
irrigation of different land. Melby must initiate a change in the place
of use of this water by first making a request to the Board of Directors.
Even if the Company approved the change in use of the shares and
the Company's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws do not prohibit
Melby's plan, the Company states that along with any terms or
conditions the Company imposes, the court must impose several other
requirements on Melby. According to the Company, Melby must pay
all assessments levied on its Company shares and the court must hold
him to strict proof of actual legal and physical availability of the water
needed for augmentation. Melby must also show that it has the legal
and physical ability to guarantee availability of the augmentation water
with adequate time, place, quality, and quantity. Melby must also meet
the requirements normally put on senior appropriations for quality,
quantity, and continuity.
The Company believes that the proposed development will injure
the quality of water available to it. Melby must also be placed on strict
proof for out-of-priority diversions and depletions caused by its
exercise of water rights. Melby must also ensure that it makes
depletions, diversions, and return flows in the historical season,
volume, and place. The court must put provisions in place to protect
other users' vested and decreed conditional water rights.
The
Company also asserts that the application lacks sufficient information.
Harold D. Simpson's ("Simpson") opposition asserts that Melby's
application does not contain sufficient information to understand the
full ramifications of the proposal. It does not adequately address the
timing of depletions in order to protect vested water rights. Simpson
urges that the court hold Melby to strict proof of both the details and
patterns of historical consumptive use and the method of recharge to
the Sanchez Ditch. Melby must also prove that the augmentation plan
sufficiently covers all proposed uses and replace depletions in time,
place, and amount.
Shana Smilovits
WATER COURT DIVISION 5
APPLICATION FOR ABSOLUTE WATER RIGHTS AND FOR APPROVAL OF
PLAN OF AUGMENTATION IN EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO.

Case No.

99CW90 (Water Division 5,June 1999). Applicant: Vail Associates, Inc.
(Atty. Glenn E. Porzak).
1. Application

Vail Associates, Inc. ("Vail") seeks an absolute decree of 6.7 cubic
feet per second from Beaver Creek, which feeds into the Eagle River.
Vail seeks the water for the beneficial uses of snowmaking, recreation,
domestic, commercial, and irrigation. Vail initiated its water right on
November 1, 1992, by diverting from an existing structure called the
Beaver Creek Diversion. Vail located the diversion at Arrowhead and
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Bachelor Gulch Ski Resorts.
In case number 94CW303, Vail seeks the additional point of
diversion to transport out-of-priority water to refill the Beaver Creek
Snowmaking Reservoir No. 1 ("Reservoir"), which has a decreed right
of 130 acre feet absolute. Vail augments the Reservoir pursuant to its
conditional decree granted in previous cases.
The decreed sources include the Eagle River and the Black Lakes,
which originate from Black Gore Creek. In case number W-4003, the
water court decreed 491.6 acre feet from the Black Lakes Diversion on
Black Gore Creek for domestic, municipal, irrigation, commercial,
piscatorial, industrial, and recreational uses. This decree obtained a
priority date of December 29, 1978. Vail also leased water from Eagle
River Water and Sanitation District to maintain instream flows for
Gore Creek.
Additionally, snowmaking return flows from Arrowhead and
Beaver Creek Ski Areas constitute augmentation sources. Pursuant to
Case Nos. 88CW456, 89CW201, and 89CW296, Vail diverts 1,754 acre
feet per year from the Eagle River for snowmaking.
In case number 94CW303, the water court determined that eighty
percent of the diversions' water returns to the Eagle River during the
spring snowmelt. Further, Vail obtained credit for 1,400 acre-feet of
the return flows. Last, Vail obtained the right to utilize these return
flows to augment out of priority diversions to the Reservoir.
2. Opposition
The cities of Colorado Springs and Aurora, through the
Homestake Project ("Project"), object to Vail's application for
perfected water rights. The Project owns conditional rights in Water
Division 5 and fears that Vail's junior water rights could injure its
conditional rights.
To protect these rights, the Project seeks
conditions to Vail's water rights.
Additionally, the Project claims that Vail's application contains
insufficient information. Thus, it seeks to reserve the right to state
additional objections when the information becomes available.
Additionally, the Project seeks permission to amend or supplement the
application, thus preventing the filing of separate statements of
opposition.
Likewise, the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") also
filed a statement of opposition claiming Vail's application remains
factually insufficient. The CWCB fears that Vail's rights may injure its
instream flow rights, which preserve the natural flow of Beaver Creek.
The agency argues that Vail's plan for augmentation may not replace
depletions at a time, place, or amount sufficient to maintain the
instream flow decreed in case number 75W2719.
Madoline Wallace

